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I. lNTRODUCTION 
Choice of law is a mess. That much has become a truism. It is a 
"dismal swamp,"1 a morass of confusion, a body of doctrine "killed 
by a realism intended to save it,"2 and now "universally said to be a 
disaster."3 One way to demonstrate its tribulations would be to 
look at the academic dissensus and the hopelessly underdetermina­
tive Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 4 Another would be 
to examine the Supreme Court's abdication of the task of articulat­
ing constitutional constraints on state choice-of-law rules.5 This ar­
ticle will do both. At the outset, though, I want to suggest that one 
need look no further than the nomenclature of the subject. I do not 
mean the arcane terminology - depec;age, renvoi, retorsion, false 
conflicts, comparative impairment, and unprovided-for cases -
that falls liltingly from the tongues of conflicts scholars and crushes 
listeners into bemusement or horror. I claim instead that the con­
ceptual difficulties of this field can be discerned at the broadest 
level of generality, in the dual names of the subject itself: "Choice 
of Law" and "Conflict of Laws."6 
1. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REv. 959, 971 (1953). 
2. Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1403, 1407 (1996). 
3. William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 Mo. L. REv. 1371, 1371 
(1997). 
4. See infra section II.D. 
5. See infra section VI.A. 
6. Joseph Beale, whose theory of vested rights was received wisdom for the first half of 
the twentieth century, considered the question of nomenclature sufficiently important to 
merit five sections of his treatise. See 1 JosEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLicr 
OF LAWS §§ 1.15-1.19 (1935). Beale admitted that "conflict of laws" was not "exactly accu­
rate" and co=ented that '"[t]he only conflict is among the legal authors who are doing this 
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The mere existence of multiple monikers should not surprise. 
Areas of legal study often go by more than one name. The class 
called "Federal Jurisdiction" at one law school might be "Federal 
Courts" at another; the same is true for "Corporations" and "Busi­
ness Organizations." Sometimes these names are synonyms; other 
times the relation is obvious enough to need no explanation. Fed­
eral courts exercise federal jurisdiction, and the study of one is the 
study of the other. Conflicts nomenclature is less transparent. An 
ordinary speaker of English might be puzzled to learn that "Choice 
of Law" and "Conflict of Laws" denote the same area. When laws 
conflict, one might think, the question is not which law should be 
chosen but rather which law prevails.7 
Legal training teaches us otherwise. When laws conflict, we 
learn, courts decide which law to apply. There is almost never a 
unique "right" answer to the question. More precisely, there is no 
right answer that can be articulated without adopting what Lea 
Brilmayer calls the "internal perspective":8 the perspective of a 
particular forum state. From the subjective perspective of a partic­
ular forum, there may be a determinate answer, given by the 
choice-of-law rules of that state. But different states will give differ­
ent answers about the same set of facts. If a case has contacts with 
a number of different jurisdictions, each may apply its own law if 
the case comes to its courts.9 Thus the answer to the question 
"what law governs this case?"10 will often vary depending on the 
forum in which the suit is brought. 
This result may seem natural if we suppose that choice-of-law 
rules simply compose part of a state's substantive law.11 Substan-
work.'" He continued, '"[y]et since the expression is consecrated by good use and is simple 
we may well make use of it.'" Id. § 1.19 (quoting CoMTE DE VAREILLES-SoMMii!RES, LA 
S�E DU DRorr INTERNATIONAL Pruv:E. xviii (1897)). Interestingly, Beale also mentions 
Eduardo Cimbali, who argued that the "false designation of the subject" had led scholars 
astray. Id. (citing EDUARDO CIMBALI, DI UNA NuovA CATEGRICA DI CoNFLITTI DE LEGGE 
(1892)). 
7. For precisely this reason Eugene Scoles and Peter Hay find fault with the phrase "Con­
flict of Laws," arguing that because forum choice-of-law rules will select a governing law, 
there is no conflict between laws. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 1.1 (2d ed. 1992). 
8. See LEA BRILMAYER, CoNFLicr OF LAws 1 (2d ed. 1995) (emphasis omitted). 
9. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
10. One of my claims is that this is a counterproductive way of framing the question. See 
infra section IV.B. In fact, I will be changing a fair amount of what I find to be misleading 
terminology. At the moment, though, I am simply discussing the current understanding of 
conflicts. 
11. See Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal 
Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1099 (1956) 
(stating that the task of courts always "involves a choice of law"). Beale also held the posi-
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tive law differs from state to state, and states will reach different 
answers about the legal consequences of the same facts. Thus it is 
not surprising that a constellation of facts entitling the victim of a 
car accident to recover under the tort law of a state employing a 
negligence standard will not allow recovery under the gross negli­
gence standard of another state. Similarly, one might think, it is not 
surprising that one state might conclude that the appropriate law is 
the law of the state where the accident took place, while another 
might look to the law of the victim's domicile.12 
This inconsistency arises from, essentially, Brilmayer's "internal 
perspective." One of the major goals of this article is to suggest 
that this way of viewing the choice-of-law problem is mistaken -
not because the alternative that Brilmayer mentions, the "external 
perspective," is correct,13 but because the dichotomy itself is false 
and the internal perspective fails on its own terms. In fact, I will 
argue, conceiving of choice-of-law rules as substantive domestic law 
does not legitimize the variance of results across forums. It merely 
masks the illegitimacy, hiding the conflict between laws behind the 
veil of choice of law, and the veil does not stand up to analysis. 
To start seeing this, take a step back. Return to the purely do­
mestic context and imagine a plaintiff who comes to court alleging 
that a wrong has been committed against him. He claims that some 
tion that choice-of-law rules were part of forum law; in fact, it is a necessary consequence of 
his principle that law can operate only within a state. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 5.4, at 53 
("Conflict of Laws is part of the law of the forum. It is quite obvious that since the only law 
that can be applicable in a state is the law of that state, no law of a foreign state can have 
there the force of law .... The foreign law is a fact in the transaction."). Of course, he did not 
conclude that variance was therefore permissible; he found general organizing principles in 
the nature of law. Id. § 4.12, at 46. 
I think there is something different about choice-of-law rules, though it turns out to be 
essentially that they are so much a matter of federal concern as to be subject to severe consti­
tutional strictures. (On my account, not the Supreme Court's. See infra Part V.) 
12. In fact, variance between forums is more likely to take the form of each forum's 
looking to its own law. This tendency, which Michael Green calls "lexforism," is the deeply 
troubling aspect of disuniformity. See Michael S. Green, Note, Legal Realism, Lex Fori, and 
the Choice-of-Law Revolution, 104 YALE LJ. 967, 967 (1995). 
13. The external perspective supposes that choice-of-law rules are uniquely determined 
by objective principles external to any state's law and hence that each forum must reach the 
same conclusion. See BRILMA YER, supra note 8, at 1. The theoretical approach that I advo­
cate will destroy the dichotomy. The Constitution is, in an interesting way, both internal and 
external. It is internal in that, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, it is part of the local law of 
each state. See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876). It is external in that it 
imposes rules state law cannot change - again, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. See, e.g., 
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988). And what I will suggest is that the Constitution 
dictates a mixed perspective - both internal and external. It does not require consistency 
across states, so that each state must adopt the same rules (the fully external perspective). 
Rather, it requires a sort of consistency within states, a lesser degree of freedom than that 
recognized by the internal perspective. This will surely seem cryptic, but a full explanation 
must await some ground-laying. 
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law - here, let us assume local tort law - gives him a right to 
relief. The court may disagree with this claim. It may be that the 
law gives him no right on these facts, or that the law provides the 
defendant with a defense that precludes liability. Either of these 
determinations is an appropriate judicial decision. But what if the 
court simply refuses to consider his tort claim because, it says, con­
tract law governs the case? This should seem odd.14 The plaintiff 
has asserted a right, and surely the court must either recognize that 
right or refuse to recognize it. Either he has stated a claim or he 
has not. To avoid this dichotomy by invoking a different law seems 
at best an oblique rejection of the plaintiff's claim, at worst a deci­
sion based on something other than whether he has an enforceable 
right.15 It seems, in short, that the court has made a choice, not 
resolved a conflict.16 
The substitution of choice for conflict, I will argue, is the funda­
mental error of conflicts jurisprudence.17 It is an attempt to avoid 
difficult questions that succeeds only in resolving them sub rosa, 
and poorly. Conflicts between rights are a common feature of law­
suits, and in most circumstances, the legal system deals with them as 
conflicts: courts look to rules specifying which right shall prevail, 
14. I am not objecting to the idea that a court may tell a plaintiff that, although he cannot 
recover in tort, he may recover in contract. Cf. BRAINERD CuruuE, Conflict, Crisis and Con­
fusion in New York, in SELECTED EssAYS ON TiiE CONFLICT OF LAWS 690, 693-94 (1963) 
[hereinafter SELECTED EssAYs] {labeling as "anachronistic" criticizing a court for "tell[ing] a 
litigant that though he cannot recover in contract he may in tort"). The problem I am con­
cerned with arises when the plaintiff pleads in tort and the court refuses to evaluate the tort 
claim. 
15. Courts do not ordinarily apply law not invoked by the parties. Affirmative defenses, 
for example, are waived if not raised at the proper stage. If the court refuses to honor the 
law the plaintiff pleads, I will suggest, it must be because that law is legally unavailable. And 
that means either that some other law operates to interfere with it, or that the law the plain­
tiff invokes grants him no rights. 
16. Of course, choosing one law effectively resolves the conflict between them: it awards 
victory to the chosen law. But it does so, we will see, without a consideration of the factors 
that should govern a resolution of the conflict. Identifying these factors is, of course, a diffi­
cult task. Common policy considerations include predictability, discouragement of forum 
shopping, and the rather amorphous goal of fairness to litigants. These are certainly values 
that a system for resolving conflicts between sovereigns should seek to promote. My pre­
scriptions, when they come, will indeed seek to promote them. But they will not rest simply 
on those values; instead, ip.ey will be drawn from another body of law aimed chiefly at meld­
ing the several states into a federal union: the Constitution. Without the constraints I iden­
tify, states may succumb to the temptation to promote forum interests, slighting the concerns 
of other states. Within the constraints, states may do many things to promote the canonical 
conflicts values. But interstate discrimination needs to be addressed first; at this moment in 
our conflicts jurisprudence, it is the primary evil and the chief distraction from sound con­
flicts rules. 
17. Consequently, I will refer to the subject as "conflicts," and continue to refer to 
"choice-of-law rules" where appropriate. My ultimate suggestion is that things will be clearer 
if we eliminate the idea of "choosing" a "governing" law, but that is a different stage of the 
rocket and must drop away later. 
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and then express their conclusions in such terms.18 In cases where 
the conflicting rights originate from different states, however, a dif­
ferent description is employed. Courts speak not of deciding which 
right prevails but of choosing which law applies to the case. This 
resort to choice-of-law rhetoric is peculiar for two reasons. First, it 
is unnecessary. Multistate cases can be described and resolved per­
fectly easily within the vocabulary of conflicts.19 Second, it is de­
scriptively inaccurate. Interest analysis (the choice-of-law 
methodology I will consider in the greatest detail) simply does not 
select the law that applies to a case.20 The rhetoric of choice per­
sists in part as a conceptual hangover from the early days of con­
flicts theory,21 but it also continues to allure because it makes less 
apparent the conflicts that have proven too hard to resolve.22 In­
deed, the Supreme Court swiftly backed away from its initial bold 
interventions into state conflicts practices; more recently it seems to 
have given up entirely.23 Consequently, there is a temptation to 
deny problems we cannot solve, by framing the issue as one of 
choice. 
This article aims to show that things are not as bad as all that. 
Interstate conflicts are a chief concern of the Constitution, and the 
Constitution will allow us to deal with them. Conflicts theory has 
failed to locate external constraints on state law and has actually 
urged states to adopt regimes that are blatantly discriminatory -
regimes that, if not explained by parochialism, are in fact self­
contradictory.24 Judicious use of garden-variety antidiscrimination 
principles embedded in the Full Faith and Credit and the Privileges 
and Immunities Clauses will prevent such favoritism. These consti­
tutional principles do not resolve conflicts by their own force -
18. See infra section IV.B. 
19. See infra section ID.C.2. 
20. See infra section IV.C. 
21. The territorial approach to conflicts, discussed below, did in fact work by identifying 
the law that governed a transaction. Interest analysis retained this vocabulary, even though 
the description no longer fit the operation of the theory. See infra section IV.C. 
22. When a state finds foreign law inapplicable, it may seem not to have rejected foreign 
rights. See CuruuE, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, in SELECTED 
EssAYs, supra note 14, at 177, 181-82. Effectively, of course, it has done so, and perhaps few 
will find the rhetoric of choice an effective fig leaf. Whether its potential for obscuring con­
flicts is the real reason for its continued popularity is a psychological question, and my sug­
gestions along these lines are only hypotheses. It does seem to be the case that Currie saw a 
difference between applying local law and rejecting foreign rights, see id., and without this 
difference, interest analysis's bias toward forum law is obviously problematic. See infra sec­
tion IV.C. 
23. See infra section V.A. 
24. See infra section IV.C. 
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they do not dictate unique solutions - but they constrain the 
states' resolutions in ways that produce a coherent jurisprudence of 
conflicts.25 In order to see how the Constitution works, we need a 
theory that frames the issue in terms of conflict, not in terms of 
choice. 
Part II of the article sets the stage for that theory by briefly 
recounting the history of conflicts scholarship and offering a word 
on methods and objectives in the conflict of laws. Part III extracts 
appropriate building blocks from the rubble of previous theoretical 
constructs; it then puts the blocks together, demonstrating in out­
line what the theory should look like. Part IV defends the theory 
by examining two situations neglected by conventional conflicts 
theory: conflicts within one state's law, and conflicts between state 
and federal law. Part V examines the relevance of the Constitution, 
and Part VI applies the constitutional principles thereby derived. 
II. CONFLICTS THEORY 
Articles about conflicts frequently begin with - or are entirely 
devoted to - a history of the subject.26 The need for another such 
recapitulation may certainly be questioned. This recounting, 
though, is not mere intellectual dressage. Because I intend to argue 
that the correct way of thinking about conflicts may be derived 
from the historical approaches, it is worthwhile to show both how 
the essential concepts already exist and how they have been pre­
vented from uniting into a coherent theory. 
Conflicts has a rich history. To begin at the beginning might 
require a return to ancient Egypt and the wrappings of a crocodile 
mummy, which supposedly contain the first recorded choice-of-law 
principles.27 A full account would then consider the theories of me­
dieval Europe, the early English approach that did away with the 
problem of foreign transactions via the fiction that all events oc­
curred in London,28 and subsequent developments in the courts of 
America. The perspective afforded by a thorough historical exposi­
tion is of significant value, for conflicts revolves around a few great 
and recurring themes. But the full-dress reenactment has itself al-
25. See infra Part VI. 
26. See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 1.1, at 11-13. 
27. See Hessel E. Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 297, 300-01 (1953). 
28. See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REv. 419, 436 (1984) . 
This led to pleadings asserting, for example, that wrongful acts were committed on the island 
of Minorca, in the city of London. See id. at 436-37. 
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ready been done,29 and only a few scenes are necessary to my pro­
ject. Of course, any attempt to sketch the history as mere opening 
act for a theoretical venture will inevitably be selectively incom­
plete. What follows is an account that highlights those aspects im­
portant to my project - how the issue of conflict has been 
repressed, and how, in later theory, choice has taken its place. 
A. Vested Rights: Joseph Beale 
Although Joseph Story exerted a profound influence on the 
early development of conflicts theory in America,30 my story starts 
with Joseph Beale. Beale was the reporter of the First Restatement, 
and his three-volume treatise on the conflict of laws is structured as 
a commentary to the Restatement.31 The Restatement's task - ra­
tionalizing the law of forty-eight states - was a formidable one. 
But Beale did not intend merely a catalogue of judicial decisions; 
his quarry was the general common law, of which the decisions of 
courts were evidence only.32 Beale's task, as he saw it, was to de­
rive the general common law of conflicts from the raw data of judi­
cial decisions. 
In this enterprise he was greatly aided by a few strong principles 
concerning the nature of law, rights, and remedies.33 Law, for 
Beale, was fundamentally territorial, supreme within a jurisdiction 
but generally powerless outside it.34 This principle gives a relatively 
easy answer to the question of what law governs a particular occur­
rence. Since local law, and only local law, applies within a given 
29. "[E]verything worthy of trying has been tried before, under the same or other labels." 
Kurt H. Nadelmann, Marginal Remarks on the New Trends in American Conflicts Law, 28 
LAw & CoNrEMP. PROBS. 860, 860 (1963). For thorough recapitulations, see, e.g., Juenger, 
supra note 28; Yntema, supra note 27. 
30. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON nm CONFLICT OF LAws, FOREIGN AND 
DoMESTic (Melville M. Bigelo ed., Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1883). Story extensively 
developed the idea of comity as a basis for resolving conflicts. Comity does not govern inter­
state conflicts, however; the Constitution does. Story's work has value for this article primar­
ily because it illuminates the original understanding of some constitutional provisions. Apart 
from that, I will largely ignore his contributions. 
31. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at xv. 
32. See id. § 1.12, at 10. This is, of course, the jurisprudential position of Swift v. Tyson, 
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which Beale cited approvingly several times. See, e.g., 1 BEALE, 
supra note 6, § 3.3, at 22 & n.1, § 3.5, at 26, § 4.6, at 39 & n.1. Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 
U.S. 64 (1938), overruled Swift just three years after the publication of Beale's treatise. One 
cannot avoid some sympathy for an author whose 2000-page magnum opus, the product of 
over twenty years of labor, enjoyed such a brief reign before one of its primary supports was 
unceremoniously knocked away. Worse was to follow. 
33. Nowadays Beale's first principles appear to be somewhat arbitrary assumptions, but 
within the jurisprudential climate of bis day, they were fairly unremarkable. 
34. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 4.12, at 45-46, § 59.2, at 308, § 61.1, at 311. 
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jurisdiction, local law must determine the consequence of acts 
within that jurisdiction: "If two laws were present at the same time 
and in the same place upon the same subject we should also have a 
condition of anarchy. By its very nature law must apply to every­
thing and must exclusively apply to everything within the boundary 
of its jurisdiction."35 If suit is brought within that jurisdiction, 
courts will obviously apply local law. Indeed, Beale denied the abil­
ity of courts to apply any but their own local law - though this 
included his general common law.36 
The transparent workings of the territorial model become some­
what more turbid when suit is brought in a jurisdiction other than 
the one in which the litigated transaction took place. In such cir­
cumstances, territoriality might seem at war with itself: If courts 
can apply only local law, but foreign law must determine the conse­
quences of acts in foreign states, how are parties ever to obtain re­
lief in courts of other jurisdictions? Beale's solution to this problem 
relied on a somewhat complicated taxonomy of rights, which he 
claimed to derive from the "difference made by our law in treating 
rights of the different classes with respect to the law creating and 
having power over them."37 On his account, law protects interests; 
these protected interests he terms primary rights. 38 The violation of 
a primary right gives rise to a secondary right- a right of redress.39 
This right vests at the moment of the violation of the primary right 
and thereafter may be considered much like personal property of 
the injured party.40 In particular, it may be brought into other fo­
rums and sued upon. Forum courts, in granting relief, are not ap­
plying foreign law but simply recognizing the secondary rights 
vested under foreign law.41 To determine whether a right has 
35. Id. § 4.12, at 46. 
36. See id. §§ 3.4, 5.4. 
37. Id. § 8A.9, at 66. 
38. See id.; see also id. § 8A.6. Thus, "[p]arties are bound, not by the law, but by obliga­
tions created by the law." Id. § 3.4, at 25. 
39. See id. § 8A.25. 
40. See, e.g., Slater v. Mexican Natl. R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 {1904) (Holmes, J.); 
Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 200 (N.Y. 1918) {Cardozo, J.). 
41. Indeed, the granting of what Beale termed a "remedial right" - an actual damages 
claim - was in fact a matter of forum law. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 8A.28, at 85-86. 
This allowed the forum to recognize the right to redress while retaining some flexibility in 
crafting a remedy - a feature Holmes exploited in Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 
233 U.S. 718 {1914). 
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vested, the forum court might need to examine foreign law, but as a 
question of fact, not law.42 
One aspect of Beale's account is of special interest for my pur­
poses. The aspect is this: given his territorial understanding of law, 
there is no such thing as conflict between laws. Each is supreme 
within its jurisdiction and does not, by the nature of law, extend 
beyond. Because laws operate only territorially, a state's law can­
not create rights from transactions occurring outside its borders.43 
Denying the application of foreign law to a transaction occurring 
within the forum state, then, is not the denial of a foreign right but 
simply a recognition of the nature of law. On this account, laws 
cannot even come into contact with each other, much less conflict.44 
The task of courts in multistate cases is truly to identify which law 
applies, which law creates the parties' rights and obligations. 
The elimination of conflicts made Beale's model pleasingly sim­
ple to operate,45 but his approach would ultimately be judged not 
for its theoretical niceties but for its real-world results. From this 
perspective, hiding difficult questions is not a virtue. Metaphysical 
observations about the nature of law do not resolve concrete 
problems, and Beale's theoretical purity was purchased at the price 
of ignoring practical issues. This preference for theory over praxis 
made Beale an easy target for criticism. He suffered so at the hands 
of the realists that his c9nflicts theory was for quite a while dis­
missed as an arbitrary metaphysics, based on "jejune notions of an 
'omnipresence' which cannot 'brood' more than three miles from 
home."46 But it is more a vessel of reflection, and less a bark of 
dogma, than such appraisals indicate.47 The internal structure is re-
42. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 5.4, at 53 ("It is quite obvious that since the only law that 
can be applicable in a state is the law of that state, no law of a foreign state can have there 
the force of law . . . .  The foreign law is a fact in the transaction."). 
43. "Since the power of a state is supreme within its own territory, no other state can 
exercise power there." Id. § 61.1, at 311. 
44. While canvassing objections to the name "conflict of laws," Beale offers a description 
that precisely fits his theory: "The laws of different sovereigns do not contend with one 
another for the mastery. Each one keeps within its sphere of operation, and only asserts its 
power in a foreign country when the law of that country commands or permits it. In practice, 
a conflict is impossible." Id. § 1.16, at 13 (quotation omitted). 
45. Indeed, Beale believed that attempts to resolve conflicts were doomed to failure. 
"Which of the two independent sovereigns should yield is a question not susceptible of a 
solution on which all parties would agree." 3 BEALE, supra note 6, § 53, at 1929. 
46. Katzenbach, supra note 11, at 1096. 
47. See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 1.2, at 20 (calling Beale's theory "quaintly moti­
vated" but "well-developed," and rejecting critics' accusation that it was "mindless dogma­
tism"). Beale did himself no favors with his vaguely Shakespearean response to accusations 
of dogmatism: "One cannot deny that most of the statements in this work will be dogmatic. 
Does not the Bar desire dogmatic statements?" 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at xiii. 
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ally rather elegant, its concepts interacting with a smoothness and 
complexity suspiciously reminiscent of celestial spheres, phlogiston, 
luminiferous ether, and other refined illusions. And many of 
Beale's claims have been taken up more recently by scholars as em­
inent as Ronald Dworkin.4s 
Admittedly, the practical effects of the theory were somewhat 
less pleasing. In order to pick a single jurisdiction where rights 
vested - as the territorial principle required - Beale needed to 
identify a specific act triggering the rights. Not unreasonably, given 
the alternatives, he decided that this should be the last act necessary 
to the existence of the cause of action.49 But the rigidity of the last 
act doctrine interacted with the intricacies of tort law to produce 
results that were undeniably arbitrary and verged on the bizarre.50 
The serpent of the practical fatally compromised Beale's conceptual 
Eden, and soon enough came the "archangels of doctrinal destruc­
tion":s1 the legal realists. 
B. Legal Realism: Walter Wheeler Cook 
In part of the Preface entitled "Apologia," Beale noted that his 
legal principles had been criticized by what he optimistically called 
"a current but ephemeral school of legal philosophy"52 - namely, 
legal realism. The characterization was, if not whistling-past-the­
graveyard bravado, a historic underestimation rivaling that of Louis 
XVI.53 Beale struck closer to the mark when he commented that 
48. Beale believed that cases had unique right answers and that courts enforce rights that 
exist prior to and independent of their decisions. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, §§ 3.1-3.4. This 
cluster has obvious affinities with Dworkin's account in RoNALD DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 
{1986). Indeed, elements of Beale's conflicts theory are enjoying a modest resurgence as part 
of a conflicts counterrevolution. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," and Choice-of· 
Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1191 {1987). The present article belongs to the same tradition; like 
Dane's, it attempts to resuscitate a few key concepts that Beale got right. 
49. See REsTATEMENT (Fmsr) OF CoNFLICT oF LAWS § 377 {1934). 
50. For example, the victim of a poisoning might travel through many states before the 
effects of the poison were felt. Beale, reasoning that no tort exists \vithout an injury, would 
look to the law of the state where the poison took effect, since that effect is the last occur­
rence necessary to the vesting of the right. But which state the victim happens to be in when 
this occurs has little to do with any policy relevant to conflicts of law; nor, without the strong 
territorialist assumption, does it seem to have much to do with the nature of law. I owe this 
example to Lea Brilmayer, see BRILMA YER, supra note 8, § 1.3, at 25-26, who points out 
further that "it is no easy matter to determine (as the First Restatement requires] where the 
'deleterious substance takes effect upon the body,'" id. {alteration in original) (quoting RE­
STATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 cmt. 2, illus. 2 {1934)). 
51. Katzenbach, supra note 11, at 1107. 
52. 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at xiii. 
53. Louis's diary entry for July 14, 1789, the date of the storming of the Bastille, reads 
simply "Rien." {"Nothing."). SIMON SCHAMA, CITIZENS 419 (1989). In fairness to Louis, this 
recorded an unsuccessful hunt. 
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"one who hears the evening bell must hasten his work, if he is to 
finish it."54 The ferocity, and the success, of the realist assault on 
Beale's verities are well documented in the scholarly literature. 
Katzenbach says that the vested rights theory was "brutally mur­
dered" by Walter Wheeler Cook,55 and Brainerd Currie's oft­
quoted evaluation was that Cook "discredited the vested-rights the­
ory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man can ever discredit the 
intellectual product of another."56 Cook, for his part, made no se­
cret of his intent to uproot and discard Beale's approach in its en­
tirety: "[U]ntil the intellectual garden is freed of the rank weeds in 
question," he wrote, "useful vegetables cannot grow and 
flourish. "57 
The realists directly attacked the idea of vested rights. In part 
this was a matter of pointing out practical difficulties with the ap­
proach. The principle that rights vest in the place of the tort seems 
easy enough to apply, but in fact it encounters serious difficulties 
when the events which make up the tort occur in different jurisdic­
tions. 58 As mentioned earlier, Beale accorded decisive importance 
to the famous "last act" necessary to the vesting of the secondary 
right.59 Unfortunately, the domestic laws of different jurisdictions 
might disagree about which act was the last one necessary to the 
vesting of a right, producing situations in which each state believed 
that rights vested within its territory - or, equally distressing, 
within the territory of the other state. To resolve this problem 
Beale had invoked the general common law,60 a maneuver that be­
came much less plausible after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins61 rejected 
the existence of such an entity. 
Still, problems of application were ancillary to Cook's project. 
His central attack was aimed at the jurisprudential groundwork of 
Beale's theory, his understanding of the nature of law and rights. 
54. 1 BEALE, supra note 6, at xii. 
55. See Katzenbach, supra note 11, at 1087-88. 
56. CuRruE, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, in SELECTED EssAYS, supra 
note 14, at 3, 6; see also David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 41 HARv. 
L. RE.v. 173, 175-76 (1933) ("Indeed, one may now wonder how any juristic construct such as 
'right' could have been accepted as fundamental in the explanation of any important aspect 
of judicial activity."); Juenger, supra note 28, at 435 ("pure sophistry"). 
57. WALTER WHEELER CooK, THE LomCAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS at ix (1942). 
58. See, e.g., id. at 314-18. 
59. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
60. See, e.g., 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 3.1-3.6; RE.sTATEMENT (FmsT) OF CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 377 cmt. d (1934). 
61. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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Rejecting Beale's conception of "theoretical law" as "the body of 
principles worked out by the light of reason and by general usage, 
without special reference to the actual law in any particular state,"62 
Cook warned that "we must as always guard ourselves against 
thinking of our assertion that 'rights' and other legal relations 'exist' 
or have been 'enforced' as more than a conventional way of 
describing past and predicting future behavior of human beings -
judges and other officials."63 He therefore opposed the reifi.cation 
of rights, arguing, in the words of the ever-quotable Holmes, that 
"'a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy.' "64 
Cook's positive program for resolving choice-of-law questions 
was not as theoretically well-developed as that of his predecessor 
(Joseph Beale) or successor (Brainerd Currie).65 This is under­
standable, given his pragmatic and antimetaphysical bent, but it 
means that his importance to this article lies largely in his critique.66 
His most notable positive contribution was the "local law theory," 
which asserted that states could apply only their own law. Beale, of 
course, agreed with this proposition; it was what necessitated his 
distinction between foreign law and the rights that vested under it. 
Cook went further, however, arguing that states did not enforce for­
eign rights but rather applied "the rule of decision which the given 
foreign state or country would apply, not to this very group of facts 
now before the court of the forum, but to a similar but purely do­
mestic group of facts involving for the foreign court no foreign ele­
ment. "67 This theory offered a solution to the problem of renvoi -
62. 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 1.12, at 9. 
63. CooK, supra note 57, at 33. One obvious problem with this "predictive" theory of law 
is that it fails to explain the thinking of a judge deciding a case, whose attempts to discern the 
correct rule of law are surely not attempts to predict his own behavior. Cook points out this 
difficulty, then comments that "our discussion at this point does not require further consider­
ation of the matter." Id. at 30 n.52a. 
64. Id. at 30 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HoLMES , Natural Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL 
PAPERS 310, 313 (1920)). Of course, Holmes's Supreme Court opinions constituted canonical 
applications of the vested rights theory. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 
542, 547 (1914); Slater v. Mexican Natl. R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904). Cook offers a 
creative reconstruction of Slater as rooted in policy judgment rather than in the vested rights 
theory, which he then cautiously attributes to Holmes. See CooK, supra note 57, at 35. It 
may be safer to rest with the observation that Holmes contained multitudes. 
65. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. 
C:m. L. REv. 1301, 1301 (1989) ("[W]hile [the realist] criticism successfully undercut the intel­
lectual foundation of traditional choice of law theory, a plausible alternative was not pro· 
posed until the 1950s."). 
66. Cook would probably not have been unhappy to be identified more with his negative 
than with his positive analysis; he believed that "[t]he removal of the weeds is . . •  as construc­
tive in effect as the planting and cultivation of the useful vegetables." CooK, supra note 57, 
at ix. 
67. Id. at 21. 
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the interminable ping-pong created when the choice-of-law rules of 
two states each directed their courts to look to the other state's law 
- but had little other significance. 68 The elaboration of a choice­
of-law theory robust enough to direct courts was the work of 
Brainerd Currie. 
C. Interest Analysis: Brainerd Currie 
Currie's important contribution, and perhaps his most signifi­
cant difference with Beale, was to analyze law not as an objectively 
existing entity but as a tool of state policy. Beale's theory deter­
mined which law applied by "deduction from territorial postu­
lates,"69 without examining the content of the law. Essentially a 
"jurisdiction-selecting" approach, it picked not a particular law but 
the sovereign with authority to legislate the consequences of the 
transaction.70 In contrast, Currie realized that the first step in 
choice of law must be an analysis of the laws contending for appli­
cation. If laws are instruments of state policy, it follows that when 
application of a state's law will not advance its policies, the state 
would not want its law applied.71 
This analysis revealed the arbitrariness of the vested rights ap­
proach. Resolving all choice-of-law questions by territorial princi­
ples results in subordinating the interests of the nonselected state 
68. Hessel Yntema calls the local law theory "empty luggage." See Yntema, supra note 
27, at 316. 
69. See Cavers, supra note 56, at 192-94. 
70. See id. at 194. 
71. As the text above says, this "instrumental" approach to law is generally considered a 
significant difference between Beale and Currie. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, 
and Choice of Law, 98 YALE LJ. 1277, 1284 (1989). Yet it seems quite easy to assimilate 
Currie's insight into Beale's system by reasoning that if the state does not want its law ap­
plied, it does not extend its law to cover the transaction. Thus the law attaches no legal 
consequences; it creates no rights or liabilities for parties to sue on. (Following Perry Dane, I 
will call such restrictions on the extension of rights "rules of scope." See Dane, supra note 48, 
at 1203-04. I discuss rules of scope at more length in section !I.E.) Beale never suggested 
that state laws must always have maximum scope - obviously, he was quite emphatic about 
territorial limitations. True, he did not see that limitation as the sovereign's choice, but if a 
state statute provided that only local citizens could recover for in-state torts, Beale would 
presumably not have maintained that out-of-staters acquired rights thereby. His fascination 
with the general common law obscures this point but provides no theoreti«al obstacle. In 
truth, it was Currie who tended to disregard states' expressions of intent not to have their 
laws applied to cases in which he found them "interested," creating willy-nilly the practical 
equivalent of rights. See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, §§ 2.5.2-2.5.4 (noting that Currie ignores 
state choice-of-law rules dictating application of another state's law, though these seem like 
expressions of lack of interest). The fact that the language of rights is more characteristic of 
Beale than of Currie has been made to bear more jurisprudential weight than it can easily 
support. See infra note 166. See generally Green, supra note 12. Now that the clamor has 
died down, the realist attack on vested rights looks rather like any other attempt to over­
throw an entrenched vocabulary seen as essentially conservative. The rhetoric may be philo­
sophical, but the stakes are political. 
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without even ascertaining that the selected state has an interest that 
will be promoted by application of its law.72 Currie correctly sug­
gested that this made little sense, and that the vested rights ap­
proach lumped together quite dissimilar cases precisely because it 
determined the applicable law without examining its content. 
Currie's approach, by contrast, allowed for distinctions among 
cases with multistate contacts. Currie began with a presumption 
that the forum would apply its own law.73 If one party suggested 
the application of another state's law, the court was to analyze the 
substantive law at issue to determine whether the forum or the 
other state had an interest in the application of its own law. If only 
one state has an interest, the case is what Currie called a "false 
conflict." In such cases, it is appropriate to apply the law of the 
only interested state. This allows for effectuation of that state's pol­
icies and does no harm to the policies of other states, since they are, 
by definition, not interested. If both states have an interest, the 
case is a "true conflict," and more difficult to resolve. Regarding 
true conflicts as insoluble, Currie suggested that the forum should 
simply apply its own law.74 A preference for forum law is not an 
obviously desirable method of resolving true conflicts, and Currie 
later suggested that in such cases the court should reexamine the 
policies at issue to see if a more moderate reinterpretation might 
eliminate one or the other interest. The last category of cases, 
72. Readers may note that I have now moved from the question of whether application of 
a law advances a state's policies to the concept of a "state interest" without much discussion 
of either. Currie was similarly elliptical, an unfortunate parsimony that has engendered sub­
stantial confusion. A fairly authoritative source, Currie's student, coauthor, and defender 
Herma Kay, has suggested that a state is interested if the policies behind the particular law at 
issue - discerned by the ordinary process of statutory interpretation - would be promoted 
by the application of that law. See Herma Hill Kay, A Defense of Currie's Governmental 
Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES CoURS 9, 50 (1984). This is the conventional way to 
determine if a law is intended to apply to a particular case. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-59 (1991) (discussing statutory interpretation and legislative intent 
with respect to extraterritorial application of Title VII). Thus, when Currie wrote that the 
proper role of courts was to promote forum policies, he was saying simply that they should 
apply laws with an eye to legislative intent. And that is simply enforcing the rights conferred 
by the law - neither an unusual nor an excessively instrumentalist approach. But cf. Dane, 
supra note 48, at 1259 (claiming that only a "Decision-Based" (realist) approach would claim 
that courts are "primarily charged" with advancing the policies of their states). What makes 
interest analysis problematic, I will suggest, is Currie's tendency to construct legislative intent 
around domiciliary status. See infra section IV.C. 
73. Larry Kramer has criticized this presumption as unnecessary. See Kramer, supra note 
65. I will suggest that it is unconstitutional, joining Dean Ely and others. See, e.g., John Hart 
Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
173, 180-91 (1981); Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The 
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 249, 310-12 (1992). I will 
also suggest that it is basically incoherent, which I think has not been done. See infra section 
IV.C. 
74. See CURRIE, supra note 22, at 184. 
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those in which neither state has an interest, are "unprovided-for 
cases." These also proved somewhat embarrassing to interest anal­
ysis. 75 Since a lack of interests provides no reason to disturb the 
presumption of forum law, Currie suggested that in this category of 
cases too, courts should apply the law of their own states.76 
The jury is still out on interest analysis. In practice, it proves 
quite underdeterminative, given the difficulty in ascertaining the 
policy behind a particular law.77 Issues of application aside, Lea 
Brilmayer has mounted a more serious attack on the central notion 
of governmental interest, suggesting that it is the product of a priori 
theorizing rather than conventional interpretation.78 I will have 
more to say about her charges later. For present purposes, though, 
two observations will suffice. 
First, interest analysis makes a very important advance by con­
ceiving of multistate cases as clashes between sovereigns, each at­
tempting to impose its own regulatory scheme in furtherance of its 
own policies. It is this perspective that reveals the conflict, which 
Beale's analysis hid. 
Second, like Beale's vested rights theory, interest analysis avoids 
the difficult task of resolving conflicts b_etween laws, though in a 
somewhat different way. While Beale's account denies the possibil­
ity of conflict - only one law governs the transaction - interest 
analysis admits it: indeed, it is this recognition that allows the dis­
tinction between cases that present conflicts ("true conflicts") and 
those that do not ("false conflicts" and "unprovided-for cases"). 
But having used the concept of conflicts to dispose of cases in which 
there are non�, interest analysis deals with true conflicts by employ­
ing a technique that suggests they do not need to be resolved. The 
technique is what I will call "personal-jurisdiction-style" analysis, 
similar to the one courts use to determine whether a state's attempt 
to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant violates due process. 
75. See, e.g., LEA BruLMAYER, AN INTRoDucrroN TO JurusmcrroN IN THE AMERICAN 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 240 (1986); Aaron Twerski, Neumeier v. Keuhner: Where Are the Em­
peror's Clothes?, 1 HoFSTRA L. REv. 104, 107 (1973). 
76. See CuruuE, Survival of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation in the Conflict of 
Laws, in SELECTED EssAYS, supra note 14, at 128, 156, 168. 
77. See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 2.1.2, at 61-62. 
78. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH. 
L. REv. 392 (1980) [hereinafter Brilmayer, Interest Analysis]; Lea Brilmayer, Methods and 
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws: A Challenge, 35 MERCER L. REv. 555, 555 (1984) [herein­
after Brilmayer, A Challenge] ("[I]nterest analysis is methodologically bankrupt."); id. at 563 
("Currie was as metaphysical as Beale."). I discuss Brilmayer's attack in more detail below. 
See infra section III.B.2. 
2464 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:2448 
The due process test for personal jurisdiction is the familiar min­
imum contacts analysis.79 If the defendant has certain minimum 
contacts with the forum, it may exercise jurisdiction. Of course, 
other states may also have jurisdiction - indeed, they may have 
substantially greater contacts than does the forum - but this has 
no effect on the forum's ability to exercise its own.80 The upshot is 
that personal-jurisdiction-style analysis does not select a unique 
state. It sets a certain baseline - the constitutionally required min­
imum contacts - and any state that meets that baseline require­
ment may exercise jurisdiction. 
Interest analysis proceeds in a similar way, using the baseline of 
governmental interest. If a state has no interest, its law should not 
be applied.81 But if a state does have an interest, there is no basis 
on which to prefer any other state. All interested states meet the 
baseline requirement; there is no way to choose between them, and 
therefore no grounds on which an interest analyst may direct an 
interested forum to apply another state's law.82 Thus, just as a state 
may exercise personal jurisdiction without derogation of the juris­
diction of other states, it may exercise legislative jurisdiction - ap­
ply its own law - without claiming that its interest in the case is 
greater than that of other states.83 Currie made this point quite ex­
plicitly, arguing that "[a] court need never hold the interest of the 
foreign state inferior; it can simply apply its own law as such. "84 
79. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 {1945). 
80. The forum may of course dismiss the case on forum non conveniens grounds. See 
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 {1981). 
81. The exception is the unprovided-for case, in which no state has an interest. Here 
Currie suggested forum law as the only plausible candidate. Larry Kramer suggests to the 
contrary that a lack of interest is a lack of interest in granting relief, and that consequently 
the plaintiff should lose. See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the Unprovided-For Case, 15 VA. L. 
REv. 1045 {1989) [hereinafter Kramer, Myth]; see also Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of 
Law, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 277, 293-307 (1990) [hereinafter Kramer, Rethinking Choice of 
Law]. My analysis will suggest something similar. 
82. This is essentially the Supreme Court's constitutional position, though its notion of 
interest is even weaker than Currie's. See infra section V.A. 
83. Though I will argue that personal and legislative jurisdictions are quite different, they 
have similar histories. Both were originally territorial. Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 
714, 722 {1877) {holding that a state can exercise personal jurisdiction only over people pres­
ent within its borders), with Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 {1897) (rejecting application 
of Louisiana law to a contract formed in New York). The Court retreated from territorialism 
at about the same time in both contexts. The personal jurisdiction recantation came with 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 {1945); territoriality gave way with respect 
to legislative jurisdiction in Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947). But 
see Quill v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 319-20 {1992) {Scalia, J., concurring) (distinguishing 
between types of jurisdiction). 
84. CURRIE, supra note 22, at 181-82. 
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I will claim - and this preview is for guidance only -. that this 
characterization is misleading. Assertions of legislative jurisdiction 
involve the rejection of foreign rights; legislative jurisdiction, unlike 
personal jurisdiction, is a zero-sum game. We will consequently do 
better by abandoning the personal-jurisdiction-style analysis and 
thinking instead in terms of a conflict between rights created by 
different laws. The classic situation is one in which the plaintiff as­
serts a right derived from the law of one state, and the defendant 
counters with a right derived from the law of another. From this 
perspective, the fundamental question of conflicts law is simply the 
ordinary legal question that arises in every case: whether the plain­
tiff has a right to recover, or whether the defendant's asserted right 
blocks the plaintiff's claim. Whatever courts say they are doing, this 
is the question that conventional legal thinking implies they answer 
when they decide conflicts cases. 
This perspective shows the difference between vested rights and 
interest analysis in a slightly different light. If we examine the 
vested rights theory while thinking in terms of conflicts between 
rights created by different laws, we see that they are always re­
solved on the basis of the territorial principle. The right created by 
the law where the last necessary act took place prevails. This reso­
lution is arbitrary, in that territorialism does not capture the rele­
vant policy concerns, but it is coherent.85 Interest analysis, by 
contrast, denies the conflict in a way that produces incoherencies.86 
Currie's prescriptions for conflicts remain plausible only so long as 
the conflict is hidden behind the veil of choice, so long as conflicts 
are conceived of as giving rise to a choice-of-law question that can 
be resolved by personal-jurisdiction-style analysis.87 
85. It is coherent in that a conventional legal principle (territorialism) specifies which 
right prevails. 
86. This is, I realize, a bold claim, and I do not attempt a justification at this point. What 
I will show is that interest analysis does not really choose an applicable law, as it claims. See 
infra section IV.C. If we examine interest analysis through the lens of conflicts, what 
emerges is not a conventional legal rationale for choosing applicable law but simple discrimi­
nation against foreign law and foreign litigants. 
87. A more sophisticated version of interest analysis has been developed by Larry 
Kramer. See, e.g., Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81. Because his approach 
is in many ways similar to the one I advocate, I will postpone consideration of his work, 
noting here only that it escapes many of the faults with which I charge Currie's approach. 
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D. Current Theory 
The only accurate generalization one can make about current 
conflicts theory is that consensus is lacking.ss Interest analysis is 
the leading scholarly position, and the only doctrine that could 
plausibly claim to have generated a school of adherents. It has 
been fiercely attacked, however, and the most thoughtful attempts 
to develop its insights have been condemned as heresy.s9 Other 
theories of choice of law, though less popular than interest analysis, 
have also been articulated. These approaches, which are not with­
out appeal, urge courts to apply the law favoring the plaintiff,9° the 
"better" law,91 or the law whose policies would be more impaired 
by rejection.92 Into this chaos came the Second Restatement, syn­
thesizing a wide range of insights into an indigestible stew.93 For 
torts, the Second Restatement urges application of the law of the 
state with "the most significant relationship" to the action;94 it then 
lists a dizzying number of factors with no hint as to their relative 
weight.95 
More recently, a counterrevolution of sorts appears to be 
emerging, marked by the insistence that the concept of rights 
should have a greater role to play.96 Finally, there exists also a sub­
stantial body of scholarship insisting that, Supreme Court pro­
nouncements to the contrary notwithstanding, the Constitution has 
88. This has been true for a while; more than sixty years ago David Cavers commented 
that "the article on a conflict of laws topic which does not deplore a current 'confusion of 
authority' is still a rarity." Cavers, supra note 56, at 177. 
89. See Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEo. LJ. 53 (1991) (criticizing Kramer). 
90. See, e.g., RussEIL J. WEINTRAUB, CoMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 360 (3d 
ed. 1986). 
91. See, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CoNFLicrs LAW § 107 (4th ed. 1986). 
92. See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 
(1963). 
93. See, e.g., Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 321-22 n.149 ("no ex­
planatory power"); Laycock, supra note 73, at 253 ("Trying to be all things to all people, [the 
Second Restatement] produced mush."); Joseph William Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. 
REv. 1, 77 (1989) ("mystifies rather than clarifies"). 
94. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971). 
95. See id. at supra note 94, §§ 6, 145. The Second Restatement may not be as worthless as 
it seems. It does at least identify relevant considerations. If states simply used these factors, 
sincerely and consistently, to create rules about which law prevailed, we would have a reginie 
quite like the one I will clainI the Constitution imposes. See infra section VI.C. 
96. See, e.g., Brilmayer, supra note 71; Dane, supra note 48. It is odd that these scholars 
seem to think that interest analysis necessarily opposes the idea of rights. See Kramer, Re­
thinking Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 278. Brilmayer's rights lead to a personal­
jurisdiction-style analysis. See Brilmayer, supra note 71, at 1279. Consequently, I do not 
endorse her account. 
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something to say about choice of law.97 I think it surely does, and 
much of this article will be spent showing how two constitutional 
clauses, taken seriously, can dramatically change the face of con­
flicts theory. 
E. Methods and Objectives: What Interest Analysis Is, What a 
Conflicts Theory Should Be 
The preceding sections have labeled the objects of their discus­
sion "conflicts theories," but this is not quite accurate. It is some­
what unfair to Currie, and somewhat generous to Beale. 
Explaining why this is so requires a look at conflicts analysis from a 
more structural perspective. The basic question in a conflicts case, I 
have said, is whether the plaintiff has an enforceable right. Later 
sections will make the argument for this perspective.98 My aim here 
is to give a more fully developed theoretical account. 
A plaintiff's claim may fail for two reasons. It may be that the 
plaintiff has no right - he might have pleaded a cause of action 
that simply does not exist, or failed to allege a necessary element. 
But a claim might also fail because the defendant has available a 
defense that defeats the plaintiff's right.99 This might be an affirma­
tive defense, such as mutual mistake in a contracts case or consent 
to a tort, or it might be something like official immunity. 
Deciding whether the plaintiff has an enforceable right thus re­
quires two quite different inquiries. The first is the determination 
whether the plaintiff has a right at all. This is a question of the 
scope of the right the plaintiff invokes - whether the law he ap­
peals to grants rights to people in his situation. The rules consulted 
for this purpose are what I have called "rules of scope," following 
Perry Dane. If the plaintiff does have a right, the court must then 
perform a similar analysis of scope to determine whether the de­
fendant has a contrary right. Only if the scope inquiry results in the 
conclusion that both parties have invoked appropriate rights is 
there a conflicts question. In such a case, the court must look to a 
97. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 73; Katzenbach, supra note 11, at 1093 ("Among the United 
States these are problems ultimately subject to Constitutional prescriptions."); Laycock, 
supra note 73. 
98. See infra Part IV. 
99. Those troubled by the possibility of unenforceable rights might wish to alter the ter­
minology here, perhaps distinguishing "prima facie" rights, which can be defeated, from 
"true" rights, which permit recovery. Cf. Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81, 
at 293-304. I do not think such semantic reticulation is necessary; where appropriate I will 
characterize some rights as "enforceable" without worrying about the implication that some 
are not. 
2468 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:2448 
different kind of rule to resolve the conflict - to what I will call a 
"conflicts rule," which specifies which right shall prevail. 
Obviously, then, there are two ways in which a theory might 
handle the issues raised by multistate cases. It might eliminate con­
flicts by aggressive use of rules of scope, or it might provide con­
flicts rules to resolve conflicts. Beale's theory is of the first sort. 
The reason that it is generous to characterize it as a conflicts theory 
is that Beale's approach has no conflicts rules at all. The territorial 
principle is a rule of scope - state laws grant rights only with re­
spect to in-state occurrences - and it eliminates conflicts entirely. 
Currie's theory is similar, but less extreme. In place of Beale's 
territorial rules of scope, Currie uses the concept of governmental 
interest to test whether rights exist.10° Currie's rules of scope are 
not quite as powerful as Beale's, and consequently some conflicts 
do arise with his approach. But Currie has very little in the way of 
conflicts rules. He has, in fact, only one such rule - forum law 
always prevails. This is, as he readily admits, more a faute de mieux 
stopgap than a real attempt to create a conflicts rule.101 
Currie had the misfortune to come up with a very troubling 
stopgap, and the obviously discriminatory character of the rule that 
forum law always prevails is the source of much of the criticism of 
interest analysis. But this criticism - unlike Brilmayer's attack on 
the notion of governmental interest - is somewhat misdirected. 
Currie conceded the jerry-built quality of his conflicts rule, and in­
deed did not claim to offer resolutions to conflicts; his aim instead 
was to show that not all multistate cases featured conflicts. He be­
lieved, in fact, that true conflicts could not be resolved by the body 
of law called "conflicts."102 What he hoped for was federal legisla­
tion under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, directed to particular 
areas of substantive law.103 It is true, I think, that the preference 
100. This is not quite true to Currie's understanding of his theory. If interest analysis 
were truly a scope analysis, then unprovided-for cases (where neither state has an interest) 
would be cases in which the plaintiff simply had no right. Currie remained blinded by the 
idea that the task in a multistate case is to find which law governs, not which right prevails. 
He was unwilling to conclude that no law governs, and thus found it necessary to apply forum 
law in unprovided-for cases. Larry Kramer has redescribed unprovided-for cases from what I 
think is the correct perspective, making the point that a lack of interest implies simply a lack 
of rights. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1064. He maintains (and I agree) that this is 
consistent with Currie's approach. 
101. See, e.g., CuRRIE, supra note 76, at 169 (" [The resort to forum law] is not an ideal; it 
is simply the best that is available."). 
102. See CuRRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, in 
SELECTED EssAYS, supra note 14, at 77, 107, 117-21; CURRIE, supra note 22, at 181-83. 
103. See, e.g., CuRRIE, supra note 22, at 183; CuRRIE, supra note 76, at 169-70. It is thus 
not quite true that Currie maintained that "[a]ll choice of law decisions should be simply 
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for forum law is unacceptable and must be rejected: Currie's con­
flicts rule is simply untenable. But the conflicts rule is not an essen­
tial conceptual part of interest analysis. Interest analysfs is 
fundamentally a scope-based theory, and its conflicts rule can be 
discarded without compromising the methodology. 
Having made the distinction between rules of scope and con­
flicts rules, we can describe the progress from Beale to Currie quite 
simply. Beale eliminated conflicts by territorial rules of scope. Im­
puting these rules to the states would have been implausible, and he 
stuck them instead in the twinkling heavens as part of the nature of 
law. The realists, rightly, did not believe that the "nature of law" 
was much of a constraint on what states did. Without an effective 
metaphysical imprimatur, Beale's rules of scope looked silly and 
wrongheaded, and Currie set out to show that different rules of 
scope were more sensible. The theories are first cousins: each re­
lies on rules of scope to do all of its work. Neither Beale nor Currie 
said anything useful about conflicts.104 
Because of their close relation, the two theories face common 
difficulties.105 The problem with having rules of scope do all the 
work is that the scope of state-created rights is first and foremost a 
question of legislative intent (or judicial intent, with regard to com­
mon law rights). But if the intent of state officials is the whole 
story, then a scope-centered theory is normatively toothless: judi­
cial or legislative statements about the scope of state rights are au­
thoritative, and while the interest analyst may find them misguided, 
he cannot claim that they are wrong. To have prescriptive force, 
rules of scope must draw on some source external and superior to 
the authority of the states.106 Beale relied on the nature of law, but 
that gambit is no longer plausible. Currie purported to uncover in­
terests via the conventional process of statutory interpretation, but 
this required him to defer to legislative or judicial statements of 
substantive decisions about the substantive rules' proper reach." BruLMAYER, supra note 8, 
at 108. First, Currie did distinguish between scope analysis and conflicts analysis even within 
his theory - though admittedly, since an interested forum will always apply its own law, the 
scope analysis ends the matter if it uncovers a forum interest. Second, and more importantly, 
Currie realized - and hoped - that federal conflicts rules would displace his rule of prefer­
ence for forum law. This latter point shows quite clearly his awareness of the distinction 
between scope decisions and conflicts decisions. 
104. Please do not quote this out of context. 
105. Brilmayer makes this point well in her extended critique of interest analysis. See 
BRII.MAYER, supra note 8, § 2.5. My discussion here is indebted to hers on several points, 
most notably the tension between objectivity and subjectivity in the nature of governmental 
interests. 
106. See id. 
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scope even ifthose conflicted with his standard domiciliary-focused 
approach to interests. Metaphysics and impotence are the Scylla 
and Charybdis of scope-centered theories. Beale's succumbs to the 
first while Currie's wavers between the two.101 
Modem theory has advanced, of course, and we now have a 
wealth of suggestions for conflicts rules.10s Many of these are good; 
a number are quite ingenious.109 It is fortunate that scholars have 
turned their attention to conflicts rules. One of the arguments this 
article will make is that conflicts are more prevalent than Currie's 
rules of scope suggest.110 In consequence, conflicts rules are where 
the action is.111 
Unfortunately, modem suggestions for conflicts rules share 
something with scope-based theories: they are normatively weak. 
The rules they offer, if followed by all states, would probably make 
all better off; coordination can often be mutually beneficial in mul­
tiparty interactions. The problem lies in achieving coordination in 
the absence of external constraints.112 As Larry Kramer has 
pointed out, conflicts presents a sort of Prisoner's Dilemma: states 
may do better by cooperating, but defection is a danger.113 The 
existing suggestions for conflicts rules lack prescriptive force in that, 
if states decide instead to pursue narrow or selfish interests, the 
scholarship is merely hortatory. 
This article will not attempt to prescribe particular conflicts 
rules, but will instead show how the Constitution constrains the 
states in their crafting of such rules. (It will not construct a building 
so much as give a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible 
buildings.) Beale and Currie both thought that conflicts were too 
107. Currie's waffling is reflected in the alternately objective and subjective nature of 
governmental interests. Brilmayer's extended discussion of interest analysis reveals this well, 
although I think she goes too far in faulting Currie for not treating state choice-of-law rules 
as rules of scope. See infra section III.B.2. 
108. See supra section II.D. 
109. Baxter's comparative impairment principle, in particular, has the elegance and good 
sense that typically prompts scholars to think that we'd have come up with that idea if we'd 
thought about it first. 
110. See infra section VI.B. 
111. More generally, the conflicts problem is that state assertions of legislative jurisdic­
tion overlap. Telling states that their rights do not extend as far as the legislature has said 
they do is pointless. In fact, I will argue, the Constitution tends to enlarge, rather than con­
tract, the scope of state-created rights. What a conflicts theory must do is manage the com­
peting claims of authority; it must oversee the conflicts between rights. This is obviously a 
matter of conflicts rules, not rules of scope. 
112. See generally MANCUR OI.SoN, THE LoGic OF COLLECTIVE AcnoN (1971). 
113. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 339-44. Kramer also sug­
gests that coordination may naturally emerge, see id. at 343-44, although the history of con· 
flicts should give optimists pause. 
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hard to resolve.114 They are hard, and the task of deciding which 
interests are more important lies properly within the authority of 
the states. The Constitution does not prescribe unique conflicts 
rules, but rather restricts the permissible grounds on which states 
may assert that their interest in regulating a transaction prevails 
over the interest of another state. By so doing, the Constitution 
creates a situation in which mutually beneficial coordination is 
likely. The proper role of the Constitution has been obscured by 
the rhetoric of choice and the concomitant personal-jurisdiction­
style analysis. If we think about the issue in terms of conflicts -
which is to say, if we think about it as a conventional legal question 
- things become much clearer. But to make the case for this 
claim, I need to develop what I have been calling the conventional 
legal perspective. 
III. RETHINKING '!HE THEORY: FROM CHOICE TO CONFLICT 
The goal of this article is to provide a workable framework for 
resolving conflicts of law, one that looks at them as conflicts and 
applies principles appropriate to their resolution. Neither the 
vested rights theory nor interest analysis fits the bill because both 
are scope-centered: neither makes a real attempt to deal with con­
fiicts.115 This sole reliance on rules of scope is both mistaken and 
unnecessary. A theoretically sound approach to conflicts can be 
constructed, and these theories give us the raw materials to do so. 
The framework proposed here will not be built from scratch; noth­
ing in conflicts is at this point. The concepts I will deploy can be 
identified quite easily as originating in either vested rights theory or 
interest analysis. The aim of this Part is to show what each ap­
proach has to offer, as well as what must be discarded. 
A. Rights and Their Critics 
Legal realism utterly destroyed Beale's carefully constructed ed­
ifice. The revolution was necessary; the vested rights theory was as 
wrong as a legal theory can be. It was wrong, however, primarily 
because it produced the wrong results, not because of any meta­
physical taint. The realist assault went beyond criticism of Beale's 
results, and in its more ambitious form it seriously overreached. 
The realists' success in dislodging Beale's rights-based framework 
114. See 3 BEALE, supra note 6, § 53, at 1929; CtnuuE, supra note 102, at 107, 117-21; 
CtnuuE, supra note 22, at 181-83. 
115. See supra section !I.E. 
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has led conflicts to its current straits. The rejection of the notion of 
rights is responsible for both the esotericism of conflicts and, relat­
edly, its disconnection from ordinary legal discourse in general and 
constitutional law in particular.116 Rescuing the rights-based frame­
work requires an evaluation of the legal realist criticisms. 
There are two quite different components to the realist attack 
on Beale's approach. The first is practical and shows that the terri­
torially based vested rights theory does not work, either positively 
or normatively. The second is theoretical arn;l aims to eliminate the 
very notion of rights from legal discourse. The following section 
considers the first component, which is sound; the next addresses 
the second, which is not. 
1. The Failure of Vested Rights I Territorialism 
From a normative perspective, the most obvious problem with 
territorialism is its tendency to produce arbitrary results. Territorial 
connecting factors, triggered by the crucial last act, often point in 
odd directions. For example, if one resident of state A poisons an­
other state A resident within the borders of state A, common sense 
political philosophy does not suggest that state B's law should gov­
ern merely because the victim happens to have crossed into state B 
when the poison takes effect. In compensation for this arbitrari­
ness, territorialism is generally supposed to offer predictability.111 
However, it turned out to be much less determinative than its pro­
ponents claimed. In part this was a consequence of the need to 
characterize actions and their elements. Courts needed to decide 
whether the suit sounded in tort or in contract before they could 
invoke the appropriate rules. Similarly, since the forum would ap­
ply its own procedural law regardless of whether it applied foreign 
substantive law, the characterization of particular issues as substan­
tive or procedural could be dispositive. The related distinction be­
tween rights and remedies also allowed courts some latitude 
because under Beale's theory, forum law governed questions of 
remedy even when the rights were foreign.11s 
Underdetermination may not be a critical defect; indeed, terri­
torialism's arbitrariness stemmed from its rigidity, and the elasticity 
provided by these "escape hatches" gave judges freedom to reach 
i16. As Kramer succinctly puts it, "Our entire legal system rests on the concept of vested 
rights." Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvo� 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979, 990-91 (1991). 
117. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 1.3; see also ScoLES & HAY, supra note 7, § 2.6, at 15 
n.10. 
118. See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Mellor, 233 U.S. 718 {1914). 
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sensible results. More serious is the problem that territorialism 
works oddly, if at all, in the absence of substantive legal uniformity. 
The elements of a tort may differ across jurisdictions; similarly, ju­
risdictions may employ different rules to determine where a con­
tract is formed.119 Thus jurisdictions applying territorialist rules 
might still disagree about what the essential last act was, and conse­
quently about where it took place. Beale attempted to smooth over 
these issues by appealing to general common law to determine the 
location of the triggering events, but general common law is no 
longer available. Since it is not even clear what results territorial­
ism prescribes, it is hard to maintain that it reaches the right ones as 
a normative matter. 
Of course, Beale proposed the vested rights theory not as a nor­
mative suggestion but as a positive statement of the law. From this 
perspective, the greatest defect of territorialism is that it is not true. 
States regularly assert the power to determine the legal conse­
quences of events transpiring outside their geographical bounda­
ries, and sometimes they succeed.120 So too does the federal 
government.121 In the face of this widespread disregard, territorial­
ism can be defended as a positive theory only by metaphysical argu­
ments about the nature of law, suggesting that actual practice is 
illegitimate, somehow "not law" despite the fact that everyone does 
it. But this style of argumentation is no longer convincing,- nor 
should it be.122 Law is a human practice, not an independent entity 
119. For example, one jurisdiction might have adopted the "mailbox rule," providing that 
the contract is formed as soon as the recipient of the offer sends acceptance; another might 
hold that the contract is formed only upon receipt of the acceptance. See BRil.MAYER, supra 
note 8, § 1.3, at 26, § 1.5.2, at 40-41. 
120. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) (upholding application of 
Minnesota law to accident occurring in WISconsin); Skiriotes v. Florida 313 U.S. 69 (1941) 
(upholding Florida prosecution of Florida resident for actions on high seas); Lea Brilmayer 
& Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HAR.v. 
L. REv. 1217, 1241-42 (1992) ("It is also fairly well established that a state may regulate its 
residents, even when they are acting outside the state."). 
121. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (upholding kid­
napping of Mexican national to be tried in United States for conspiracy to torture United 
States government agents in Mexico). See generally Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 120, at 
1229 (discussing rules on federal extraterritorial criminal prosecution). Even the operation 
of federal law within the states would seem to pose problems for Beale's theory of a single, 
territorially supreme sovereign. Beale admits no difficulty: he suggests that each state of the 
union remains a "separate legal unit," 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 2.2 (discussing annexation of 
Hawaii), and then explains that federal law is local law everywhere, see id. § 2.3, at 18 ("It is 
perfectly correct to say . . .  that the law of each of the states consists of the constitution, 
treaties, and statutes of the United States, the constitution and statutes of the particular state, 
and the co=on law of that state."). This analysis allows his theory to operate but, charac­
teristically, suppresses the possibility of conflict between state and federal law. 
122. In fact, Beale attempted to defend territorialism as a matter of positive law. "Since 
the power of a state is supreme within its own territory, no other state can exercise power 
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to which practice must conform.123 Consequently, it cannot credi­
bly be attacked for failure to abide by metaphysical principles. 
Criticisms of violations of territoriality must be made within the 
law, but Beale has no tools with which to make those criticisms. 
This should be enough to condemn Beale's version of the vested 
rights theory. Territorialism is neither normatively attractive nor 
positively accurate. His rules of scope are simply wrong. What we 
are left with, then, is a machine missing a vital gear. Without the 
territorial principle, it does not run. 
2. Salvaging the Concept of Rights 
Beale's theory aims to help judges ascertain parties' rights. In 
criticizing Beale's results, legal realism left this aspiration undis­
turbed; it merely pointed out that territorialism did a bad job. The 
more ambitious aspect of the realist challenge consisted of the re­
jection of the goal itself, the denial of the concept of rights. This 
broader attack on received wisdom was part of a widespread reac­
tion against formalism and metaphysics.124 In a classic statement of 
the principles of realist jurisprudence, Felix Cohen affiliated himself 
with a laundry list of like-minded philosophers - Charles Pierce, 
William James, Bertrand Russell, and Rudolf Carnap, to name a 
few - and linked the realist movement to similar developments in 
physics, mathematics, psychology, and even grammar.125 The com­
mon thread binding these thinkers, what Cohen called the "func­
tional approach," was "an assault upon all dogmas and devices that 
cannot be translated into terms of actual experience. "126 Cohen 
thus demanded, with the pragmatism of William James, that con­
cepts pay their way,127 and asserted, with the verificationism of the 
logical positivists, that "[a]ll concepts that cannot be defined in 
there," he wrote. 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 61.1. He then turned for support to Chief Justice 
Marshall's opinion in Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808), but the quotation in fact 
suggests that personal and territorial traditions mingle: "It is conceded that the legislation of 
every country is territorial; that beyond its own territory, it can only affect its own subjects or 
citizens." 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 279 (emphasis added). Law has never been purely territorial 
in practice. 
123. Cf. PmuP BoBBITr, CoNSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 24 (1991) ("Law is some· 
thing we do, not something we have as a consequence of something we do."). 
124. See LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 14-15 (1986). 
125. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REv. 809, 822, 826 (1935). 
126. Id. at 822. 
127. See WILLIAM JAMES, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM AND THE MEANING 
OF TRUTH, 27, 31-32 (1978) ("You must bring out of each word its practical cash-value • . .  "). 
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terms of the elements of actual experience are meaningless."128 
Armed with these principles, the realists went after the notion of 
rights, arguing, for example, that assertions of rights were no more 
than predictions of official behavior.129 
The attack has been understood in two different ways. First, it 
can be seen as a denial that rights exist.130 This argument is deeply 
out of tune with the philosophies Cohen invoked, for a denial of the 
existence of rights is just as metaphysical as the affirmation it op­
poses.131 It is just as much an attempt to catalog the furniture of the 
universe, to provide a description that is not merely useful for par­
ticular purposes but, in the most robust sense of the word, true. 
Claiming that rights do not exist independent of their enforcement 
(or, equivalently, that law is "made" by judges, rather than 
"found") merely embroils law in the sort of ontological quarrel that 
has troubled philosophy for centuries - in philosophy of mind, be­
tween behaviorists and mentalists; in philosophy of science, be­
tween realists and antirealists; in epistemology, between realists and 
relativists.132 
When philosophical disputes have gone on for so long, with so 
little in the way of resolution, it is a good bet that there is some­
thing wrong with the terms of the debate.133 Rudolf Carnap's diag­
nosis suggests the problem is that questions at this level of 
generality are not ontological at all, but rather practical.134 That is, 
within Beale's framework it makes sense to ask whether a particu­
lar party has a right. Asking whether rights exist at all, on the other 
128. Cohen, supra note 125, at 826. The logical positivists maintained that the meaning of 
a sentence consists of its method of verification. See, e.g., Moritz Schlick, Positivism and 
Realism, in LomCAL POSITIVISM 86-88, 106-07 (A.J. Ayer ed. & David Rynin trans., 1959). It 
follows immediately that an unverifiable proposition - one with no empirical consequences 
- is meaningless. 
129. See, e.g., CooK, supra note 57, at 33; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 
10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897). 
130. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 1.5.2, at 37 ("[The realists] believed, in addi­
tion, that there simply were no such things as vested rights."); Dane, supra note 48, at 1225 
(commenting that realists "have spent a good deal of ink denying the metaphysical reality of 
legal norms or rights 'existing' independent of their enforcement"). 
131. The logical positivists, at least, were clear that they were not denying the existence of 
anything but simply abandoning meaningless discourse. See, e.g., Schlick, supra note 128, at 
106-07. 
132. Law has, of course, endured this debate, though current theory wisely tends to char­
acterize it as a waste of time. See, e.g., DwoRKIN, supra note 48, at 225; Richard H. Fallon, Jr. 
& Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARv. 
L. REv. 1731, 1764 (1991). 
133. See P.M.S. HACKER, WrrroENsTEIN's PLACE IN TwENTIElH·CENTURY .ANALYTIC 
PHILOSOPHY 100-03 (1996). 
134. See Rudolf Carnap, Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology, in MEANING AND NECES­
SITY: A STUDY IN SEMANTICS AND MODAL Lome 207, 207-08 (1956). 
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hand, is either trivial or nonsensical within the framework.135 An­
swering that broader question, in a metaphysical sense, requires a 
true and singular description of the world, an ideal language among 
whose terms the disputed entities will or will not be found. How­
ever, we do not have such a language; what we have are different 
sets of linguistic practices adapted to different purposes and circum­
stances. We are dealing not with entities but with ways of talk­
ing.136 Consequently, the decision whether to talk in terms of rights 
must be made on practical grounds.137 
The better understanding of the realist attack thus takes the ulti­
mate question to be not whether rights exist, but rather whether 
they are theoretically useful. From this perspective, the realist 
claim is that talking in terms of rights does not advance the ball. 
That claim is wrong, and demonstrating its error is the work of this 
article. 
I obviously cannot argue here for the proposition that thinking 
in terms of rights is useful. I can only attempt to show it, and that is 
the task of later sections. I can say, however, that realism's attempt 
to bring scientific methods to bear on conflicts did not succeed in 
producing clarity. What it did succeed in doing was to cut conflicts 
loose from the remainder of legal discourse, which pervasively em­
ploys the concept of rights. That should be a prima facie reason to 
doubt the realist contribution.13s 
135. Cf J.L. Austin, The Meaning of a Word, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 55, 57-58 (3d ed. 
1979). 
136. Cf LuowIG WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL lNvEsTIGATIONS §§ 400-01 (1958). 
137. Cohen certainly seemed to understand this point. See Cohen, supra note 125, at 835 
("A definition of law is useful or useless. It is not true or false • . . •  "). 
138. Another reason is the fate of the related movements to which Cohen pointed. 
Cook's realist approach to conflicts linked itself quite closely to the logical positivists; he 
identified himself explicitly as a "scientific empiricist," CooK, supra note 57, at 46, and took 
as his epigraph for Chapter III a restatement of their central principle of verification, attrib­
uting it to the Marxist and pragmatist philosopher Sydney Hook. See id. at 71. Logical posi­
tivism was a dramatic failure; when AJ. Ayer was asked for the chief difficulty in a television 
interview, he is reported to have responded, "I suppose its main defect was that it wasn't 
true." See Shusha Guppy, Tom Stoppard: The Art of Theater VII, reprinted in ToM STOP· 
PARD IN CONVERSATION 177, 187 (Paul Delaney ed., 1994); see also id. (describing criticism 
of logical positivism as "attacking a dodo"). For a concise philosophical evaluation of logical 
positivism, reaching essentially the same conclusion as Ayer, see HACKER, supra note 133, at 
64-65. Both positivists and realists, I suggest, erred by embracing a dogmatic reductivism 
rather than a sensitive analysis of the actual use of language. Realism's value lies in its skep· 
tical contributions, not in any attempts to create a general theory of law, and it may be better 
understood as consisting simply of the former. See JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. 
CoLEMAN, PHILosoPHY OF LAw 35 (1990). 
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What I want to draw from Beale's work, then, is the principle 
that the basic task in conflicts is to determine whether the plaintiff 
has an enforceable right. As discussed above,139 this determination 
requires a two-step inquiry. First, the court must analyze the scope 
of the laws invoked by plaintiff and defendant to determine 
whether a conflict exists. If it finds a conflict, it must employ con­
flicts rules to resolve it. The question at this point is how to arrive 
at the appropriate scope and conflicts rules. For that enterprise I 
will enlist parts of interest analysis, and before coopting the theory, 
I must evaluate it. 
The realists attacked Beale's approach on two levels, faulting 
both its results and its theoretical orientation. Interest analysis has 
been subjected to the same dual challenge. At the level of result, 
the charge is that Currie erred in his creation of rules of scope and 
conflicts rules. At the level of theory, put forth most forcefully by 
Lea Brilmayer,140 the realist argument is that the governmental in­
terests Currie purported to identify are not part of a realist or func­
tionalist analysis, but rather a metaphysical construct akin to 
Beale's vested rights, imported for a similar deus ex machina solu­
tion to conflicts questions. Once again, I will consider the specific 
criticisms before moving on to the general ones. 
1. The Weakness of Currie's Approach 
As a normative matter, Currie's rules are not very attractive. 
His examples are complex, but the tendency that emerges is un­
abashedly parochial. Generally speaking, as a matter of scope, 
state law grants rights only when to do so favors a local; and when 
rights conflict, forum law always wins.141 Neither of these 
domiciliary-centered rules seems a good recommendation. 
Like Beale, however, Currie advanced his scope analysis as a 
positive statement of the law. It is, he claimed, simply interpreta­
tion of the substantive laws at issue.142 The utility of the concept of 
governmental interests depends on this claim, and I consider 
Brilmayer's challenge to it in the next section. The practical weak­
ness of Currie's approach is more obvious, and it has to do with his 
conflicts rule. 
139. See supra section II.E. 
140. See sources cited supra note 78. 
141. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 2.1.2, at 65. 
142. See, e.g., CuruuE, supra note 102, at 118. 
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Currie did not purport to derive his preference for forum law in 
true conflicts from analysis of state law. In fact, he advanced it with 
some embarrassment, as "not an ideal" but "simply the best avail­
able."143 It is not an attempt to resolve conflicts at all, and it pro­
duces a theory just as impotent as Beale's without the territorial 
principle. Vested rights analysis worked only so long as its rules of 
scope suppressed the possibility of conflict; without these rules, 
conflict appears and cannot be resolved. Interest analysis, while no 
longer working explicitly in terms of rights, confronted the same 
problem. Currie's rules of scope suggested that some multistate 
cases did not present conflicts. Because his rules of scope were 
more plausible than Beale's, the approach had some practical value 
- identifying false conflicts is generally considered a real contribu­
tion. But it did not even pretend to solve the fundamental problem. 
In true conflicts, Currie suggested that courts should apply forum 
law, not because it was appropriate according to conflicts principles, 
but because such conflicts were at bottom insoluble.144 
This is not much of a conflicts theory. If we grant that state 
interests are entities discernible by the methods Currie advocates, 
the theory shows that some cases do not present the basic conflicts 
issue: a clash between two sovereigns, each of which demands that 
its law be given effect. Where such conflicts do exist, however, in­
terest analysis offers no solution.145 
The only reason that this confession of weakness seems anything 
less than a confession of failure is that interest analysis employs 
what I have called a personal-jurisdiction-style analysis. This ap­
proach conceives the task as choosing applicable law, not resolving 
conflicts, and it suggests that choosing forum law does not imply 
that the interests of other states have been deemed inferior.146 If 
choosing forum law is acceptable in true conflicts - Currie calls it 
"sensible and clearly constitutional"147 - then true conflicts do not 
create a gaping hole in the heart of the theory. It is for this reason, 
I think, that interest analysis is forced to characterize away the con­
flict, to adopt the personal-jurisdiction-style choice-of-law ap­
proach. If the conventional legal perspective reveals that the 
143. See CURRIE, supra note 76, at 169. 
144. See CURRIE, supra note 102, at 107, 117. 
145. This is not precisely true; after all, Currie suggested that in true conflicts, courts 
should apply forum law. But he did not see this as a resolution. See id. at 117-21. Nor should 
he have; it is obviously discriminatory and, I will argue, unconstitutional. 
146. See CURRIE, supra note 22, at 181-82. 
147. CuRRIE, supra note 102, at 119. 
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interest analysis approach to true conflicts is illegitimate - and I 
will show that it does, though the demonstration is still a ways off -
the recharacterization is unavailing. In that case, interest analysis 
fails because it cannot handle conflicts. 
2. Salvaging the Concept of Interest 
Just as Beale's rights-based framework can survive without his 
territorial rule of scope, Currie's concept of governmental interest 
does not depend on his conflicts rule. Nor, of course, does it de­
pend on the precise rules of scope he derived. Currie's admission 
that his analyses were only tentative and "subject to modification 
on the advice of those who know better"148 - namely state courts 
and legislatures - shows that the theory can accommodate a wide 
variety of such rules. 
Brilmayer's more ambitious attack on the notion of governmen­
tal interest begins with Currie's scope analysis. She rejects the idea 
that scope can be determined simply by analysis of the substantive 
law and faults Currie for ignoring state choice-of-law rules in his 
determination of governmental interests.149 If correct, the criticism 
has serious implications; it shows that the key concept of interest is 
not something derived from state law but "an externally deter­
mined and objective concept that is imposed on state legislatures 
and state judges by scholars."1so The criticism is not correct, how­
ever: it runs together scope analysis and conflicts analysis. Choice­
of-law rules are not rules of scope, and Currie was right not to defer 
to them. 
A functional analysis leads to this conclusion, for choice-of-law 
rules simply cannot do the work of rules of scope. To the extent 
that they might seem to grant or deny rights, they are trumped by 
substantive law. First, choice-of-law rules will never affirmatively 
produce a right denied by substantive law. If a Connecticut statute 
grants rights explicitly only to those injured within the state, a 
choice-of-law rule dictating the application of Connecticut law to an 
extraterritorial injury will not expand the statute's scope. Second, 
choice-of-law rules do not withhold rights affirmatively granted by 
substantive law. A state choice-of-law rule codifying the territorial 
principle that the law of the place of the tort governs might seem to 
indicate a lack of intent to grant rights to a domiciliary injured 
148. CURRIE, The Verdict of Quiescent Years, in SELECTED EssAYS, supra note 14, at 592. 
149. See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, §§ 2.5.1-.4. 
150. Id. § 2.5.5, at 110. 
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outside its borders, but this is not in fact so. Even the territorialists 
granted that if a tort occurred in a place with no local law, at least 
between two domiciliaries of the same state, that state's law would 
determine rights and obligations.151 
Instead, choice-of-law rules typically prescribe which rights will 
prevail when rights conflict.152 (It is because there are no conflict­
ing rights that the law of common domicile applies in tort cases oc­
curring in lawless lands, despite territorial choice-of-law rules.) 
They are, generally speaking, conflicts rules. The confusion over 
their nature results presumably from the fact that choice-of-law 
rules are drafted to answer the question "what law applies?" This 
question is part of the rhetoric of choice, and as I have suggested 
before, it prevents us from seeing clearly the structure of conflicts 
analysis.153 The question "what law applies?" runs together the is­
sues of whether a party has a right, and whether that right prevails 
against a conflicting right. It suggests that a choice-of-law rule is 
relevant to both. Thus Larry Kramer, maintaining that "choice of 
law is a process of interpreting laws to determine their applicability 
on the facts of a particular case," claims that consequently "the fo­
rum can never ignore other states' choice-of-law systems."154 But 
if, as I have argued, choice-of-law rules are conflicts rules, not rules 
of scope, the conclusion does not follow. A conflicts rule that local 
rights will yield to foreign rights on a particular constellation of 
facts does not mean that the local rights do not exist. 
Of course, the conclusion that choice-of-law rules are conflicts 
rules does not salvage Currie's positive analysis; the question re­
mains why he did not defer to them instead of concluding that fo­
rum rights should always prevail over foreign rights. It might seem, 
however, to rescue his conception of governmental interests as 
things that an analyst can discern by analysis of substantive law. In 
fact, there is another element of the challenge that must be faced. 
151. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909} 
{Holmes, J.) ("No doubt in regions subject to no sovereign . . .  [civilized nations] may treat 
some relations between their citizens as governed by their own law, and keep to some extent 
the old notion of personal sovereignty alive."); 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 45.2 (discussing 
jurisdiction over actions arising on the high seas). 
152. A rule looking to another state's law may also reflect an intention to give the same 
rights as that state's substantive law would in a domestic case. This is the most natural inter­
pretation of a rule that, for example, provides that the rights of heirs shall be determined by 
the law of the testator's domicile. Cf. In re Annesley, 1 Ch. 692 {1926) (Eng.). This is what 
Perry Dane calls a "rule of assimilation": it incorporates the terms of foreign law in much the 
same way that federal copyright law looks to state law to determine who are the "children" 
entitled to share in renewal rights. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956). 
153. See supra Part I. 
154. See Kramer, supra note 116, at 1005. 
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Brilmayer's critique of Currie devotes much space to the claim 
that his "governmental interests" are objective, rather than subjec­
tive - that is, that their existence is determined by a priori theo­
rizing, rather than analysis of state law.155 I have suggested that 
they are subjective, and Currie, to the extent that he addressed the 
issue, said so explicitly.156 Brilmayer's critique of the concept of 
governmental interests, however, is actually disjunctive. Like the 
realist attack on rights, it maintains not that these interests do not 
exist but that the concept is not useful, regardless of the nature of 
interests.151 If interests are objective, they are metaphysical fictions 
that judges may safely ignore. If they are subjective, then they are 
determined, in the absence of legislative specification, by the 
judge's own decision. Interest analysts may seek to free judges 
from territorialist dogma by showing them a wider range of options, 
but that is the extent of their contribution. If the judge decides 
upon reflection that state law is nonetheless territorial in scope, the 
interest analyst can only carp from the sidelines.15s 
The horns of the dilemma converge on the same point: the con­
cept of governmental interests cannot direct the resolution of cases. 
Interest analysts have no footing for "normative critique of existing 
case law."159 This is true - but it is also true of most current con­
flicts scholarship. Suggestions for conflicts rules or rules of scope 
are always mere suggestions; states may decide otherwise. Still, this 
hardly shows that the concept is useless; proposals of better law can 
be invaluable. My analysis actually aspires to slightly greater nor­
mative bite: it seeks to show the constitutional limits on state con­
flicts practices. From this perspective, Currie's approach has great 
utility. The methodology of interest analysis is useful because it 
foregrounds the question of what states are attempting to do. 
Currie's particular suggestions are especially useful precisely be­
cause they are so parochial. Currie posits a maximally selfish state, 
interested only in advantaging its domiciliaries. Starting from this 
position and investigating the extent to which the state can achieve 
its selfish ends produces a "bad state" view of conflicts, which is 
what the field needs at this point. If states cannot be compelled to 
155. See, e.g., BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 2.5-2.6, at 99-119. 
156. See CuruuE, supra note 148, at 592. 
157. Brilmayer actually concludes that Currie's interests are objective and hence denies 
their existence. See BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 2.5.5, at 115. She does, however, give a 
quite complete statement of the weaknesses of subjective interests as well. See id. § 2.5.3. 
158. See id. § 2.6, at 117-18. 
159. See id. § 2.5.3, at 104. 
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take the high road, the important question is what barriers exist 
along the downward path. 
C. The Positive Account 
Despite the criticisms of vested rights and interest analysis, con­
ceptual building blocks remain. Joseph Beale posed the key ques­
tion: Does the plaintiff have an enforceable right? And Brainerd 
Currie identified the correct way to begin the inquiry: apply the 
tools of statutory construction to determine whether the law the 
plaintiff invokes seeks to give him a right, and whether the law the 
defendant invokes seeks to restrain that right. This scope analysis 
disposes of some cases - those in which the plaintiff pleads a law 
that gives him no right, and those in which the defendant interposes 
a law that gives him no defense. On its face, and as developed by 
Currie, that is as far as it goes. Larry Kramer has taken interest 
analysis somewhat further,160 in what I think is essentially the right 
direction, and the positive account I develop here is quite similar to 
his approach. 
The previous sections clarified some foundational points. The 
idea that rights must vest under one, and only one, law, to be identi­
fied by appeal to a priori principles, is indeed misguided; but the 
idea that analysis must eschew the concept of rights is no better. 
Conflicts scholarship has thus conformed (metaphorically, of 
course) to Newton's laws of motion: Beale's misguided metaphys­
ics are matched by an equal and opposite error in the realist reac­
tion. If there is progress in the scholarship, we might hope for ever 
more gradual oscillations of the pendulum between vested rights 
and realism. Such is, in essence, the aim of this article: to show that 
there exists a happy medium. The two approaches are not incom­
patible but in fact have much to offer each other. 
1. Thinking in Terms of Rights 
Both vested rights and interest analysis, I have said, suppress the 
notion of conflict. The vested rights theory simply denies the possi­
bility; interest analysis hides it behind the idea of choice. Ulti­
mately, both theories effectively resolve conflicts by invoking 
principles - territorialism and forum-preference - that serve poli­
cies of conflicts jurisprudence accidentally, if at all. It would be bet­
ter for everyone, I suggest, if we stopped hiding conflicts and 
started thinking about how they are resolved. I will ultimately ar-
160. See, e.g., Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81. 
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gue that the Constitution speaks to this point, but the first step is to 
take conflicts out of the shadows in which the choice-of-law per­
spective shrouds them.161 
The easy way to do this is to return to the idea of rights. This is 
a venture one might hesitate to undertake, given the amount of crit­
icism the concept has absorbed,162 but I have suggested that the 
criticisms are overstated. Nor am I alone in suggesting that a 
greater focus on rights would benefit conflicts theory.163 Perry 
Dane, in particular, has defended at length what he calls the 
"Norm-Based" view of law - essentially, commitment to the rule 
of law164 - and argued that it implies "vestedness" (the principle 
that a party's rights should not depend on the forum).165 While I 
sympathize with Dane's project, I do not intend to make a jurispru­
dential argument.166 I suggest instead that a description that oper-
161. Resolving conflicts is hard, and abandoning the personal-jurisdiction-style analysis 
will force us to confront some new difficulties. Currie similarly found that his approach faced 
problems that the vested rights theory did not - notably, the issue of discrimination between 
citizens and noncitizens of a state. His diagnosis was one we should keep in mind: 
The fact that these problems come immediately into view when conflicts problems are 
approached in this way does not mean that they are generated by the method. Indeed, 
their prompt appearance is ground for an inference that they have been present from the 
beginning, obscured and suppressed by the traditional conflict-of-laws system. 
CuRRIE, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 
in SELECTED EssAYS, supra note 14, at 445, 448. 
162. "Indeed, one may now wonder how any juristic construct such as 'right' could have 
been accepted as fundamental in the explanation of any important aspect of judicial activity," 
wrote David Cavers. Cavers, supra note 56, at 175-76; see also Juenger, supra note 28, at 435 
(vested rights theory is "sheer sophistry"). 
163. See generally Brilmayer, supra note 71. 
164. See Dane, supra note 48, at 1218. 
165. See id. at 1245. I will claim that the Constitution requires a neutrality quite similar 
to Dane's vestedness. See infra Part VI. 
166. In particular, I do not mean to be endorsing a "deontological" rather than a "conse­
quentialist" approach to conflicts. Dane and Brilmayer, unlike Kramer, become philosoph­
ically self-conscious when they talk of rights. See Dane, supra note 48, at 1218-23; 
BruLMAYER, supra note 8, § 5.2 (describing modem choice of law theory as instrumentalist); 
Brilmayer, supra note 71, at 1278 ("There is more at stake �an semantics. Choosing to talk 
in terms of rights rather than policies or interests represents a fundamental jurisprudential 
commitment which is reflected in the way that concrete problems are resolved."). The sug­
gestion that the language of rights implies a deontological rather than consequentialist theory 
of law is, however, overstated. Michael Green, for example, has shown that a realist ap­
proach (policy analysis) is in fact compatible with deontological principles. See Green, supra 
note 12, at 968-86. A more obvious objection is that the "instrumental" goal that judges seek 
to maximize might be vindication of parties' preexisting rights in general. More seriously, 
Brilmayer begs the question by assuming that whether application of a law will achieve its 
purpose is a different question from whether its application will vindicate preexisting rights. 
See BruLMAYER, supra note 8, § 5.2, at 225; see also Dane, supra note 48, at 1243-44 (sug­
gesting that only the "Decision-Based" view of law would propose that courts, in adjudicat­
ing disputes, are "primarily charged" with advancing the policies of their states). As Larry 
Kramer sensibly suggests, these are basically the same question: if allowing a party to appeal 
to a particular law will not effectuate the law's purpose, it is quite likely that the law does not 
give that party any rights. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1064; Kramer, Rethinking 
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ates in terms of rights is more consistent with ordinary legal 
discourse, and that it will prove more useful in developing a juris­
prudence of conflicts. My claim that both vested rights theory and 
interest analysis hide real conflicts between laws is not meant as a 
metaphysical assertion. It is not a claim that "rights exist independ­
ent of their enforcement" - whatever that means. I describe con­
flicts decisions from a conventional legal perspective because they 
are legal decisions. I talk in terms of rights because that is how 
lawyers and judges talk, and it is useful to talk in that way. 
The description I propose is, essentially, a reworking of interest 
analysis that operates in terms of rights and thereby makes explicit 
the conflicts that had been hidden by the personal-jurisdiction-style 
analysis of "choice of law." I will start with first principles. These 
need not be accepted, though I hope that they will be uncontrover­
sial enough to arouse little opposition. The ultimate test of the the­
ory should be its utility; whether it seems natural is not as important 
as whether it handles conflicts effectively. 
Law is an instrument of social organization, designed to allow 
society to function and to resolve disagreements without resort to 
private violence.167 Consequently, law establishes constraints on 
permissible behavior. Transgression of these limits may authorize 
the government, if it can prove the proscribed conduct, to impose 
civil or criminal sanctions to deter such conduct. It may also au­
thorize other private parties, upon lesser but similar proof, to win a 
damages judgment in order to be made whole. This authorization 
of recovery may be characterized as the creation of a right: the 
Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 291-303. Indeed, this is conventional statutory interpreta­
tion, see Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 291-303, employing standard 
reference to the intent and purpose of the drafters, see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 
499 U.S. 244, 248-59 (1991). 
Conversely, references to parties' rights need not suggest a deontological morality at 
work. The language of rights may be used simply because determinate rules (which is what 
rights talk leads to) maximize utility. That is, rights talk might just be rule-utilitarianism. 
Legal scholars are bafflingly blind to the existence of this approach and tend to think that any 
invocation of a rule is deontological. The blindness is the more surprising because the law 
and economics movement has devoted much ingenuity and more ink to showing that particu­
lar allocations of rights are or are not efficient, i.e., utility-maximizing according to the 
willingness-to-pay metric. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 12-
17 (1998). Brilmayer does at least mention rule-utilitarianism. See Brilmayer, supra note 71, 
at 1291 n.53. Perry Dane suggests that commitment to the rule of law implies a commitment 
to the idea that a norm has an importance as "a goal in and of itself," and that vindicating 
that norm at a cost to its underlying purpose has "a special nobility." Dane, supra note 48, at 
1219. But rule-utilitarianism surely is not committed to that proposition; rule-utilitarians 
may simply believe that rules are more efficient in general even if their fit is not perfect. 
167. Larry Kramer starts from a very similar picture of civil society. See Kramer, Myth, 
supra note 81, at 1052. 
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right to win a judgment upon a showing of the required elements.168 
A judgment is a judicial determination that the showing has been 
made. It also confers a right, namely the right to the damages 
awarded. The next question is what happens to rights created by 
one state when they meet the rights of another. 
2. Thinking in Terms of Conflict 
When governments create rights, other governments may or 
may not respect those rights.169 For example, if the law of a state 
does not authorize recovery upon a showing that allows a right to 
recover in another state, it gives people a right to engage in the 
conduct for which the plaintiff seeks damages.17° We then have a 
conflict and must decide which right prevails. There is no reason to 
describe this as a question of choosing which law applies, and, as we 
shall see, this notion of choice does not comport with current con­
flicts methodology.171 Further, speaking in terms of conflicts may 
change the way we think about these cases. A conflict is not typi­
cally resolved by a personal-jurisdiction-style analysis that identifies 
a number of permissible options, but it is rather a legal question of 
whether the plaintiff's or the defendant's claimed right must 
168. There is no need, for my purposes, to suppose that these rights vest at the time of 
any particular action. A state tort law will give certain people a right to recover damages if 
they make the required showing. Whether a tort has been committed will obviously have a 
bearing on whether or not the showing can be made, but it need not affect our characteriza­
tion of the right. Beale, on the other hand, did need to identify a unique moment of vesting. 
The territorial principle could not operate without a method of determining in which state 
the rights vest, and without the last act doctrine, Beale would have been forced to confront 
conflicting rights. But my point is exactly that these conflicts exist, and that an analysis that 
hides them does us no favors. 
169. With judgments, they typically do; a judgment obtained in one state confers rights 
enforceable in any state. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367 
(1996). There is nothing analytically special about judgments; they are simply one instance of 
state-created rights. The difference b,etween rights based on judgments and those based on 
legislation or common law is that there will seldom, if ever, be a right the defendant can 
assert against enforcement of the judgment. States have not adopted laws giving their citi­
zens rights against foreign judgments. Indeed, Congress has specified that they may not, see 
Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
prevents them from doing so of its own force, see, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 n.4 
(1951). In consequence, cases in which a party asserts a right derived from a judgment tend 
not to feature conflicting rights, and a scope-based analysis will suffice. 
170. See generally Wesley Newcombe Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as 
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE LJ. 16 (1913). To say that one has a right to engage 
in certain conduct means (roughly) that the conduct cannot form the basis for recovery or 
sanctions; to say that one does not have a right means the conduct may. (This is only roughly 
true because in some cases the exercise of constitutional rights may allow recovery of dam­
ages. For example, breaching a personal services contract is constitutionally protected in that 
a state may not use its criminal Jaw to compel performance. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 
219, 238-44 (1911). But the breaching party will still be liable in contract.) 
171. See infra section IV.C. 
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yield.172 What the law is that resolves this question I must leave for 
later.173 
I therefore suggest the following analysis. The plaintiff may 
plead whatever law he desires. Courts are simply not in the busi­
ness of amending complaints sua sponte. They are in the business 
of judging their sufficiency.174 The defendant might argue that the 
law· pleaded gives the plaintiff no rights at all - that it does not 
even purport to give a right to one in the plaintiff's situation.175 
This is the claim that the action falls outside the reach of the plain­
tiff's chosen law - it is an appeal to a rule of scope. 
Such would ordinarily be the case, for example, if, in a suit be­
tween two Connecticut domiciliaries over a car accident in New 
York, the plaintiff claims a right under Oregon law. It is very un­
likely that Oregon intends to give the plaintiff a right in this situa­
tion. This is, however, just a question of interpreting Oregon law. 
Absent some statement to the contrary, it makes sense to presume 
that a state's tort laws are intended to apply at most to torts involv­
ing its citizens and to torts committed within its borders. Quite pos­
sibly the intended reach is narrower, though this is more difficult to 
ascertain. My point here is simply that if the plaintiff invokes a law 
that has no application to him, the defendant can defeat the claim 
on that basis. 
Suppose, however, that there is a generous Oregon statute 
claiming to give rights to all persons injured within the United 
States. If the plaintiff invokes this statute, the defendant cannot 
rely on the rule of scope argument that no right exists. He might, 
however, argue that some other law - presumably the law of either 
New York or Connecticut176 - gives him a defense against the 
right asserted under Oregon law. 
Both New York and Connecticut law satisfy the broad condi­
tions set out above for presumptive applicability of law. The de­
fendant is a Connecticut domiciliary, so Connecticut may well 
172. Cf. Laycock, supra note 73, at 259. 
173. I will claim that although the determination of the prevailing right lies within the 
legitimate authority of the states, the Constitution sets out parameters within which state 
conflicts rules must be drawn. See infra Part VI. 
174. With regard to this point - that what happens in a conflicts case is that the plaintiff 
files a complaint alleging violation of some right and the court assesses its sufficiency - I am 
in complete agreement with Kramer. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81, 
at 282. 
175. Kramer characterizes this question as whether the law gives a prima facie right, pre­
sumably to indicate that prima facie rights may not be enforceable. As discussed supra note 
99, I think we may speak simply of rights. But of course nothing turns on the terminology. 
176. Or possibly federal law. I consider state-federal conflicts in infra section IV.B. 
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desire to protect him. And the tort occurred in New York, so New 
York may well intend to determine the situations under which peo­
ple acting in New York will be forced to compensate those they 
injure. To determine whether the defense the defendant invokes is 
applicable, we need again to take a closer look at the law. 
Let us consider a few possibilities. The defendant may argue 
that his driving met the standard of care established by Connecticut 
law, and that this absolves him of liability. It is unlikely, however, 
that Connecticut intends its domiciliaries to carry with them Con­
necticut's rules of the road. Generally speaking, rules directed to 
so-called "primary conduct" - the actions forming the basis for the 
lawsuit - should be presumed to have a territorial scope. 
Alternatively, the law at issue might not focus on primary con­
duct. It might be a rule that has very little effect on the conduct 
forming the basis for the lawsuit, such as a rule providing that tort 
claims abate on the death of the tortfeasor.177 Again, both New 
York and Connecticut laws meet the test of prima facie applicabil­
ity. But would New York likely intend to prevent one Connecticut 
domiciliary from recovering against the estate of another, when this 
restriction would have so little impact on their actions within New 
York? Probably not; the defendant will have an easier time invok­
ing the abatement rule if it is a provision of Connecticut law.178 
Rules that do not focus on primary conduct should generally be 
presumed to be intended for domiciliaries. 
Let us suppose, finally, that the defense invoked is one that the 
state intends to offer to the defendant - it comes from a New York 
statute setting the standard of care for its highways. If the Oregon 
law at issue purports to hold the defendant to a higher standard of 
care, we have what my framework sees as a true conflict. How this 
177. A distinction is often drawn between "conduct-regulating" and "loss-allocating" 
rules. See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985). Currie draws 
a similar line between "rules of conduct" and "rules of decision." See CuruuE, On the Dis­
placement of the Law of the Forum, in SELECTED EssAYS, supra note 14, at 3, 68-69. I avoid 
the terminology because I doubt the distinction is tenable as a general matter. Charitable 
immunity, which Schultz treats as loss-allocating, will surely have some effect on how careful 
charities are; immunities obviously eliminate the deterrent effects of liability. Still, rules are 
directed at particular objects, though they may have broader effects. Tue question at this 
point is simply which parties and transactions a legislature intends its law to cover. An abate­
ment rule will lift liability only from the dead, and death is generally an unimprovable deter­
rent Thus its effect on primary conduct should be minimal, and its applicability 
presumptively domiciliary-focused. 
178. It may be, of course, that New York cannot withhold from the defendant defenses 
made available to its own domiciliaries. See infra section VI.B.2. 
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conflict is to be resolved is a different question, and I claim it is a 
legal one, to which conventional legal reasoning applies.179 
IV. DEFENDING THE THEORY: T wo EXAMPLES 
My argument is that a conflicts case presents a conventional 
legal question. The plaintiff asserts a right, grounded in some law; 
the defendant asserts a contrary right, grounded typically in a dif­
ferent law. The court must decide which right prevails, and this is a 
legal question, to be determined by state conflicts rules operating 
within constitutional constraints. When a court "chooses" the "ap­
plicable law" it is really determining that one right will be recog­
nized and the other subordinated.1so 
Given my disavowal of jurisprudential intent, it might be won­
dered how much force the word "really" can muster. Generally 
speaking, I think that claims about what "really" happens are argu­
ments in favor of a particular description, to be judged by the utility 
of that des.cription. If others prefer a different description, counter­
arguments may be persuasive, but they are never conclusive. Still, 
there should be a presumption in favor of the conventional legal 
perspective. If conflicts cases depart from this and employ a novel 
vocabulary to describe quite ordinary questions, we should ask why. 
Moreover, the principle that competing descriptions are essentially 
equals does not always hold in law; relativism comes to an end 
somewhere. The Constitution eventually takes over, in that if a de­
scription that sees a constitutional violation is sufficiently plausible, 
states may not defend their conduct by offering an alternate de­
scription on which there is no violation. That, finally, is what I 
claim happens here. The conflicts, or conventional legal, perspec­
tive makes the violation so clear that the Constitution forbids us 
from hiding behind the rhetoric of choice of law. This is a familiar 
point from conflicts jurisprudence; for example, states may not 
subordinate federal rights by claiming merely to have applied their 
own law. 
179. This assertion may seem so obvious as to be unnecessary. Tue question is resolved 
by the court, and courts resolve legal questions. But in making this claim I am neither flog­
ging the choir nor preaching to a dead horse. Currie's interest analysis seems to suppose that 
it is not a legal question. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 22, at 182. 
180. If the court actually decides that one law governs (to the exclusion of the other), it 
has likely awarded victory to a cluster of rights. This is an unfortunate consequence of the 
choice-of-law vocabulary. There is little reason to suppose that an intelligent conflicts rule 
would treat bodies of law as indivisible units. It might make good sense to look to the law of 
the place of a car accident for rules of the road but to another law for other purposes. In fact, 
current approaches to conflicts, while claiming to select "the applicable law," do not pick a 
law that governs in this sense. See infra section IV.C. 
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Two examples help substantiate the argument that multistate 
conflicts cases raise no distinctive legal issues. Both feature circum­
stances in which a conflict between laws cannot be denied, in which 
the court cannot invoke the idea of a "choice of law." Neither, con­
sequently, is typically considered as raising a "choice-of-law" is­
sue.181 This is advantageous for my purposes; it suggests precisely 
that "choice of law" is an attempt to avoid conflicts rather than a 
sensible method of resolving them. 
A. The Unseen Conflict: Purely Domestic Cases 
The canonical conflicts cases are, without exception, cases that 
have contacts with more than one jurisdiction. From the perspec­
tive that takes conflicts cases to be about choice of law, this makes 
sense: if there is no possibility of choosing the law of another juris­
diction, there cannot be a choice-of-law issue. But there are purely 
domestic cases in which laws conflict, or seem to.182 These cases, 
like the more conventional multistate conflicts cases, require courts 
to determine which law prevails, which right will be vindicated. An 
examination of such cases is fruitful because it tells us something 
about what conflicts analysis is. It lifts the veil of choice-of-law 
rhetoric and allows us to see what goes on when courts resolve con­
flicts between laws. 
The first sort of domestic conflict arises from transitions be­
tween legal regimes.183 When a state enacts a new statute, creating 
new rights or obligations, there will be cases in which the relevant 
transactions took place before the enactment of the new statute. 
Courts must then decide whether the new rights or obligations will 
be recognized in such cases - whether, for example, a defendant 
whose conduct met the old standard of care should be held liable 
because a new statute imposes a greater duty. 
181. The notable exception here is Larry Kramer, who argues that domestic cases and 
multistate cases raise similar "choice-of-law" issues. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 
supra note 81, at 283. 
182. In purely domestic cases, courts must also perform a scope analysis to determine if 
the law at issue grants the parties rights. See CURRIE, supra note 22, at 184. That is not very 
surprising, since scope analysis is just statutory interpretation. The presence of scope analysis 
in domestic cases might suggest that there are some similarities between conflicts cases and 
domestic cases - after all, Beale's theory had nothing more than rules of scope. It might 
also suggest the correctness of the initial scope analysis in conflicts cases. More significant 
for present purposes is the fact that courts actually employ conflicts rules in domestic cases. 
They do so rarely, because the detection of a conflict is frequently taken as an indication that 
the scope analysis has gone wrong - courts presume that legislatures do not intend to create 
conflicting rights. But the conflicts rules are there if we look for them. 
183. Currie also noted the presence of scope analysis in retroactivity jurisprudence. See 
id. Again, my point is slightly different: courts also perform conflicts analysis. 
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This is, or may be, a conflicts issue; indeed, the Supreme Court 
has characterized it as a matter of intertemporal "choice of law."184 
The process of decision, however - at least where the new law is 
created by statute185 - is no complex and murky choice-of-law 
calculus. Instead, the court engages in the conventional process of 
statutory interpretation to ascertain whether the new law purports 
to grant rights to, or impose liability on, the parties.186 This is, of 
course, the scope-based first step of interest analysis: determining 
whether there is a conflict. Ordinarily, statutes operate only pro­
spectively. The rights they create may not be invoked with respect 
to transactions occurring before their enactment, and so there is no 
conflict between old and new law. The legislature may also specify, 
however, that the new statute is to have retroactive effect. In this 
case, there will be a conflict: both the old and the new statute pur­
port to grant rights. Such conflicts are easily resolved: the new law 
prevails, unless the Constitution restrains it.187 That is the applica­
tion of a conflicts rule; there is no reason to describe it as a choice 
of law.188 
Thus it can be seen that at least some purely domestic cases in­
volve conflicts, and the analysis performed in such cases fits com­
fortably within the approach I advocate. Retroactivity cases are not 
the only ones. In fact, the potential for a conflict exists in all cases. 
This may seem counterintuitive. After all, in purely domestic cases, 
once the plaintiff has made a claim that some law entitles him to 
relief, it usually does not matter what other laws say. For example, 
if the plaintiff makes out a tort claim, it does not matter that the 
defendant has available an adequate defense in contract. It will do 
him no good to argue that contract law applies to the case, unless 
the point is that the plaintiff has actually pleaded in contract and 
184. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 535 (1991). 
185. The issue of the retroactive effect of a judicial decision, rather than a new statute, is 
quite murky. Oddly, the analysis now favored by the Court resembles Joseph Beale's vested 
rights theory: it hides conflicts between early and later law via the premise that only the law 
in effect at the time of the parties' actions can confer rights. See Kermit Roosevelt III, A 
Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CoNN. L. 
REv. 1075, 1080 (1999). This is not an encouraging sign, and I have argued that current 
retroactivity jurisprudence is the unfortunate legacy of an earlier mistake. See id. at 1087-91. 
Matters would be much clearer if the Court simply confronted the existence of conflict and 
adopted, as a conflicts rule, the principle that later rights prevail over earlier rights, as it has 
done in the statutory context. 
186. See, e.g., Landgraf v. U.S.I. Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (engaging in compre­
hensive interpretation of the Civil Rights Act § 102 to determine whether plaintiff, who ar­
gued for retroactive application, had a cause of action). 
187. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. 
188. Legislatures do, of course, choose whether their statutes apply retroactively or not, 
but that is a matter of choosing the scope of the rights. 
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not in tort. The contract defense the state has created does not 
interfere with the plaintiff's right to recover in tort; the two state­
created rights do not, so to speak, touch each other. They coexist 
perfectly happily; the defense does not apply to the right to recover, 
nor does it purport to. This is, again, what scope analysis reveals. 
But such is not always the case. The state may, for example, 
have created immunities. The question then is whether the immu­
nity applies to the case at hand, whether the defendant's right inter­
feres with the plaintiff's. It may or may not; this is a matter of scope 
analysis - that is, interpreting the law. Suppose, for example, that 
the plaintiff makes out a tort claim, but the defendant claims to be a 
state officer acting within the course of his duties. The state may 
have immunized such officers, or it may have placed a limit on dam­
ages recoverable in such actions.189 The court must decide whether 
the state immunity may be invoked by the defendant - whether it 
grants him a right. If it does, the scope analysis has revealed a con­
flict. The court must then determine whether the immunity defeats 
the plaintiff's claim: it must decide whether the immunity prevails 
over the plaintiff's right to recover in tort. 
This is, it should be evident, analytically identical to the issue 
that arises when a plaintiff relies on one state's law for his right to 
recover, and a defendant asserts a defense created by the law of 
another state. The court must decide if there is a conflict between 
the rights asserted and, if so, which prevails. Again, there is no ob­
vious reason to describe this as a choice between laws.19o 
The suggestion that purely domestic cases may involve conflicts 
of law, like the analysis of the preceding section, bears an obvious 
similarity to some of Larry Kramer's work.191 Kramer argues that 
all cases involve a choice of law.192 I think this is an important in­
sight, and correct, but I would phrase it somewhat differently: no 
cases involve a choice of law. Of course, this sounds rather more 
like a denial than a rephrasing. Kramer's point, however, is that 
cases in which courts perform an explicit "choice-of-law" calculus 
189. See generally, e.g., Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732 (Utah 1996) (discussing Utah Gov­
ernmental Immunity Act). 
190. This does not mean that it could not be described as a choice of law - though, as 
section IV.C shows, it cannot be described as a choice of which law applies. But the fact that 
in the domestic context there is no temptation to do so should suggest that something odd is 
going on in the realm of conflicts. My technique for revealing that oddity is basically to 
redescribe conflicts cases from the conventional legal perspective. I will argue that from this 
perspective, conventional conflicts analysis is fatally flawed, and that conflicts cases are de­
scribed as involving choice precisely in order to mask these flaws. See infra section IV.C. 
191. In particular, see Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 81, at 280-83. 
192. See id. 
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do not differ in any fundamental way from those in which they do 
not; the same process goes on in determining whether the plaintiff 
has a right to relief. I claim that this determination does not require 
a court to "choose" which law to "apply." Now, of course, this 
claim is a bit hard to square with the practice of courts, and from 
the descriptive perspective, Kramer has things rather easier. It 
must seem more plausible to suggest that a similar process to the 
explicit choice of law goes on in all cases than to suggest that the 
explicit choice of law does not occur. I do not - and cannot -
deny that courts often characterize their analysis as choosing be­
tween competing laws. I claim that "choice of law" is a misnomer; 
it is more accurate to say that when a court "chooses" one state's 
law over another's, it has actually rejected a claim of right based on 
the nonselected law.193 It has refused to honor a right created by 
that law, and thereby determined that rights based in the law it 
"selects" prevail in a conflict between rights.194 Courts find no need 
to talk of choice in the ordinary case, and there is no need to do so 
in multistate cases either. 
Before moving on to the second example, I want to draw three 
points from the consideration of purely domestic conflicts. First, 
there are · potential conflicts even where the law is all from one 
state. These conflicts are not considered to raise a choice-of-law 
issue because they are resolved by rules. And they go away fairly 
quickly - they do not persist as troubling questions. Again, this is 
193. It is more accurate because, among other things, it makes clear that a court might 
enforce rights created by more than one state, rather than determining that one state's law 
"applies" to the entire case. Because conflicts theory historically tried to determine which 
law governs, this possibility appears anomalous and receives the appropriately exotic name of 
"depec;age." See, e.g., ScoLES & HAY, supra note 7, at 38. More significantly, thinking in 
terms of conflicts focuses attention on the conflicts rule that determines which right prevails. 
Interest analysis relies on the choice-of-law vocabulary precisely to deflect attention from its 
conflicts rules. 
194. For a description of this situation we might turn again to Beale, who in the conflict 
between law and equity had to confront a situation in which - much as the current situation 
under interest analysis - two courts disagreed about which right prevailed. 
[In .common law jurisdictions] the theory upon which courts proceed is the theory of 
separate and independent systems of right. The court of law regards the equitable right 
as subordinate to the legal right, while the court of equity takes the opposite view . • . .  It 
is clear, however, that there cannot be two separate and distinct laws prevailing in the 
same place at the same time; and therefore in fact, whatever may be the theory of the 
courts, one of the conflicting rights must be valid and the other invalid. 
1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 4.8, at 41. I do not quote this passage for the correctness of its 
conclusion. In a conflict between rights of co-equal sovereigns such as sister states, I see no 
reason why there should be what philosophers call a "fact of the matter" about which right 
"really" prevails. The Constitution does not resolve conflicts of its own force, and, absent 
federal legislation, there is no other superior authority to make the decision. The point is 
rather that Beale correctly sees not a choice between laws but a conflict between rights re­
quiring the subordination of one to the other. 
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because they are resolved by rules. The extent to which statutes 
can retroactively alter common law rights might once have been a 
difficult question - it was litigated195 - but the rules are now es­
tablished, and they govern. 
Second, the conflicts rules for purely domestic cases are well 
established: statutes beat common law, and recent statutes beat 
earlier ones. Courts follow these rules as legal principles. They do 
not suggest that a choice must be made, whereby different results 
would be equally legitimate. 
Finally, this analysis suggests that resolving a conflict between 
two laws does not amount to a determination that one law governs 
the transaction to the exclusion of the other. If the state officer 
defense applies, it may bar or limit recovery; this does not mean, 
however, that the tort cause of action is somehow excluded, that it 
is part of a body of law that does not apply. This observation but­
tresses my claim that a conflicts case does not require a court to 
identify the law that governs. The question is which right prevails. 
Of course, where both contending rights originate from the same 
sovereign, it is not clear what it would mean for one body of state 
law to apply to the exclusion of the other. This point will be made 
somewhat more strongly by the next section. 
B. The Easy Conflict: State Law vs. Federal Law 
Conflicts between state and federal law are easy: federal law 
wins.196 They are so easy that conflicts scholars tend to them give 
little attention,197 presumably because they pose no choice-of-law 
question.198 My argument, however, is that no case presents a 
195. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) (rejecting the idea of vested rights 
in common law rules); see also Landgraf v. U.S.!. Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 271 n.25 (1994) 
(collecting cases discussing retroactive alteration of property and contract rights). 
196. That federal law defeats contradictory state law follows directly from the Supremacy 
Clause of Article VI, which provides that the Constitution and federal laws "shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land . . .  any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CoNST. art. VI. 
197. By "state-federal conflicts" I mean preemption of state law by federal law. Neither 
Brilmayer's treatise nor the Scoles and Hay hombook discusses preemption as a choice-of­
law issue - presumably for the reason that there is no choice. They do discuss state attempts 
to withdraw jurisdiction for federal causes of action, which I see as a somewhat more refined 
attempt to subordinate federal rights. 
198. It might of course be suggested that there is no issue of choice because federal law is 
literally local law everywhere. See, e.g., Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876). Beale 
took this tack: 
There cannot be two independent laws within a territory, even though that territory be 
subject to the legislative jurisdiction of two independent sovereigns. The law of the terri­
tory, resulting from the legislative action of both sovereigns, is a single law. The law of a 
single legal unit must be one law, the one and undivided law of that territory. 
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"choice of law," and for this reason I think that state-federal con­
flicts are importantly illuminating. Federal law wins, and the con­
flict cannot be denied - it cannot be hidden behind the choice-of­
law veil. Consequently, as with domestic conflicts, we gain the op­
portunity to see what is really going on. 
There are two different types of federal-state conflicts, depend­
ing on whether it is the plaintiff or the defendant who appeals to 
federal law. Where it is the defendant, analysis rather obviously 
follows the conventional legal model that I set out above.199 The 
court must determine whether the laws invoked grant rights to the 
parties invoking them, whether those rights conflict, and which 
right prevails - all ordinary legal questions. CSX Transportation, 
Inc. v. Easterwood2°0 illustrates this model. 
That case featured a wrongful death suit brought by the widow 
of a man killed when a train collided with his truck at a Georgia 
crossing. The widow alleged that the railroad was negligent under 
Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the 
crossing and for operating the train at an excessive speed. The 
complaint stated a claim under Georgia law, or at least, no one sug­
gested that it did not. The Court assumed that Georgia law had 
standards governing the duties of railroads with respect to train 
speeds and the safety of grade crossings, and that the plaintiff had 
alleged a violation of those standards.201 Rather than challenge the 
sufficiency of the complaint under Georgia law, however, the de­
fendant appealed to federal law, arguing that the Federal Railroad 
Safety Act (FRSA) gave it a defense against state law tort claims.202 
The Court started with a scope analysis. Whether federal law 
preempts state law is a question of congressional intent, to be deter­
mined by an examination of the statute's text, structure, and legisla­
tive history - the ordinary tools of statutory construction.203 The 
FRSA preemption clause stated that "laws . . .  relating to railroad 
safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State 
1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 2.4, at 17-18. This seems more like definition than argument, how­
ever, and of course there are obvious senses in which federal law is not local law. Most 
patently, it cannot be changed by the will of the state legislature. Equally significant, succes· 
sive prosecutions under state and federal law are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause 
precisely because the laws emanate from different sovereigns. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 
359 U.S. 121, 121-24 (1959). At any rate, I have already suggested that purely domestic cases 
may present conflicts. 
199. See supra section III.C. 
200. 507 U.S. 658 (1993). 
201. See CSX Transportation, 507 U.S. at 666. 
202. See CSX Transportation, 507 U.S. at 665. 
203. See CSX Transportation, 507 U.S. at 664. 
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may adopt or continue in force any law . . . relating to railroad 
safety until such time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regula­
tion, order, or standard covering the subject matter of such State 
requirement."204 Thus the existence of federal regulation provided 
a defense to any state-law claim on the same subject. As it turned 
out, the Court determined that federal regulation barred the negli­
gence claim based on excessive speed, but not the claim relating to 
the warning devices.2os 
This resolution might seem inconsistent with the suggestion that 
federal law provides a defense against state-created rights, or at 
least the defense might seem to be of an odd type. In the example I 
turned to in section III.C.2, the defendant appealed to New York 
law not as a force that displaced the Oregon tort action but rather 
as the source for the standard of care. The effect of that maneuver, 
if successful, would have been to allow him to argue that he had 
met the applicable standard of care, not that no cause of action 
could be maintained. The federal preemption in CSX Transporta­
tion, by contrast, did not change the question to whether the train 
company had complied with the federal speed limit, but actually 
prevented a state tort suit based on excessive speed regardless of 
how fast the train was going.206 Thus it might seem that federal law 
actually governed the suit. 
That would be a misinterpretation. It is one of the axioms of 
federal jurisdiction that federal law is interstitial,2°7 and the claim 
that federal law "preempts" state law is not fundamentally different 
from the appeal to a defense created by sister-state law. The com­
plete preemption of the excessive speed claim was a consequence of 
the statutory language; federal law frequently works only to alter 
the standard of care and not to prevent the assertion of state tort 
claims.208 Some federal laws are even more permissive, preserving 
all state laws that do not proscribe actions permitted, or require 
204. See CSX Transportation, 501 U.S. at 662 n.2 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 434 (1970)). 
205. See CSX Transportation, 507 U.S. at 673, 676. 
206. This is not entirely true; it might have been possible for the plaintiff to bring a state­
law claim based on failure to comply with a (federal) statutory speed limit. See CSX Trans­
portation, 501 U.S. at 677 (Thomas, J., concurring and dissenting). Her complaint conceded, 
though, that the federal speed limit had not been exceeded. See CSX Transportation, 501 
U.S. at 672. 
207. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL 
CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 521-22 (1996). 
208. For example, the National Highway Safety Act allows states to enforce laws whose 
safety standards are identical to the corresponding federal standard. See 49 U.S.C. 
§ 30103(b)(2) (1994). It also preserves all claims at common law. See Freightliner Corp. v. 
Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 284 (1995). 
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actions forbidden, by federal law.209 This is also the result where 
Congress has not specified the scope of preemption. Without an 
explicit congressional statement, the rules of "implied conflicts pre­
emption" direct that state law is nullified only to the extent that an 
actual conflict exists.210 Moreover, appeals to sister-state law do 
sometimes prevent a particular cause of action from being main­
tained at all. If the cause of action the plaintiff invokes does not 
exist under sister-state law, it may be wiped out just as if it had been 
preempted by federal regulation.211 
This, then, is what happens when the defendant appeals to fed­
eral law: the court must decide whether Congress intended that the 
defense be available. If it did, the defense prevails over the state­
created right. Sometimes this is a relatively easy question: a fed­
eral law explicitly authorizing certain conduct clearly bars the impo­
sition of liability for that conduct under state law.212 Similarly, a 
federal law placing a cap on tort damages would create a right avail­
able to defendants in any state tort suit. The difficult questions are 
ones of preemption, when the extent of preemption will not always 
be obvious. Plaintiffs seeking to circumvent federal defenses can 
thus argue that the preemption is narrow and permits the state law 
cause of action. All of the action in state-federal conflicts takes 
place at the level of scope, because the conflicts rule is clear. 
When the party appealing to federal law is the plaintiff, avoid­
ance seems more difficult. No defendant could suggest that a state­
law defense vitiates a federal cause of action; this would run directly 
counter to the Supremacy Clause. Consequently, a defendant must 
find some way to deny the conflict, to suggest that only state law 
applies to the action. Phrasing the issue as choice of law is one way 
to do so - I have suggested that this is currently done with inter­
state conflicts. But the characterization as a choice, rather than as a 
conflict, will be effective only if a choice-of-law rule points away 
from federal law. This requirement created some problems for de­
fendants. Our canonical state-federal conflicts cases come from the 
territorialist era, and the defendants seeking a territorial choice-of-
209. Title VII expressly preserves state laws that do not conflict. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e(7) (1994); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 101 (1983). 
210. See Myrick, 514 U.S. at 287. For this reason, I think that "preemption" is a some­
what unfortunate term. What happens is simply that federal rights defeat state rights. 
211. In such a case, the law's denial of the cause of action should be seen as granting 
parties a right to engage in the conduct at issue. 
212. See Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 309-11 (1964) {describing availability 
of federal defenses to prosecutions for attempts to obtain service in places of public 
accommodation). 
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law rule selecting state law will have great difficulties: federal sov­
ereignty extends through every state, and acts anywhere in the 
United States thus create rights under applicable federal laws. For­
tunately for such a defendant, the territorial choice-of-law system 
was replete with escape devices that allowed judges to mitigate the 
rigidity created by the last act doctrine. A defendant trying to use 
choice-of-law analysis to privilege state rights over federal rights 
could thus exploit the flexibility of the system to argue for the appli­
cation of state law. 
Appeal to these escape devices by defendants is exactly what we 
see in state-federal conflicts. In Mondou v. New York, New Haven 
& Hartford R.R. Co., 213 the defendant won in state court with the 
claim that the federal statute was contrary to the public policy of 
the state of Connecticut and could not be enforced in its courts.214 
This is, of course, a conventional choice-of-law maneuver. States 
have traditionally declined to permit causes of action based on sis­
ter-state law on the grounds that the causes of action offend their 
public policy.215 
If the choice-of-law perspective were valid - if describing cases 
as involving a choice somehow meant there was no conflict216 -
this approach would have been satisfactory. But the Supreme 
Court was not fooled; it rejected the suggestion that contrary public 
policy could lead to the application of Connecticut law.217 With the 
public policy escape hatch closed, defendants turned to others -
and the Supreme Court shut them as quickly as they opened.218 
Employing a choice-of-law methodology will not allow states effec­
tively to decide that their rights prevail in conflicts with federal 
213. 223 U.S. 1 (1912). 
214. See Mondou, 223 U.S. at 55-56. 
215. See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597 (N.Y. 1936) (rejecting interspousal tort 
claim). Oddly, the invocation of the public policy exception does not seem to correlate with 
the repugnance of the foreign law - the New York Court of Appeals used it to reject the 
Connecticut law of interspousal tort liability but accepted Hitler's Nuremberg laws. See 
Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy 
Exception, 106 YALE LJ. 1965, 1975 {1997); see also Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, 
"Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLUM. L. REv. 969, 980-81 (1956). 
216. See, e.g., CuruuE, supra note 22, at 181-82; ScoLES & HAY, supra note 7, at 2. 
217. See Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57-58. 
218. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 {1947) (rejecting the argument that the federal 
statute was "penal"). Early cases such as Mondou and Testa do, interestingly, stay within the 
choice-of-law paradigm. Mondou holds not that public policy must yield to the Supremacy 
Clause but rather that because federal policy is local policy everywhere, there is no contrary 
local policy. See Mondou, 223 U.S. at 57. Testa similarly relies on the argument that, while 
the federal statute might be penal, it is a local penal statute. See Testa, 330 U.S. at 392-94. 
More recently, the Court has also considered such cases from the conflicts perspective, noting 
that state law must yield to federal rights. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375-81 {1990). 
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rights. This comports with what I have been arguing: "choice of 
law" is a fligh� from conflicts that redescribes, but does not substan­
tively alter, the underlying issue. This is the main lesson I want to 
draw from the consideration of domestic and state-federal conflicts. 
Additionally, these cases show that deciding a particular law 
prevails in a conflict does not mean that law governs the action. 
Consider a federal law that imposes a cap on tort recoveries, pro­
viding every defendant with a resource against state-created rights. 
The result, in a case where the plaintiff wins, will be that the federal 
defense imposes a limit on the permissible recovery: the state law 
right is restricted by the federal defense. This does not mean the 
transaction is governed by federal law, however; federal law gives 
no right to recovery, and if the entire case were really governed by 
federal law, the plaintiff would get nothing. It is not clear why a 
similar approach would not make sense in multistate cases - why it 
should not be the case that nonconflicting rights from both states 
are recognized.219 Saying that the court's task is to "choose" the 
law that "applies" obscures this possibility; choice-of-law theory ex­
oticizes the ordinary by calling it "depe�age."220 
C. Back to Choice? State Law vs. State Law 
The preceding section has argued that there is nothing analyti­
cally special about multistate cases. Purely domestic cases, or state­
federal conflicts, may raise the same issues. These latter two types 
of cases, however, are not generally considered to raise choice-of­
law issues. This is so, I suggest, because the results are clear, and 
choice-of-law rhetoric will not change them. Attempts to use 
choice-of-law methodology to reach prohibited conflicts results -
the defeat of federal rights by state rights - have been consistently 
rejected. Choice-of-law rhetoric may have a use, though, if the con­
flicts results appear unacceptable but the appropriate solution is not 
clear: it may mask the illegitimacy. That, I believe, explains its con­
tinuing allure in multistate cases. The correct way of implementing 
constitutional restrictions on state conflicts rules has not yet been 
discerned, and the rhetoric of choice makes the constitutional 
219. In fact, Currie suggested that while a state would apply its "rules of decision" to an 
accident between two domiciliaries, it would determine negligence by looking to the "rules of 
conduct" (such as speed limits) of the place of the accident. See CURRIE, supra note 177, at 
68-69. 
220. The Second Restatement, to its credit, explicitly contemplates depei;age; it advocates 
a choice of law calculus for each issue in a case. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS § 145, cmt. d (1971). 
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problems with the Supreme Court's current laissez-faire approach 
less obvious. 
Describing the Court's failed attempts and uncovering the ap­
propriate methodology is the task of the subsequent Parts of this 
article. The point here is simply that if conflicts results are illegiti­
mate, resort to a choice-of-law description will not save them. That 
is the lesson of state-federal conflicts. Given that premise, interest 
analysis can be rejected if the conflicts perspective reveals that it 
reaches unacceptable results. This section will attempt to show pre­
cisely that. But first I want to make a more ambitious claim: inter­
est analysis is incoherent on its own terms. It simply is not a 
method of determining what law applies to a case. The conflicts 
perspective is not just more useful; it is the only intelligible choice. 
Imagine a married couple with different domiciles. Husband's 
domicile (say, Connecticut) has interspousal tort immunity; Wife's 
domicile (say, New York) does not. Driving in separate cars, they 
collide; both are injured, and both are arguably at fault. Husband 
sues Wife in Connecticut, and she files a counterclaim. According 
to interest analysis, what law applies to this case? 
The result is relatively easy to discern. Connecticut has an inter­
est in affording Husband the protection of interspousal immunity, 
so it will. Connecticut law applies to Wife's counterclaim, and she 
cannot recover. But Connecticut has no interest in affording Wife 
the benefit of that immunity, and it does have an interest in com­
pensating Husband. Husband will recover from Wife, under the 
law of New York.221 
Thus interest analysis directs application of one state's law to 
Husband's claim and another state's law to Wife's counterclaim. (It 
parcels out these results so as to favor its domiciliary, but let us 
ignore that for the moment.) Yet not only are both these claims 
part of the same case, they both arise from the same collision. It is 
untrue that one state's law applies to this case, or even to this acci­
dent; consequently, it is untrue that interest analysis allows courts 
to choose which law to apply.222 
221. This example is analytically similar to the married women's contracts case discussed 
by Currie; I have tinkered with it a bit in order to generate a counterclaim arising from the 
same transaction. For Currie's similar conclusions, see CuruuE, supra note 102, at 90-91 
(finding that a court in a state with married women's disability should apply local law to a 
claim by foreign creditor against domestic married woman but should apply foreign law to a 
claim by domestic creditor against foreign married woman). 
222. The example works with regard to interest analysis, but it should be clear that simi­
lar examples can be generated for any conflicts theory that is not jurisdiction-selecting. 
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It is true, of course, that interest analysis chooses the law that 
applies to a particular claim, but at this point the choice-of-law rhet­
oric is idling. There is really no difference between "choosing" law 
claim-by-claim, and accepting or rejecting the rights undergirding 
each particular claim. Under even modest analytical pressure, the 
choice-of-law perspective seems to collapse into the conflicts 
perspective. 
A modern interest analyst such as Kramer might have an answer 
here. Only one law applies, he might say, and it is forum law; the 
law just does not give the same rights to Wife as it does to Hus­
band.223 That account rescues the claim that interest analysis 
selects a law to apply, but at some cost. Interest analysis not only 
directs that forum law prevail against foreign law, it alters forum 
law to disfavor foreigners. That raises the question of discrimina­
tion, which is the main focus of this section.224 I have said that if 
the conflicts results of interest analysis are unacceptable, the rheto­
ric of choice will not save them. It is time to consider those results. 
Interest analysis is biased in two distinct ways: against foreign 
domiciliaries, and against foreign law. I will use two hypotheticals 
to highlight these different forms of discrimination. For the first, I 
can do no better than an example contrived by Douglas Laycock.225 
Laycock asks us to imagine two acquaintances, Mary from Mary­
land and Del from Delaware. They drive together, taking turns be­
hind the wheel, and each is injured in an accident with the other 
driving. (I will suppose, though Laycock is not explicit on this 
point, that the accidents take place in the same state.) Mary sues 
Del in Delaware, and Del files a counterclaim. Delaware has a stat­
ute preventing guests from suing hosts for injuries in auto accidents, 
and Maryland does not. 
According to interest analysis, Mary's claim will be barred but 
Del's will not. Delaware has an interest in applying its guest statute 
to protect its domiciliary Del, so it will. But it has no interest in 
protecting Mary, and it does have an interest in compensating Del, 
so the guest statute will not prevent Del's suit. 
What does this mean from the conflicts perspective? Dela­
ware's guest statute grants drivers of automobiles rights against 
their guests: it grants them the right not to be held liable for their 
guests' injuries. This right is not given to everyone driving in Dela-
223. Cf. Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1054-55. 
224. In fact, Kramer finds that selectively granting rights to forum domiciliaries but not 
others will sometimes violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause. See id. at 1065-74. 
225. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 276. 
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ware, however - according to the interest analyst's scope-based 
approach, the right is not extended to out-of-staters at all. Del can 
assert it, but Mary cannot. Local law gives rights to locals but not 
to out-of-staters, simply because they are from out of state. This is 
discrimination against foreign domiciliaries. 
What of the discrimination against foreign law? Suppose that 
Al, from Alabama, is driving near his house when he collides with 
Georgia resident George. Al sues George in Alabama. Suppose 
further that Georgia has a damages cap limiting recovery to 
$50,000, while Alabama has a more generous $75,000 cap. Under 
interest analysis, the court will apply Alabama law and reject the 
Georgia damages cap. Now suppose that Lou, from Louisiana, has 
a similar run-in with Al, this time in Louisiana, which has no dam­
ages cap. Lou sues Al in Alabama. Under interest analysis, the 
court will again apply Alabama law, giving Al the benefit of the 
damages cap. 
What has happened here? Conflicts analysis works, in theory, 
by examining the contacts that an action has with different jurisdic­
tions. Standard factors for car accident cases, according to Currie, 
are the location of the accident, the domicile of the parties, and the 
location of the forum.226 Leave aside for the moment the location 
of the forum. Al v. George, from the perspective of the Alabama 
court, has the following arrangement of contacts: local plaintiff, 
foreign defendant, local accident. The result is that local rights pre­
vail. Lou v. Al has the opposite arrangement of contacts: foreign 
plaintiff, local defendant, foreign accident. The two suits are what I 
will call "mirror-image" cases. If there is any reason, based on 
these three contacts, why local rights as to the available damages 
should prevail in the Al v. George suit, it can be mustered in favor 
of the corresponding foreign rights in Lou v. Al. If the conflicts 
rule is neutral between local and foreign rights, each should prevail 
in one case.227 But of course under interest analysis, foreign rights 
prevail in neither. The location of the forum is dispositive; the fo­
rum applies local law because it is local law. Foreign rights are dis-
226. See CuRruE, supra note 76, at 141. 
227. A common law judge evaluating precedents with no knowledge of interest analysis 
might well think that a decision in favor of local rights in Al v. George compelled a decision 
favoring foreign rights in Lou v. AL If there is such a thing as the nature of law, it might be 
encapsulated in Cardozo's adage: "It will not do to decide the same question one way be­
tween one set of litigants and the opposite way between another . . . .  If a case was decided 
against me yesterday when I was defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am 
plaintiff." BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 33-34 (1921). 
From the classic common law perspective, interest analysis hardly appears a legal theory at 
all. 
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favored in true conflicts not because of some arrangement of 
contacts that can be applied in mirror-image cases, but simply be­
cause they are foreign. Without the principle of rejecting foreign 
rights because of their origin, interest analysis is flatly incoherent; 
the rules it prescribes are self-contradictory. 
Currie suggested that in true conflicts, "[a] court need never 
hold the interest of the foreign state inferior; it can simply apply its 
own law as such."228 This may be true from the choice-of-law per­
spective: the court has not attempted to weigh interests, and so, a 
fortiori, it has not found the foreign interest inferior. But what the 
mirror-image Al v. George and Lou v. Al cases show, from the con­
flicts perspective, is that the court has indeed held foreign interests 
inferior - not in the sense that it has found the foreign state to be 
less interested, but in the sense that it has taken foreign interests 
less seriously than Alabama interests. If Alabama can make an ar­
gument that Alabama rights should prevail in Al v. George for any 
reason other than that they are local rights, Louisiana can make the 
same argument for Louisiana rights in Lou v. Al. If Alabama is 
deaf to those arguments in Lou v. Al, when it found them convinc­
ing in Al v. George, it has not given rights created by Louisiana law 
the same respect it gives Alabama rights. 
Are these forms of discrimination constitutional? State-federal 
conflicts are so easy because the federal government is superior to 
the states. Interest analysis derives its plausibility from the claim 
that the coequal status of the states makes things different. No 
state can force another to apply its law; hence an interested state 
may always apply its own law to a case in its courts. This makes 
some sense from the choice-of-law perspective, using a personal­
jurisdiction-style approach. But the conflicts perspective shows that 
assertions of legislative jurisdiction involve the rejection of foreign 
rights, and that interest analysis makes these assertions in a discrim­
inatory fashion. 
The basic problem with interest analysis is that it does not direct 
states to treat each other as equals. It prescribes, quite candidly, 
that foreign law should be rejected in conflicts simply because it is 
foreign, that scope analysis should withhold rights from out-of­
staters simply because they are not locals. The coequal status of 
states is not an explanation of this approach - it is an indictment. 
If the principle of state equality has any force at all, it prohibits 
228. CuruuE, supra note 22, at 181-82. 
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interest analysis.229 The next Part argues that even the weakest 
reading of the relevant constitutional provisions leads to this con­
clusion, laying the groundwork for Part VI, which shows the consti­
tutional consequences for conflicts more generally. 
V. CONFLICTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
Two constitutional provisions will have relevance to this discus­
sion: the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Privileges and Im­
munities Clause.230 I will offer here what I think is a very modest 
reading of these Clauses, and then show that even the weak reading 
has quite dramatic consequences for conflicts theory. Before the 
textual exegesis, however, a bit of historical analysis is in order. 
The Supreme Court has done almost nothing with the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause in the conflicts arena,231 so there is no his­
tory in need of recapitulation. There is a long series of Full Faith 
and Credit decisions, and these are worth revisiting. 
A. Introduction 
If the current conceptual approach to conflicts has any virtue, it 
is that it spares the courts from confronting a difficult constitutional 
issue: the extent to which the Constitution requires federal inter­
ference with state prioritization of interests. Deciding what sorts of 
contacts with a state are important enough to justify a claim of leg­
islative jurisdiction is quintessentially a matter of local concern; this 
is a matter of deciding how important are the various state policies 
implicated by different contacts. But these assertions come at the 
expense of sister-state legislative jurisdiction, and that is quintes­
sentially a matter of federal concern. If th� "choice-of-law" ques­
tion is conceived of in terms of interstate recognition of rights -
and I hope to have shown the correctness of that conception - it 
becomes immediately apparent that the ConstitutiQn has obvious 
relevance. The problem is how to accommodate both local and fed­
eral aspects of the issue.232 This is hard, and I think the Supreme 
Court's abandonment of the conflicts field follows from a recogni-
229. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 73; Laycock, supra note 73. 
230. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, §§ 1-2. Additionally, I will make some fleeting references to 
Due Process. The Commerce Clause is also important, but not for present purposes. 
231. See the sparse discussion in ScoLES & HAY, supra note 7, at 104-07. 
232. See Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the 
Constitution, 45 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 28 (1945) ("How to determine when [federal considera­
tions] require the law of the forum to give way to the law of another state seems to me an 
unsettled question . . . .  The ultimate answer, it seems to me, will have to be based on consid­
erations of state relations to each other and to the federal system."). 
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tion of the difficulty and a choice to err on the side of federalism 
rather than nationalism. 
Many scholars have suggested that the Constitution has a good 
deal to say about conflicts of law.233 This is hardly surprising. The 
great aim of the Constitution is to knit the discrete sovereignties of 
the states into a federal union, and this purpose obviously requires 
rules governing the treatment of the laws, and the citizens, of sister 
states. If the states related to each other as foreign sovereigns, 
these would be political questions, to be answered perhaps by trea­
ties, perhaps by principles of comity. But states do not relate to 
each other in that way.234 They cannot make treaties among them­
selves.235 Questions that were political have been made legal -
which is to say, constitutional. As Laycock puts it, "How Texas 
courts treat the law of a sister state is a matter of law, not comity, 
and the choice is no longer voluntary. For this purpose Texas is not 
a sovereign state; it surrendered this portion of its sovereignty when 
it joined the Union."236 
What is surprising, then, is not the suggestion that the 
Constitution should supervise state conflicts rules but rather the ex­
tent to which the Supreme Court has ignored the suggestion. 
Closer analysis reveals an explanation, though: changed under­
standings of conflicts have created serious federalism challenges to 
constitutional supervision, and the current Court is receptive to fed­
eralism concems.237 The Court did try to develop a doctrine of con­
stitutional conflicts law, at least under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause; its early conflicts cases suggested that the vested rights the­
ory had constitutional force.238 This made sense, from Beale's per­
spective - laws, being territorial, did not conflict. The only 
233. Most notably Douglas Laycock, see Laycock, supra note 73, on whose historical ar­
guments this section relies quite heavily. See also Ely, supra note 73; Jackson, supra note 232; 
Katzenbach, supra note 11; James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry About Full Faith and 
Credit to Laws, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1299 (1987). 
234. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (stating that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause "altered the status of the several states as independent foreign 
sovereignties, each free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established 
by the judicial proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation"). 
235. See U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 10. 
236. Laycock, supra note 73, at 259; see also Jackson, supra note 232, at 30. 
237. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-22 (1997); Sun Oil Co. v. 
Wortman 486 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1988) ("If we abandon the currently applied, traditional no­
tions of [legitimate state legislative jurisdiction] we would embark upon the enterprise of 
constitutionalizing choice-of-law rules, with no compass to guide us beyond our own percep­
tions of what seems desirable."). 
238. See, e.g., Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 587-90 (1897); Chicago & Alton R.R. v. 
Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1877); Green v. Van Buskirk, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 307, 313-
14 (1866); see also Pielemeier, supra note 233, at 1303-04. 
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question was whether foreign rights would be recognized, and Full 
Faith and Credit prescribed that they would. The erosion of the 
territorial conception revealed the possibility of conflict between 
laws, however, and the Court accordingly began to discuss conflicts 
in terms of evaluating the competing interests of the states.239 Ap­
plication of Full Faith and Credit became more difficult, but the 
· Court still supposed that the Clause resolved conflicts in favor of 
the state with superior interests.240 
But to tell a state that its interests are inferior is a serious in­
fringement on its power to determine the relative importance of 
particular policies. Surely it is for each state to decide which inter­
ests are more important to it. The federal judiciary would under­
standably hesitate before entering so deeply into the internal 
workings of state government, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
gives no guidance as to what makes an interest superior.241 Conse­
quently, the Court quite swiftly abandoned the idea that Full Faith 
and Credit determined unique solutions and fell back to a safe dis­
tance from which to oversee state conflicts rules: a baseline test for 
legitimate application of forum law. 
[T]he full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substi­
tute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the 
conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of con­
trolling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to 
the same persons and events.242 
That at least hewed to a territorial line, invoking the state's in­
terest in regulating "persons and events within it." But territorial­
ism was on the wane, and the Court soon retreated farther, rul_ing 
239. See, e.g., Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532, 547-58 
(1935). 
240. See Alaska Packers, 294 U.S. at 547-58. I think that at this point the Court was not 
far wrong. The Alaska Packers Court seemed to suppose that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause contained the "rational" rules determining which state's interest was superior. That 
was a mistake; the setting of priorities is indeed a matter for the states. But this does not 
mean that the Clause has nothing to say. It requires that a state base its assertion of legisla­
tive jurisdiction on a claim that its interests are superior; this is the only way to afford foreign 
law the appropriate respect while still determining that local rights prevail. It further re­
quires that the interests not be superior merely because another state's interests are weighed 
less heavily. See infra section VI.B.1. 
241. Justice Jackson noted, "Nowhere has the Court attempted, although faith and credit 
opinions have been written by some of its boldest-thinking and clearest-speaking Justices, to 
define standards by which 'superior state interests' in the subject matter of conflicting stat­
utes are to be weighed." Jackson, supra note 232, at 16. The reluctance to impose particular 
substantive standards, I will suggest, was entirely correct Full Faith and Credit does not set 
out standards by which a court may determine which state's interest is greater; it simply 
demands that states respect each other's laws. What I try to show here is how the principle of 
respect for sister-state law translates into restrictions on state conflicts rules. 
242. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). 
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that Full Faith and Credit did not require displacement of the fo­
rum state's law if the state had a "substantial connection" to the 
action.243 The retreat has by now become a rout. In Allstate Insur­
ance Co. v. Hague,244 the Court announced that the only restriction 
the Constitution placed on state conflicts rules was the requirement 
that the choice of law be "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally un­
fair."245 Hague was a Wisconsin domiciliary who died when the 
motorcycle on which he was a passenger was struck by a car. The 
accident occurred in Wisconsin, and the drivers of both vehicles 
were Wisconsin domiciliaries. Neither driver carried valid insur­
ance, but Hague held an insurance policy, issued in Wisconsin, that 
offered up to $15,000 for loss incurred in accidents with uninsured 
motorists. He owned three cars, and the policy covered each. Wis­
consin law would have limited his recovery to $15,000; Minnesota 
law, however, allowed the coverage on each car to be "stacked," 
raising the limit to $45,000. Hague's widow moved to Minnesota 
after the accident (for what the Court called "bona fide" reasons246) 
and brought suit there seeking the more favorable terms of Minne­
sota law, which the Minnesota courts gave her. The Supreme Court 
stated that "if a State has only an insignificant contact with the par­
ties and the occurrence or transaction, application of its law is un­
constitutional."247 It nonetheless affirmed, finding that the widow's 
new domicile, and the fact that the decedent had worked in Minne­
sota (and commuted to work there), created an interest sufficient to 
justify application of Minnesota law.24s 
The "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" language . of 
Allstate is the language of due process, and as a construction of the 
Due Process Clause, it makes perfect sense. But the Due Process 
Clause is about the rights of individuals, and conflicts cases raise 
other issues. Parties may resist application of a particular law on 
the grounds that it is unfair, but more often their argument is that 
they may not be subjected to the liabilities of one law because an­
other law operates to shield them. This is no longer simply a ques­
tion of individual rights or due process, but one of the respect due 
243. See Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 476 (1947). 
244. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
245. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 320. 
246. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 319 n.28. 
247. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 310-11. 
248. Allstate requires that a state have "a significant contact or significant aggregation of 
contacts." Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313. This does mean something; the Court has ruled that a 
state may not apply its law to suits to which it has no connection. See Phillips Petroleum Co. 
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985). 
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to sister-state law; that is, it is a question of Full Faith and Credit. 
Yet Allstate holds that the answer is always the same.249 
It is disappointing - though, I have suggested, not incompre­
hensible - that the Court has merged the limitations imposed by 
Due Process and those of Full Faith and Credit, because the two 
Clauses could not be more different. Apart from the fact that Due 
Process governs relations between states and individuals, while Full 
Faith and Credit governs interstate relations, there is an important 
conceptual difference. Due process analysis sets a minimum thresh­
old; beyond that threshold, there are no restrictions. Consequently, 
a due process analysis often leads to the conclusion that a number 
of different states' laws may apply. (This is, of course, the personal­
jurisdiction-style analysis whose presence in the conflicts realm I 
have been deploring.) Full Faith and Credit, by contrast, demands 
that each state accord the greatest degree of respect - fell faith 
and credit - to the laws of sister states. This may be a baseline 
requirement in some sense, but the baseline is set as high as it possi­
bly could be.250 To suppose that such a forceful command results in 
the same threshold test as Due Process - in particular, the tooth­
less Allstate test - is to suppose that the Constitution cares very 
little about the resolution of conflicts between laws. 
That supposition is of course false. Discrimination in choice of 
law can easily become discrimination against foreigners - this is 
precisely what Currie's interest analysis shows - and discrimina­
tion against sister-state citizens is one of the most obvious threats to 
the Union. The Framers were quite clearly aware of this. For evi­
dence we need look no further than the Federalist Papers, where 
Alexander Hamilton invoked the "horrid picture of the dissensions 
and private wars" that wracked Germany before the creation of an 
impartial court to decide questions between members of different 
249. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308 n.10. This portion of the opinion was only a plurality, 
see 449 U.S. at 320-22 (Stevens, J., concurring) {distinguishing between the clauses), but the 
Court has shown no subsequent inclination to distinguish between Full Faith and Credit and 
Due Process analyses. 
250. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 296. Laycock is essentially correct to suggest that 
since "full faith and credit" is what state courts give their own laws, the Clause demands 
equality of treatment. See 3 JosEPH STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 1304 {1833) (stating that the Framers' intent was to give foreign laws "full 
faith and credit . . .  so that they cannot be denied, any more than in the state, where they 
originated"). 
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sovereignties.251 Indeed the Constitution is replete with provisions 
intended to restrain geographical favoritism.252 
Although the most textually obvious candidate is the Privileges 
and Imm.unities Clause, which Hamilton "esteemed the basis of the 
Union,"253 Full Faith and Credit is no insignificant part of this de­
sign. The Framers most likely supposed that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause prescribed unique answers to choice-of-law ques­
tions, regardless of the forum in which suit was brought, and thus it 
was not the source of a personal-jurisdiction-style analysis, which 
produces several acceptable, nonunique answers. They thought this 
not because they had a stronger reading of Full Faith and Credit 
than we do now, but because they drafted it against the backdrop of 
a particular understanding of conflicts of law.254 
While the precise contours of this understanding are probably 
impossible to recover, and different Framers quite likely had differ­
ent understandings,255 they seem to have shared some variant of the 
classic territorially oriented theory.256 Story's authoritative treatise, 
first published in 1834, comments in its "Introductory Remarks" 
that "[i]t is plain that the laws of one country can have no intrinsic 
force, propria vigore, except within the territorial limits and juris-
251. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 477 {Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
252. The Full Faith and Credit and Privileges and Immunities Clauses are the obvious 
examples. Federal diversity jurisdiction is also targeted at interstate discrimination. See, e.g., 
id.; Baxter, supra note 92; Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 
HARv. L. REv. 483 {1928); Laycock, supra note 73, at 278-83; Pielemeier, supra note 233, at 
1316-22. 
253. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 251, at 478; see also Paul v. Vrrginia, 75 U.S. {8 Wall.) 
168, 180 (1868) ("[N]o provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the 
citizens of the United States one people as this."). Why the Supreme Court's fairly robust 
Privileges and !=unities Clause jurisprudence, see, e.g., Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 {1985); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975), has exerted so 
little influence on its conflicts jurisprudence is a mystery. In Allstate, for example, a Privi­
leges and Immunities argument could have been made that Minnesota courts would surely 
not have decided the case the same way if the widow had been a Wisconsin domiciliary, and 
hence the courts were awarding to locals benefits withheld from foreigners. See Ely, supra 
note. 73, at 185-89 (noting tension between Allstate and Austin). It may be that the rhetoric of 
choice obscures things here too, by avoiding talk of the rights on which Privileges and !=u­
nities case law focuses. 
254. See Laycock, supra note 73, at n.276. 
255. See Jackson, supra note 232, at 6. 
256. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 289-90. Future Chief Justice John Marshall appar­
ently gave a quite clear statement of the vested rights contract theory in the Virginia ratifying 
convention. See id. at 306-07. In 1797, the Supreme Court had quoted Ulrich Huber's (the 
Court referring to him as Huberus) territorialist maxims. See Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. {3 
Dall.) 369, 370 n.* (1797). It was applying a territorial theory to decide torts cases as early as 
1842, with no suggestion that it was creating a new approach or rejecting an earlier under­
standing. See Smith v. Condry, 42 U.S. {l How.) 28, 33 {1842). 
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diction of that country."257 He repeats the principle as "[t]he first 
and most general maxim" of international jurisprudence.258 Nor 
was Story innovating in this regard; he derived his general theory in 
large part from the Frisian jurist Ulrich Huber, who published in 
the late seventeenth century.259 Story claimed that Huber's territo­
rial principles had "been sanctioned both in England and America 
by a judicial approbation, as direct and universal as can fairly be 
desired for the purpose of giving sanction to it as authority, or as 
reasoning. "260 
Under a territorial approach, as explained above, there is no 
question of laws conflicting. Only the territorially appropriate law 
creates a right. The question, from the Framers' perspective, would 
simply have been whether rights created by the law of one state 
would be recognized by the courts of another. To answer that ques­
tion, one could hardly draft a more emphatic provision than the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause. Rights acquired in one state must be 
respected everywhere, regardless of whether other states disagree 
with the substantive law creating those rights.261 
That, then, is the most plausible original understanding: con­
flicts cases have unique resolutions because the only question is 
whether sister-state rights shall be recognized or rejected, and the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the former. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court's early ventures into conflicts jurisprudence con­
sisted exactly of the constitutionalization of the vested rights the­
ory.262 Things have changed since the Framers' days, however, and 
the changes have weakened some of their devices for national 
unity. Under the Framers' understanding, parties in federal court 
by reason of diversity jurisdiction would have been guaranteed an 
unelected, life-tenured federal judge, presumably less prone to pa­
rochialism than an elected state judge. This guarantee has survived. 
Those parties would also have been guaranteed the general federal 
common law, however, applied by a decisionmaker not bound by 
the decisions of state courts, a decisionmaker who would "never 
257. STORY, supra note 30, 'JI 7, at 8. 
258. Id. 'JI 18, at 21. 
259. See ScoLES & HAY, supra note 7, § 2.2, at 9, § 2.4, at 12. 
260. STORY, supra note 30, 'JI 38, at 36. For a listing of largely territorialist state court 
cases roughly contemporaneous with the drafting of the Constitution, see Laycock, supra 
note 73, at 307 n.340. 
261. See Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1908) (Holmes, J.). The rights that 
vested under the territorially appropriate law were not too dissimilar from the rights created 
by judgments. See 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 8A.10. The significant point here is that there 
were no opposing rights. 
262. See supra note 238. 
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immolate truth, justice, and the law because a State tribunal has 
erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice."263 With the general 
federal common law died one of the antidiscrimination tools of di­
versity jurisdiction.264 
Time has similarly enervated Full Faith and Credit. The Clause 
was not drafted in an era that saw the possibility of interstate con­
flicts of rights. If the question is only whether rights acquired under 
the law of one state shall be respected, when no other rights oppose 
them, the Clause provides a clear affirmative answer; but once 
there is the possibility of conflicting rights, or doubt about which 
law is the law producing the rights, things get harder. What could 
Full Faith and Credit mean in this context? The Supreme Court has 
suggested that a literal reading would mean that in conflicts cases, 
forum law must always yield - that "the statute of each state must 
be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own"26S 
- an obviously absurd result. Consequently, where cases feature 
competing rights, the Court has said essentially that forum law may 
always prevail.266 
Douglas Laycock characterizes this approach as embodying the 
belief that "the phrase cannot be taken literally, and therefore it 
need not be taken seriously at all."267 This is fairly accurate on Lay­
cock's part, and total nonsense on the Court's. Full Faith and 
Credit must be taken seriously, and it can be taken literally. We no 
longer have the backdrop of territorial rules of scope, but Full Faith 
and Credit can do a lot of work without that jurisprudential back­
ground. Demonstrating the power of even a weak reading of the 
Clause requires that I give that reading, and it is time now to begin 
the textual exegesis. 
263. Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206-07 {1863). 
264. See Pielemeier, supra note 233, at 1316-19. On diversity as antidiscrimination, see 
generally Friendly, supra note 252. Litigants might also have gotten federal conflicts rules, a 
hope slain by Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 {1941). I do not 
believe that federal conflicts rules are necessary, provided that we pay attention to constitu­
tional restrictions on state conflicts rules. It is troubling that under Klaxon the federal courts 
act as ventriloquists' dummies, reproducing the very parochialism and bias their diversity 
jurisdiction exists to counter. The Second Circuit's experience with New York law is espe­
cially notable and unfortunate in this regard. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 {2d 
Cir. 1973); Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 {2d Cir. 1962) (en bane). It is the 
substantive bias of state choice-of-law rules that is the real problem, though, and if attention 
to the Constitution will eradicate it, there is no harm in having federal courts follow state 
conflicts law. 
265. Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 294 U.S. 532, 547 {1935). 
266. See infra text accompanying notes 276-80. 
267. Laycock, supra note 73, at 295. 
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B. The Two Clau.ses 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, as discussed above, dictates 
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public 
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State."268 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause provides that "[t]he Citizens 
of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States."269 
These are clearly both nationalizing Clauses, intended to bind 
the several states into a union.270 They are also both clearly antidis­
crimination Clauses. Full Faith and Credit governs discrimination 
against foreign law, Privileges and Immunities discrimination 
against foreign people. To put the point slightly differently, Full 
Faith and Credit determines when parties must be accorded the 
rights granted by foreign law; Privileges and Immunities when they 
must be accorded rights granted by forum law. The Clauses de­
mand equality of treatment, but what is the cash value of this equal­
ity?271 I do not want my argument to rely on dubious or overstrong 
interpretations of the Clauses. The reading I offer is thus a mini­
malist one - the weakest I can come up with. 
My reading is the following. The Full Faith and- Credit Clause 
means that a state may not refuse to recognize rights created by the 
268. U.S. CoNST. art IV, § 1. 
269. U.S. CoNST. art. IV., § 2. 
270. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 n.9 (1951) ("[The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause] 'altered the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each 
free to ignore rights and obligations created under the laws or established by the judicial 
proceedings of the others, by making each an integral part of a single nation."' (quoting 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943))); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 
· 395 (1948) ("The primary purpose of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] . . .  was to help 
fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States."). 
271. Different notions of equality compete in conflicts theory. One directs that people 
acting in the same jurisdiction be treated the same regardless of where they are from (equal­
ity across domicile, power arranged territorially), the other that people from the same state 
be treated the same regardless of where they act (equality across territory, power arranged 
personally). See Mark D. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 lowA L. REv. 893, 
902 (1988). Gergen suggests there is no clear reason to prefer a territorial arrangement of 
state power to a personal one, so that scholars should simply accept "that any approach or 
policy will treat people unequally for reasons that may seem arbitrary to some people," id. at 
902, but admits that those urging a territorial ordering have "a [constitutionally] stronger 
argument," id. at 906. Tue Constitution indeed seems to have a territorial orientation: at 
least, the Privileges and Immunities Clause entirely rejects the idea of ordering power on a 
personal basis. 
Peter Westen has suggested that equality is an "empty" idea that should be eliminated 
from legal discourse. See Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HAR.v. L. REv. 537 
(1982). Westen claims that appeals to equality require some underlying notion of a relevant 
difference, and that equality arguments can be paraphrased as arguments about the relevance 
of the difference. Tue move is reminiscent of the realist attacks on the concept of rights. I 
have doubts about whether the paraphrases do avoid reliance on equality norms, but in any 
case I do not think that legal theory would benefit from eliminating the concept. 
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law of a sister state simply because those rights are foreign. It may 
subordinate foreign rights to its own in some circumstances, but it 
must have a reason for doing so, and the reason may not be merely 
that the foreign rights are foreign.272 Similarly, the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause means that a state may not deny to out-of­
staters rights it accords domiciliaries simply because out-of-staters 
hail from outside its borders. It may selectively withhold rights in 
some circumstances, but it must have a reason, and the reason may 
not be merely that those from whom it withholds the rights are for­
eign. Nor may its conflicts rules provide that rights in the hands of 
locals have greater force than the same rights in the hands of out­
of-staters simply because of their domicile. 
Both of these readings fall comfortably within the current juris­
prudential understanding of the Clauses; both have been explicitly 
voiced by the Supreme Court.273 The next section will show that 
even such minimalist accounts, taken seriously, have profound im­
plications for conflicts. It remains here only to clear up a few 
slightly murky issues about the scope of the Clauses. 
272. Full Faith and Credit targets discrimination in favor of local law, but by its own 
terms prohibits discrimination against any law solely by reason of its origin. Thus 
Massachusetts could not provide, for example, that in conflicts cases it will always apply 
Alaska law, because this would discriminate against other laws purely on the basis of their 
origin. 
273. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 
U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (stating that the Privileges and Immunities Clause bars "discrimination 
against citizens of other States where there is no substantial reason for the discrimination 
beyond the mere fact that they are citizens of other States"). With respect to Full Faith and 
Credit, the antidiscrimination principle appears clearly in cases involving attempts by states 
to close their courts to foreign law. See, e.g., First National Bank of Chicago v. United Air 
Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951); see generally Lea Brilmayer 
& Stefan Underhill, Congressional Obligation to Provide a Forum for Constitutional Claims: 
Discriminatory Jurisdictional Rules and the Conflict of Laws, 69 VA. L. REv. 819, 825-26 
(1983) ("The Supreme Court has consistently held, under the full faith and credit clause, that 
a state must give the same access to its court system for actions based on another state's law 
as it does for similar actions based on its own law."). As discussed in the text, this antidis­
crimination reading is not quite as obvious with respect to rejections of foreign rights based 
on conflicting local law, rather than on jurisdictional limitations. Germs of the reading - or 
a similar one - did make an appearance in Alaska Packers Assn. v. Industrial Accident Com­
mission of California, 294 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1935), where the Court suggested that Full Faith 
and Credit would require recognition of foreign rights whenever a party could show "upon 
some rational basis, that of the conflicting interests involved those of the foreign state are 
superior to those of the forum." The Court quickly retreated from the suggestion that Full 
Faith and Credit contemplated balancing of interests in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. 
Industrial Accident Commission, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), and buried it entirely in Carroll v. 
Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955). I do not suggest that courts should decide which state's interest 
is superior; the task is rather to be sure that states do not claim a greater interest because 
they hold lightly the interests of other states. See infra text accompanying notes 329-31. 
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With respect to Full Faith and Credit, the only question out­
standing from the preceding section is whether the Clause applies 
to sister-state laws as well as judgments. It does, simply· as a matter 
of positive law. The historical evidence suggests fairly clearly that 
this was the original understanding,214 and even were it otherwise, 
the Supreme Court has consistently said so.275 The Court has also 
read the Clause to embody an antidiscrimination norm in cases in­
volving attempts by states to close their courts to foreign law.276 
The lesson of these cases is that states must allow their courts to 
hear actions based on foreign law if they hear similar domestic ac­
tions - they cannot treat foreign actions differently simply because 
they are foreign. The antidiscrimination reading is somewhat less 
obvious when foreign rights are rejected based on conflicting local 
law, rather than on jurisdictional limitations. That is, it seems that 
lesser standards apply to a state's decision to substitute local rights 
for foreign rights. A number of cases, notably Carroll v. Lanza211 
and Nevada v. Hall,278 have held that "the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not require a State to apply another State's law in vio­
lation of its own legitimate public policy."279 Of course, a state may 
not refuse to hear a federal cause of action and instead apply its 
own law; that is the lesson of Mondou and Testa. The Supreme 
Court thus seems to realize that application of forum law subordi­
nates rights asserted under foreign law. The two lines of cases can 
be distinguished by noting that while federal rights may never be 
subordinated to state rights, states may sometimes favor their own 
rights over those created by other states. Hall and Carroll do not 
deny that foreign rights were rejected, but rather suggest that suffi­
cient justification existed.280 Under Hughes and First National 
274. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 290-95. 
275. See, e.g., Carrol� 349 U.S. at 411 ("A statute is a 'public act' within the meaning of 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause."). 
276. See supra note 273. 
277. 349 U.S. 408 (1955). 
278. 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
279. Hal� 440 U.S. at 422; see also Carrol� 349 U.S. at 412-14 (distinguishing between 
denial of jurisdiction to hear suit based on foreign law and decision according to local law). I 
suggest not that Full Faith and Credit requires this, but simply that it requires a reason for 
local rights to defeat foreign rights - and that, having announced this reason, a state must 
consistently follow it, regardless of whose ox is gored. (Thus while any particular conflicts 
decision is likely to be acceptable, certain patterns of decisions will not be.) 
280. Both cases featured injuries occurring in the forum state, and a simple territorial rule 
explains these results quite easily. In fact, the notion of territorial sovereignty is clear in the 
early Full Faith and Credit cases. See, e.g., Pacific Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commn., 
306 U.S. 493, 504-05 (1939) ("Full faith and credit does not here enable one state to legislate 
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Bank, that justification must be something more than that the rights 
are foreign.281 That is all I claim. The antidiscrimination reading is 
thus at least implicit in the cases, even where rejection takes the 
form of "applying local law" instead of rejecting the cause of action. 
The more recent All.state decision suggests that a state may re­
ject foreign rights in favor of its own on the basis of extraordinarily 
slender justifications, which clearly do not embody a consistent pol­
icy.282 Basically this amounts to the principle that one state may 
always reject another's law if it disagrees sufficiently to have en­
acted a different law. That is an absurd reading of Full Faith and 
Credit; if it commands respect for sister-state law merely when the 
states agree, it does nothing at all.283 All.state is in tension with the 
Hughes line of cases, and also with the Court's Privileges and Im­
munities jurisprudence.284 More bluntly, it is wrong.28s Why has 
the antidiscrimination principle of Full Faith and Credit emerged 
strongly with respect to judgments and jurisdictional limitations, 
but remained only implicit with respect to conflicting local law? If 
we take the jurisprudence at face value, the answer seems to be that 
policy disagreements trump Full Faith and Credit; but this is a 
wildly implausible reading, given the Clause's history and aspira­
tions - policy disagreements are obviously one of its chief con­
cems.286 If it were the case that conflicting local law trumped 
another state's law, the Court has never explained why it would not 
for the other or to project its laws across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescrib· 
ing for itself the legal consequences of acts within it."). The absence of similar territorial 
reasoning in Hall (which, oddly enough, quotes the above sentence, see Hall, 440 U.S. at 423-
24) provoked a three-Justice dissent. See Hall, 440 U.S. at 428 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(contrasting majority opinion to territorial reasoning of lower court). 
281. See supra note 273. 
282. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-20 (1981} (upholding application of 
Minnesota law based on decedent's working in Minnesota, widow's after-acquired Minnesota 
domicile, and Allstate's "presence" in Minnesota). 
283. Cf. Kramer, supra note 215. 
284. The tension with Privileges and Immunities arises because it seems unlikely that 
Minnesota would have applied its law to benefit a Wisconsin domiciliary in similar straits. 
Indeed, if the domiciliary status of one party is the only reason a state has for applying its 
law, Due Process will forbid it from extending similar rights to out-of-slaters, as Phillips 
Petroleum holds. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 815-22 (1985). But the 
Court's Privileges and Immunities cases suggest that out-of-slaters may not be denied the 
rights granted locals merely on the basis of their foreign domicile. See supra note 273. 
285. It is wrong because, were the contacts reversed, Minnesota would surely not have 
held that Wisconsin rights prevailed with respect to an accident between Minnesotans occur­
ring in Minnesota, where the plaintiff moved to Wisconsin after the accident. Consequently, 
Minnesota must have rejected the WISconsin rights because they were foreign and thereby 
violated Full Faith and Credit. See infra section VI.B.1. 
286. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 521 (1953} (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
("The whole purpose and the only need for requiring full faith and credit to foreign law is 
that it does differ fr<:>m that of the forum."). 
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equally allow rejection of sister-state judgments. A more realistic 
explanation is that the Court has simply been unable to come up 
with a reading that allows it to handle conflicts between rights.2s1 
The jurisdictional line of cases28s did not raise this issue. When 
a state closes its courts to a foreign cause of action, it is simply re­
jecting a foreign right. It is not (superficially) resolving a conflict in 
favor of a local right, and therefore condemning the door-closing 
practice does not mandate subordination of local rights. Similarly, 
interstate enforcement of judgments poses no question of conflict­
ing rights because our approach to judgments still resembles that of 
Joseph Beale. The law of the state of rendition determines the ef­
fect of a judgment,289 and when a plaintiff sues to enforce a judg­
ment in another state, he is asking simply that rights created by the 
law of the state of rendition be respected. There will seldom be 
even a prima facie right that a defendant can invoke against the 
enforcement of the judgment. 
The situation with rights to recover, rights which have not been 
reduced to judgment, used to be much the same: the plaintiff in­
voked the rights created by the territorially appropriate law, and 
the defendant had available no contrary rights. But with the death 
of vested rights, the picture changed dramatically. Instead of 
Beale's no-conflict world, courts confronted cases in which the 
plaintiff urged a right created by one law while the defendant ap­
pealed to a defense created by another. (Another way of putting 
this is that it became unclear which state's law was the source of the 
plaintiff's rights.290) Where rights conflict, or laws contend for ap­
plication, the meaning of Full Faith and Credit is much less clear, 
and the temptation for courts is to hide behind a personal-jurisdic­
tion-style analysis that suggests the issue is one of choice, rather 
than of conflict. I will later explain how a straightforward applica­
tion to conflicts may fulfil the aims of the Clause.291 What should 
be already clear is that it cannot be ignored. It does require that 
'21!,7. More charitably, the Court's retreat may reflect the realization that constructing a 
hierarchy of interests is the legitimate prerogative of the states. But this does not mean that 
Full Faith and Credit has no role to play. Its goal is to "guard the new political and economic 
union against the disintegrating influence of provincialism in jurisprudence, but without ag­
grandizement of federal power at the expense of the states." Jackson, supra note 232, at 17. 
The question is how to balance the federal and local interests, and leaving everything up to 
the states is not the answer. 
'21!,8. See supra note 273. 
'21!,9. See, e.g., Matsushita Blee. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375-59, 386-87 (1996). 
290. This is the more popular description. As discussed above, see supra section III.C, I 
think it is more useful to talk in terms of conflicting rights. 
291. See infra section VI.B. 
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states give full faith and credit to the laws - both statutory and 
common - of sister states.292 
2. Privileges and Immunities 
Uncertainty also exists with respect to the scope of "privileges 
and immunities." The counterpart to the (foolishly) literal reading 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is the supposition that the Privi­
leges and Immunities Clause requires out-of-staters to be granted 
all the rights of locals, including the right to vote and pay in-state 
tuition for public schools. The Supreme Court, however, has not 
similarly emasculated the Clause in the face of such an absurdly 
expansive reading, but has suggested instead that it applies only to 
"fundamental" rights.293 Some privileges granted to locals - such 
as the elk-hunting license at issue in Baldwin - are not fundamen­
tal. Nor is the Clause absolute in its proscriptions. States may treat 
out-of-staters differently if they have a "substantial" reason that is 
"substantially advanced" by the discriminatory treatment.294 
This restriction, by itself, is not a full explanation. The right to 
vote is surely fundamental, but no court has suggested that it is one 
of the relevant privileges and immunities. I think a satisfactory an­
swer is that the idea of discrete states presupposes the distinction 
between members of the polity and outsiders. If all federal citizens 
could vote in all state elections, we would no longer have politically 
distinct states. This sort of discrimination is required for the Privi­
leges and Immunities Clause to have meaning; it cannot be a viola­
tion of the Clause. Relatedly, Ely suggests that if outsiders could 
vote, they would be able to protect their interests, and there would 
be no need for the Clause.ws 
The more serious question is how privileges and immunities re­
late to conflicts rules. Laycock casts this in terms of "choice-of-law 
rules that prefer local litigants" and avoids the "fundamental 
rights" limitation by noting that equal treatment in court is surely a 
fundamental right.296 This is a tempting argument, but it fails be­
cause it operates at too high a level of generality. All of the dis­
criminations against outsiders that the Supreme Court has 
292. See Jackson, supra note 232, at 12; Laycock, supra note 73, at 290-95. 
293. See Baldwin v. FISh & Grune Commn., 436 U.S. 371, 387-88 (1978). 
294. See Supreme Court of New Hrunpshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985). A mere 
desire to benefit locals does not count as a substantial interest. 
295. See Ely, supra note 73, at 190. 
296. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 265-66. Currie similarly talks about "[t]he right of 
access to courts, generally stated." See CuruuE, supra note 161, at 467 n.70. 
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approved as not implicating fundamental rights do involve the 
question of equal treatment in the courts, and they all involve 
choice-of-law rules that prefer locals. That is, when the out-of­
stater goes to court to get his elk-hunting permit, he is asking for a 
right that local law gives to locals. When the court denies his re­
quest, it is withholding from him rights granted to locals; it is (in a 
sense) refusing to apply local law to his claim. This is the paradig­
matic Privileges and Immunities discrimination, analytically identi­
cal to a determination that out-of-staters have no right to recover 
for in-state batteries. If we are to give meaning to the "fundamen­
tal rights" restriction, we have to go case-by-case. 
There is a sense, however, in which Laycock is right. Earlier I 
distinguished between rules of scope, which determine the extent of 
state-created rights, and conflicts rules, which prescribe which rights 
shall prevail in a conflict. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
(unlike Full Faith and Credit, which applies only to conflicts rules) 
governs both sorts of rules. With respect to rules of scope, it de­
mands that states extend to out-of-staters all the rights that they 
extend to locals - or rather, all fundamental rights, unless there is 
a substantial nondiscriminatory justification. With respect to con­
flicts rules, it demands that out-of-staters asserting rights not be 
treated differently from locals asserting the same rights simply be­
cause they are out-of-staters.297 That is, if the state's conflicts rule 
provides that a local right will prevail in a particular case when as­
serted by a local, that right must prevail when asserted in the same 
case by an out-of-stater, unless there is some nondiscriminatory rea­
son why it should not. Equality of treatment under conflicts rules is 
clearly fundamental, and Laycock is correct to say so. 
If equality with respect to conflicts rules is to be meaningful, 
however, there must be equality with respect to rules of scope. If a 
state can limit the scope of a right to locals, then a nondiscrimina­
tory conflicts rule will do nothing to remedy the discrimination. 
The question then is whether states, by restricting the scope of 
nonfundamental rights, may affect the outcome of the classic con­
flicts cases. It seems unlikely. These cases are usually ones in 
which a local would be able to avoid liability as a defendant, or 
recover damages as a plaintiff, under local law; and for some reason 
297. This is, in a sense, just another way of saying that equal treatment in the courts is a 
fundamental right. I think it is somewhat clearer, though, to distinguish between rules of 
scope and conflicts rules. 
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these rights seem to be regarded as fundamental.298 Perhaps there 
is something about the adversarial nature of civil litigation that ele­
vates the interests involved, such that the rights an individual pos­
sesses against other individuals are more likely to be deemed 
fundamental than his rights to governmental largesse. Or perhaps 
the interests protected against infringement by other individuals are 
typically more important than the interest in a hunting license. 
Neither of these rationales is entirely clear, but I have seen no seri­
ous suggestions that the rights at issue in conflicts cases will fre­
quently not be fundamental for Privileges and Immunities 
purposes. 299 
The minimalist reading I advocate can thus be applied to the 
classic conflicts cases. The Supreme Court, which accepts this read­
ing,3oo seems to think that it has no serious consequences. The next 
section will show, however, that such consequences exist: this read­
ing is in irreconcilable tension with Allstate, with interest analysis, 
and with the personal-jurisdiction-style approach to conflicts more 
generally. 
VI. TOWARD A CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 
OF CONFLICTS 
This Part aims to show that even a weak reading of the Consti­
tution imposes real limits on state conflicts rules and rules of 
scope.301 The method will be to start with Currie's conception of 
governmental interests and then to show how the Constitution 
reconfigures his approach. I start with Currie's vision not because it 
seems accurate, or even plausible, but because it exemplifies the 
excesses the Constitution reins in. Brilmayer is undoubtedly right 
that it is dangerous to impute to legislatures policies they seem ex­
plicitly to disavow. States may refrain from pressing their legisla-
298. See Ely, supra note 73, at 182-83 ("Baldwin or no Baldwin, it is not likely to be 
suggested that [decisions about liability] implicate rights so unimportant that they can be 
dismissed as beyond the coverage of the Privileges and Immunities Clause."). 
299. The right of access to courts is acknowledged as fundamental. See McKnett v. St. 
Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233 {1934). The refusal to grant the benefits of local law 
is not precisely a denial of access, but surely the right of access is meaningless if, having once 
gotten into court, the out-of-stater then faces discrimination as to substantive rights. 
300. See supra note 273. 
301. As mentioned earlier, I think that "choice-of-law rules" are misleadingly named. 
What they actually do is describe when foreign-created rights \vill be respected. The appro­
priate way to invoke a foreign-created right is not to sue under forum law and have the forum 
court decide which law applies to the claim; it is to sue under foreign law. If the forum court 
then decides that local law "applies," it has decided either that the law the plaintiff pleads 
grants him no right (a scope decision) or that the foreign right yields to whatever local de­
fense the defendant invokes (a conflicts decision). 
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tive jurisdiction to the limit; they may also be more solicitous of 
sister-state domiciliaries than classic interest analysis supposes. 
Currie, of course, recognized both of these facts.302 His aim was to 
show what states could do, and what it was appropriate for judges 
to do in the absence of legislative guidance. 
That is also my aim, though my conclusions are quite different. 
The import of this Part is that states cannot do much of what Currie 
thought they could. In particular, the Constitution prevents them 
from following the discriminatory policies of interest analysis. One 
way to express this conclusion would be to say that state policies are 
not discriminatory. Because federal interests are local interests 
everywhere,303 the antidiscrimination policies of the Privileges and 
Immunities and Full Faith and Credit Clauses are the true policies 
of the states, whatever their legislatures may in fact desire.304 
It will be clearer, however, to talk in terms of state interests ac­
cording to the Currie model and to consider the Constitution as an 
external constraint. I will also largely ignore statute-specific rules 
of scope. It is important to ask if a particular right is intended to be 
granted to those in the particular situation of the party before the 
court, but at the level of generality at which this section works, that 
inquiry can be sensibly performed only in terms of state interests. 
One more introductory point remains. The reason I find the 
Constitution so effective in constraining choice-of-law rules is that I 
approach "choice of law" from the perspective of conflicts. That is, 
I see a "choice-of-law" question as a question of which right will 
prevail. State conflicts rules articulate a hierarchy of rights by es­
tablishing factors that determine which right prevails. The 
Constitution limits the acceptable factors. In particular, Full Faith 
and Credit prevents consideration of the fact that a particular right 
is a local one, and Privileges and Immunities similarly prevents the 
fact that a party is (or is not) a forum domiciliary from having 
weight. Beyond these two restrictions, states may construct what 
hierarchies they will. As we shall see, however, the restrictions 
suffice. 
302. See CuRRIE, supra note 22, at 186. 
303. See Mondou v. N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 55-57 (1912). 
304. See John K. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 
656, 665 (1917) ("Surely the Constitution expresses the real and controlling 'policy' of the 
states in this regard."). In a sense, the Constitution thus provides the objective state interests 
whose absence Brilmayer believes dooms Currie's theory. 
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A. Rules of Scope and the Constitution: Tivo Myths 
Currie's analysis is supposed to show that some cases create no 
real problems, that they pose no issue of choice of law - namely, 
false conflicts and unprovided-for cases. In the last analysis, my as­
piration is much the same. Like Currie, I do not think that conflicts 
theory has much to say about true conflicts - situations in which 
both states claim priority for the rights created by their law. As 
long as the rule that prioritizes local rights is constitutionally sound, 
there is no reason why the forum should not apply it. My point is 
rather that this will very seldom happen. I do not mean that there 
will be few cases in which rights conflict - I actually find more 
conflicts than does Currie - but it will be a rare case in which 
states disagree on which right should prevail. Explaining why disa­
greement will be rare requires an analysis of the limitations the 
Constitution places on state conflicts rules, but that is the task of 
the next section. This section seeks to illustrate the application of 
the Constitution to the permissible scope of state laws. The issues 
are distinct: scope questions are about whether a given law creates 
a right or not, conflicts questions are about when one right prevails 
over another. This section will show that what interest analysis 
terms false conflicts and unprovided-for cases are actually true 
conflicts. 305 
1. The Myth of the Unprovided-for Case 
The title of this subsection is the same as the title of an article by 
Larry Kramer.306 It was that article that started me thinking about 
conflicts in the way developed here, and this section unsurprisingly 
shows his influence. My analysis does, however, differ in some im­
portant respects, most notably my understanding of the effect of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
Recall that Currie found an unprovided-for case when 
"[n]either state cares what happens."307 This situation obtains, gen­
erally, when the law of the defendant's domicile permits recovery, 
the law of the plaintiff's domicile bars it, and the tort occurs in the 
nonrecovery (plaintiff's) state.308 In such a case, the plaintiff's state 
305. It is doubtless not obvious how this result will be helpful. The discovery of false 
conflicts is generally considered the great achievement of interest analysis; rejecting this in· 
sight does not seem like an advance. I will argue, however, that an abundance of conflicts is 
not a bad thing. See infra section VI.B. 
306. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81. 
307. CuRRm, supra note 76, at 152. 
308. Lea Brilmayer suggests that only domiciliary factors were generally relevant to 
Currie, see BRILMAYER, supra note 8, § 2.1.2, at 65-66, and hence that an unprovided-for case 
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has no interest in generating a recovery for the plaintiff; its domes­
tic law does not do so. Nor does the defendant's state have an in­
terest in granting recovery for an out-of-stater, against its own 
domiciliary, for a tort that occurred outside its borders. If state in­
terests are thought of as interests in the application of state law, it 
seems that the lack of an interested state creates a troubling lacuna: 
no state wants its law applied. Interest analysis thus seems to sug­
gest that no law applies to the case, and this is a prospect from 
which conventional legal thinking recoils. 
Two basic insights drive Kramer's revisionary approach. First, 
he conceives of interest analysis as simply a method of determining 
when positive law confers rights on the parties.309 That is, he sees 
the detection of interests as a matter of rules of scope.310 The de­
termination of interest must thus be made with respect to each 
claim of right.311 For example, a decision that California tort law 
gives the plaintiff a right to recover does not necessarily mean that 
defenses created by California law should be available to the de­
fendant. To say that California law "applies" in this sense is not to 
say that the transaction is governed by California law. The case is 
not decided as though it were a purely Californian case, as though 
arises whenever the plaintiff's home law bars recovery and the defendant's permits it, see id. 
§ 2.1.2, at 63. This is somewhat of an oversimplification, as she later acknowledges, see id. 
§ 2.1.2, at 67, and only true with respect to Currie's analysis of married women's contracts, 
see CuruuE, supra note 102, at 108. If a tort occurs in the pro-recovery state, Currie found an 
interest: the state "may incur responsibility to the person injured in the state." CuruuE, 
supra note 76, at 148; see also id. at 157 (constructing table of permutations, finding different 
interests based on territorial factors); id. at 149 ("California's interest in the injured plaintiff 
is based solely on the fact that he was injured here, but that has been regarded as a substan­
tial basis."); id. at 150-51 ("[T]he fact that the injury occurred in California suggests -
though it does not necessarily follow - that California may become very deeply con­
cerned."). In his analysis of married women's contracts, the starting point for Brilmayer's 
discussion, Currie in fact found no unprovided-for cases. See CuruuE, supra note 102, at 95 
(evaluating effect of application of law of the place of contracting on state interests, and 
finding an interest in each permutation). 
This results from his rather complex articulation of the interests at stake. It is not unfair 
to say that Currie tended to find interests that produced congenial results. Brilmayer sug­
gests that different, equally plausible interests may be constructed, see BRILMAYER, supra 
note 8, § 2.1.2, at 61-62, and this is quite true. To generalize interest analysis sufficiently that 
it becomes determinate, rather than retaining enough flexibility to produce whatever result 
the judge wishes to reach, it is probably necessary to distort Currie a bit. Tackling Currie on 
his own terms is like having a fistfight with a fog. Attributing to him a focus on domiciliary 
factors is one way to do so. Kramer produces a slightly more charitable generalization, sup­
posing that states generally have interests in regulating conduct either occurring within their 
borders or affecting their domiciliaries. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1065. 
309. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1064. 
310. It may be that at this point my reading of Kramer is too strongly colored by my own 
perspective; in later work he casts the question in terms of which law applies. See supra note 
154 and accompanying text. 
311. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1051-55. This is of course the procedure fol­
lowed in ordinary cases. 
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only California law (and the entirety of California law) determines 
the rights of the parties. This is the same lesson I urged that we 
take from the coexistence of state and federal rights; it is also the 
reason I claim that interest analysis does not in fact select the "ap­
plicable law. "312 
Kramer's second, and related, insight is that a determination 
that no state is interested means that no state's law grants any 
rights.313 The plaintiff loses; he has failed to state a claim on which 
relief may be granted. 
What do these insights mean for "unprovided-for" cases? Such 
cases occur only when the plaintiff's home law does not permit re­
covery in a purely domestic case. There are two ways in which re­
covery might be restricted. First, on the facts of the plaintiff's case, 
the law may create a defense to the cause of action. Kramer be­
lieves that this sort of case is not truly unprovided-for because the 
plaintiff's state has no interest in extending the defense to a non­
domiciliary defendant. Therefore, the result in such cases will be 
that the plaintiff recovers under his home state's law even though 
he could not recover against a codomiciliary. 
Kramer has two examples from this category. Having surely 
taxed the reader's patience already, I will consider only one, a vari­
ant of Grant v. McAuliffe.314 Both Arizona and California have 
wrongful death actions, but Arizona abates its action upon the 
death of the tortfeasor. The unprovided-for case arises when an 
Arizona plaintiff sues the estate of a California tortfeasor for an 
accident that occurred in Arizona. The Arizona defense would or­
dinarily apply, but Arizona has no interest in extending it to a Cali­
fornian. Thus, Kramer finds, the plaintiff can recover under 
Arizona law. 
But this is shockingly discriminatory, and Kramer subsequently 
recants. The Privileges and Immunities Clause, he says, will not al­
low states to decompose their "no recovery" rule into rights and 
defenses and deny the defenses to out-of-staters. If the plaintiff's 
home state does not permit recovery against its own domiciliaries, it 
cannot tinker with its law to disadvantage out-of-staters. So in the 
Grant variant, the plaintiff loses. 
312. See supra section IV.B. One thing Kramer's article thus shows is how far astray the 
notion of choosing an applicable law led Currie. Oddly, Kramer at times seems prone to the 
same mistake. See supra text accompanying note 154. 
313. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1062-63. 
314. 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953). Grant is the occasion for another of Currie's extended 
analyses of possible permutations of contacts. See CuRruE, supra note 76. 
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The second way in which the plaintiff's home law might "not 
permit recovery" is by simply not conferring a right to recover at all 
(rather than creating a right but subordinating it to a defense).315 
Here, Kramer finds, the "unprovided-for" aspect of the case simply 
means that the plaintiff has no right.316 Kramer's example of this 
sort of case is Erwin v. Thomas,317 in which a Washington resident 
was injured by an Oregon resident in Washington. The victim's 
wife sued to recover for loss of consortium, an action recognized by 
Oregon but not by Washington law. Oregon law gives no right be­
cause it is not interested in allowing recovery, and Washington law 
gives no right because it sees no injury. Thus, once again, the plain­
tiff loses. In sum, unprovided-for cases are simply ones in which the 
plaintiff cannot state a claim under his own law. 
All this is dead on, as far as it goes - the law of the plaintiff's 
state will not help him in an unprovided-for case. But what about 
the defendant's home law? The defendant's home law, remember, 
permits recovery. Interest analysis says that it confers no right, be­
cause the defendant's home state has no interest in allowing recov­
ery based solely on the fact that the defendant is a local.318 But 
perhaps Privileges and Immunities has something to say here as 
well, and in fact, Kramer thinks that it does. In his analysis of 
Erwin, he initially concludes that the plaintiff loses: neither state's 
law gives her a right to recover. When Privileges and Immunities 
enters the picture, however, Kramer finds that Oregon cannot jus­
tify withholding the benefits of its law from a nonresident plaintiff 
when it would let an Oregonian recover.319 Consequently, the 
plaintiff can recover under Oregon law - at least, in an Oregon 
court. 
315. Distinguishing between these two classes of cases may be difficult. It is not impossi­
ble, however, and is sometimes easy. If a state does not permit suit for loss of consortium, its 
law clearly confers no right. If it does have a wrongful death action but abates it on the death 
of the tortfeasor, its law confers a right but subordinates it to the defense. (These examples 
are drawn from the facts of Grant and Envin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973), which 
Kramer considers in Myth, supra note 81, at 1048-56 (Grant), 1060-63 (Envin). 
316. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1062-63. 
317. 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973). 
318. The tort, in these examples, takes place in the plaintiff's state. See, e.g., Envin, 506 
P.2d at 495. 
319. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1073. This may not be the correct reading of the 
Clause; it is at least arguable that it applies only to treatment of out-of-staters with respect to 
in-state occurrences. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) ("It was designed to 
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens 
of State B enjoy."). Whether the Clause is triggered when a State A citizen "ventures into 
State B" to litigate an out-of-state �ansaction is not entirely clear. 
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If this is so, why should the result be different in the Grant vari­
ation Kramer considers? Why does Privileges and Immunities not 
likewise compel California to extend the benefit of its law to the 
Arizona plaintiff, entitling him to recover under California law? It 
presumably would were the plaintiff a Californian320 - in that case, 
both parties would be from California and the case would be a 
"false conflict" because Arizona would have no interest.321 Thus 
the withholding of the right to recover under California law does 
not seem significantly different from the discrimination forbidden 
to Oregon. 
Kramer's reasoning here is hard for me to discern. It seems that 
the location of the forum makes the difference. Currie's unpro­
vided-for variant of Grant has the suit occurring in California, but 
Kramer's Privileges and Immunities analysis considers an Arizona 
court.322 He further suggests that courts may deny their own resi­
dents the benefits of sister-state law without violating the Clause. 
Thus while an Oregon court cannot deny a Washingtonian the ben­
efits of Oregon law, a Washington court could. Similarly, an 
Arizona court can deny an Arizonan the benefits of California law. 
This reasoning is not entirely satisfactory. The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause is partly about the permissible actions of state 
courts, but it is also about the permissible content of state laws. It 
means, in particular, that as a matter of positive law, California 
must extend to Arizonans the rights it extends to its own domiciliar­
ies. 323 Thus when the Arizona court refuses to allow the plaintiff to 
rely on California law, it rejects a California right. After we use the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause to reconfigure the scope of the 
state laws, we find that both states are interested, in the sense that 
both attempt to confer rights. 
That leads to the main point of this section. The determination 
that the Erwin plaintiff has stated a claim under Oregon law is just a 
matter of scope analysis. The question remains whether the de-
320. Whether it would or not is the crucial question for Privileges and Immunities, and I 
will consider it in more detail later. See infra part VI.B.1. At this point, we may simply note 
that if it followed the prescriptions of interest analysis, it would. As a matter of historical 
fact, of course, California did apply its law, see Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 949 (Cal. 
1953), but I am considering how interest analysis operates. 
321. The presence of an Arizona interest will not prove essential to my analysis. With a 
law directed to primary conduct, Arizona presumably has an interest in deterring dangerous 
activity within its borders. The abatement of a tort suit upon the death of the tortfeasor has 
only marginal effect on primary conduct, however, so the claim that Arizona has no interest 
in applying that rule to two Californians is at least plausible. 
322. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1073. 
323. Subject, of course, to the qualifications noted above. See supra section V.B.2. 
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fondant has a defense avfillable. Of course he does - Washington 
law recognizes no cause of action, and thus privileges the conduct 
complained of. Washington obviously extends this right to locals 
acting in Washington; following Kramer's analysis, Privileges and 
Immunities requires it to extend equally to Oregonians acting there. 
So while the plaintiff has a claim under Oregon law, recovery is not 
a foregone conclusion - the defendant has a defense under Wash­
ington law. That is as far as rules of scope take us. 
This should be a startling conclusion. It may still be that 
Kramer gets the results right - though eyebrows will raise at the 
suggestion that what should happen in "unprovided-for" cases is 
that the plaintiff should win if and only if he sues in the defendant's 
home court, a result troublingly similar to the overstrong reading of 
Full Faith and Credit. My point here is simply that these cases are 
not easy to resolve, even after Kramer's reworking; the outcome is 
not as clear as his optimistic assertions.324 He is right that they are 
not, in fact, unprovided-for, but he does not go all the way: they are 
actually true conflicts.325 
2. The Myth of the False Conflict 
The preceding section concluded that the Constitution turns 
unprovided-for cases into true conflicts. The conclusion of this sec­
tion, with respect to false conflicts, will be the same. 
Take as a first example the actual facts of Grant v. McAuliffe: a 
collision in Arizona between two California domiciliaries. In this 
case, Currie said, "Arizona had no conceivable interest in the appli­
cation of Arizona law to the case."326 This is true enough, accord­
ing to Currie's construction of interests. But again, the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause will change things. What happens when the 
California defendant (that is, his estate) invokes the Arizona abate­
ment rule? The way to perform this analysis, as intimated above, is 
to ask whether Arizona would assert an interest if the party asking 
for the benefit of her law were a domiciliary. The answer is yes, 
according to Currie's analysis; with a California plaintiff and an Ari­
zona defendant, the case is a true conflict, where both states are 
324. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1047-48. 
325. Perhaps these should be called "reverse true conflicts" since they feature the unu­
sual situation in which each state is asserting an interest in disadvantaging its domiciliary. 
{This is the reason Kramer believes that the plaintiff wins by suing in the defendant's home 
court) 
326. CuruuE, supra note 76, at 161. 
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interested. If Arizona grants this right to its own domiciliaries, 
must it not offer it on equal terms to out-of-staters? 
Kramer suggests not; he argues that in such a case Arizona may 
defer to California's interests by withholding the benefits of Ari­
zona law. Such deference, he claims, will reduce interstate friction, 
and thus better serve the aims of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause.327 But interstate friction is not clearly the sole target of the 
Clause. By its words, after all, it grants rights to individuals, not to 
their states, and the Supreme Court has never suggested that states 
may waive the rights of their citizens to the privileges and immuni­
ties of other states' laws. If the Clause aims to promote national 
unity, conceptually as well as instrumentally, it seems likely that the 
creation of a class of outsiders with fewer rights against each other 
than against local citizens offends the principle of equality of indi­
viduals within states. 
Admittedly, the facts of Grant v. McAuliffe lend themselves to 
the proposition that rights created by the law of the common domi­
cile should have priority, primarily because the law at issue has so 
little effect on primary conduct. The idea that a Californian can 
invoke such an Arizona rule against another Californian is odd; it is 
not clear why Arizona would want to make the law available to 
Californians inter se, nor why the Constitution should require it to. 
And I do not mean to suggest that the Constitution compels the 
application of Arizona law. After all, the California plaintiff can 
surely point to a California law that gives him a right to recover, so 
the result would be at most a true conflict. Arizona may be able 
constitutionally to adopt a conflicts rule deferring to California's 
regulation of its domiciliaries, and if it can do that, it can probably 
also simply withhold rights with such a marginal relation to primary 
conduct. I suspect, though, that the Constitution prevents Arizona 
from declaring as a general matter that Californians, inter se, do not 
have the rights of Arizonans. 
Suppose that instead the law focuses on primary conduct; sup­
pose Arizona has a cause of action that California law lacks - say, 
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. There is something 
plausibly wrong with a legal regime under which a Californian in 
Arizona does not enjoy the protections that Arizonans do, so long 
as the tortfeasor is also a Californian. Finally, suppose that the law 
is a speed limit - clearly directed to primary conduct. In an acci­
dent between two Californians, it seems intolerably odd that one 
327. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1069-70. 
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would not be able to defend against an allegation of negligence with 
the claim that he had complied with the Arizona speed limit, re­
gardless of what California's is. 
These examples do not show that situs rights should always de­
feat those created by the law of the common domicile - it makes 
sense only in some cases - but rather that depe<;age may be most 
sensible. California rights prevail with respect to some issues (such 
as the abatement of the cause of action), and Arizona rights with 
respect to others (such as the applicable speed limit). This is com­
mon in state-federal conflicts, and we have seen no reason why mul­
tistate conflicts should treat it as anomalous. 
The larger point thus is not that all false conflicts are necessarily 
true conflicts, but that some must be. Deference to the policies of 
the state of common domicile may be a sufficient nondiscriminatory 
reason to withhold local rights not affecting primary conduct -
though I think this will be quite a small set. But Currie's concep­
tion of the category of false conflicts goes further, because he be­
lieves that states generally have no interest in granting rights to 
recover, or defenses against liability, to out-of-staters.328 This is the 
discrimination I claim Privileges and Immunities blocks. "False 
conflicts" that are false simply because the situs state has no inter­
est in compensating or defending out-of-staters, where it does have 
such interests with respect to locals, are made true conflicts by the 
Constitution. 
B. Conflicts Rules and the Constitution 
Thus far I have suggested that, taking the Constitution seriously 
and thinking in terms of conflicting rights, unprovided-for cases and 
false conflicts are often true conflicts. This is not an auspicious 
start; it undoes most of the advances of interest analysis. This sec­
tion will take some steps forward by arguing that the prevalence of 
true conflicts is nothing to worry about. Conflicts arise because 
rules of scope tend to be broad enough that more than one state 
will often create rights with respect to a particular transaction. 
Broad rules of scope are not the problem, however; we have seen 
that the Constitution works primarily to enlarge, not to constrict, 
the scope of state-created rights. The problem lies rather in the 
discriminatory manner in which conflicts are resolved. If states are 
328. Generalizing about Currie's approach is difficult, and this characterization may not 
be entirely fair. Currie did, after all, suggest that a state may have an interest in allowing 
recovery to out-of-staters so that they can pay their in-state hospital bills. See CURRIE, supra 
note 76, at 145 n.64. 
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prevented from discriminating, they will usually agree on which 
rights should prevail; where they do not, they act within their au­
thority by resolving conflicts according to their own rules. 
Whatever theory is invoked, courts resolving these conflicts do 
hierarchize rights: they recognize foreign rights or refuse to do so. 
Because these are legal decisions, there must be a legal rationale -
a rule specifying which rights prevail and which must yield, what I 
have called a conflicts rule. The range of permissible conflicts rules 
is not infinite, however; the Constitution imposes constraints. 
1. Conflicts Rules and Law: Full Faith and Credit 
Full Faith and Credit requires that the conflicts rule a state 
adopts not disfavor foreign rights simply because they are foreign. 
Whatever the conflicts rule may be, it may not provide that local 
rights defeat foreign rights simply by reason of their origin. The 
reason must instead be neutral, in that it cannot be conditioned on 
the origin of the rights. (I will describe this as the requirement that 
the state must assert a greater interest in the suit; the characteriza­
tion is useful but not essential.) 
Return to the example of luckless driver Al. Al collides \vith 
George in Alabama and with Lou in Louisiana. In both cases, Al 
prefers Alabama law; Alabama, if it is interested in the financial 
welfare of its domiciliaries, and certainly if it adheres to interest 
analysis, might thus want to draw both cases within its legislative 
jurisdiction. But it cannot. 
Al v. George and Lou v. Al are what I have called mirror-image 
cases, essentially identical (both are car accidents, and the law at 
issue in both cases determines the damages available), with the ex­
ception that the relevant contacts have been switched.329 From the 
perspective of Alabama, Al v. George has a local plaintiff, a foreign 
defendant, and a local accident. Lou v. Al has a foreign plaintiff, a 
local defendant, and a foreign accident. Any reason that can be 
given in favor of Alabama rights in Al v. George can be given for 
Louisiana rights in Lou v. Al, and therefore no conflicts rule that is 
329. See supra text accompanying note 226. I use here the contacts that Currie sets out as 
potentially relevant, though I omit the location of the forum. See CURRIE, supra note 76, at 
141. It should be emphasized that these are not the only contacts a conflicts rule can consider 
- states have the freedom to orient their rules around whatever contacts they desire. De· 
pending on the contacts deemed relevant, Al v. George and Lou v. Al might not be mirror 
images as I have constructed them. For example, it might be relevant whether the parties 
know each other and were traveling to the same destination in separate cars. It should be 
nonetheless clear that mirror-image cases can be constructed, using whatever contacts are 
taken as relevant. 
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neutral in the required sense can provide that Alabama rights pre­
vail in both cases. Alabama can adopt a conflicts rule privileging 
Alabama rights in one case; that amounts to the assertion that its 
interest in that case is greater. But this assertion immediately im­
plies that its interest is inferior in the other case, because the other 
case is a mirror image.330 
Thus Full Faith and Credit will have a real effect on the develop­
ment of state conflicts rules. If states abide by the principle of relin­
quishing the mirror images of cases in which they hold that their 
rights prevail, the system will develop appropriately, either by stat­
ute or by common law. But state compliance need not be willing. 
If Alabama decides that its rights prevail in Al v. George and then 
reaches the same conclusion in Lou v. Al, Lou's Full Faith and 
Credit argument has already been made for him. He can demon­
strate "on some rational basis" (to use the short-lived Alaska Pack­
ers formulation) that Alabama's interest is inferior, for Alabama 
has said as much. Even if no mirror-image cases exist yet, states are 
unlikely to cheat, because an insincere assertion of greater interest 
will come back to haunt them when the mirror-image case arises.331 
This use of Full Faith and Credit does not require the federal 
judiciary to interfere with a state's establishment of priorities.332 If 
Alabama's conflicts rule provides that Alabama rights prevail in Al 
v. George, a federal court directing that Louisiana rights prevail in 
Lou v. Al has not imposed its conception of interests on Alabama 
or even deemed Alabama's interest inferior. It has simply listened 
to Alabama's analysis of what makes an interest superior and taken 
the state at its word. If a state asserts legislative jurisdiction over a 
case and its mirror image, it has violated the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. What's sauce for the goose must be sauce for the gander. 
330. Cf. Jackson, supra note 232, at 25-26 ("'It will not do to decide the same question 
one way between one set of litigants and the opposite way between another . . . .  If a case was 
decided against me yesterday when I was defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today 
if I am plaintiff."') (quoting CARDozo, supra note 227, at 33 (alteration in original) (quoting 
WILLIAM GOLDSMITH Mn.I.ER, THE DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE 335 (1903) (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
331. With this particular example, Alabama would probably opt for a rule privileging its 
rights in Al v. George and subordinating them in Lou v. A� primarily because the accident in 
Al v. George occurred in Alabama. For the same reason, Louisiana's conflicts rules are likely 
to privilege its rights in Lou v. AL A general preference for territorial sovereignty will lead 
to interstate agreement about whose rights should prevail. This is nice, but not essentiaj. 
332. I speak of the federal judiciary because state courts have played a role in creating 
discriminatory conflicts rules. Of course, the constitutional limits I identify bind state courts 
as well. 
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2. Conflicts Rules and Domicile: Privileges and Immunities 
The Privileges and Immunities Clause, I have said, operates at 
two levels. As a restriction on rules of scope, it requires states to 
extend to out-of-staters the same rights they do to locals. As a re­
striction on conflicts rules, it requires states to grant those rights the 
same force. These conditions may seem modest, but they have sub­
stantial effect. 
Return to Laycock's example of hapless friends Mary and Del. 
They are involved in two accidents together; in each accident a dif­
ferent friend is driving. Assume further that the accidents both oc­
cur in the same state and are substantively identical.333 Del sues 
Mary in Delaware, and Mary counterclaims; Delaware has a guest 
statute, and Maryland does not. If Delaware is interested simply in 
helping its domiciliaries, it will want to use the guest statute to bar 
Mary's claim but not Del's. This is precisely what interest analysis 
directs. But it violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
There are two ways in which Delaware can regulate the effect of 
its guest statute: rules of scope, and conflicts rules. Neither offers a 
way to distinguish between the two claims. If the scope of the guest 
statute extends to Del, it must also to Mary, because the only differ­
ence be.tween the two claims is the domicile of the parties. For the 
same reason, if the guest statute in Del's hands defeats the right to 
recover, it must also do so in Mary's hands. 
This example may suggest a linkage between rules of scope and 
conflicts rules, and it bears repeating that they are distinct. Con­
sider again Erwin v. Thomas. An Oregon domiciliary injures a 
Washington husband in Washington, and his spouse sues for loss of 
consortium, an action existing under Oregon law but not (for wives) 
under Washington law. Oregon may not want to grant recovery to 
the Washington plaintiff, and I will show that it need not, contra 
Kramer,334 but it will probably have to employ a conflicts rule to 
achieve this end. 
With regard to rules of scope, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause will probably require Oregon to extend the loss-of­
consortium cause of action to the Washington plaintiff because it 
would likely grant the right to a similarly situated local. If no other 
law interferes, a state will often give its law extraterritorial force for 
333. Laycock does not specify these conditions, see Laycock, supra note 73, at 276, but 
they are essential to my analysis. 
334. See Kramer, Myth, supra note 81, at 1073; see also supra text accompanying note 
319. 
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transactions between two of its domiciliaries.335 Consequently, the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause will require the state to grant 
rights to similarly situated nondomiciliaries. This is how the Clause 
creates the true conflict. But granting the right and prioritizing it 
over a competing right are two different things.336 The defendant 
can appeal to Washington law for a defense - Washington does not 
recognize the cause of action - and to allow this defense to defeat 
the Oregon right, the Oregon court need only apply the conflicts 
rule that in tort cases, rights (and defenses) created by the law of 
the place of the wrong have priority over other rights.337 The Privi­
leges and Immunities Clause, as a restriction on conflicts rules, does 
not bar this rule, for the rule does not disfavor rights because the 
party invoking them is a foreign domiciliary. 
As a last example, let us return to the example of Grant v. 
McAuliffe, a collision between two California domiciliaries occur­
ring in Arizona. Interest analysis identifies this as a false conflict, 
but we have seen that it is actually a true one, in that Arizona can­
not, as a general matter, withhold the benefits of its local law. The 
scope and conflict requirements of the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause imply that, if Arizona provides that its rights will defeat for­
eign rights in a suit over a local tort involving one of its domiciliar­
ies, it must also provide that its rights defeat foreign rights in a 
similar suit where neither party is a domiciliary. Otherwise, its con­
flicts rule favors rights asserted by a local over rights asserted by a 
similarly situated out-of-stater. The result seems to be that, in false 
conflicts, the Constitution requires that out-of-staters be able to in­
voke local law. This makes sense in some circumstances; for exam­
ple, it seems natural that a Californian must be able to defend 
against an allegation of negligence by showing that he complied 
with the rules of the road applicable to Arizonans. 
In comparison, the idea that Arizona must provide that its 
abatement rule controls a suit between two Californians is harder to 
335. Cf. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909) (Holmes, 
J.) (pointing out that national states - i.e., countries - often seek to apply their own law, 
even to acts within other jurisdictions). 
336. Again, conflicts rules are not rules of scope. The Privileges and Immunities Clause 
operates as both a rule of scope and a constraint on permissible conflicts rules. As a rule of 
scope, it requires state laws to extend rights to nondomiciliaries on the same terms as it 
extends them to locals. As a conflicts rule constraint, it prevents states from applying rules 
that honor those rights helpful to local domiciliaries. 
337. For this to work, it must be the case that Washington grants the defendant a right. A 
rational attempt to promote state interests would lead it to do so, since otherwise it loses the 
ability to control transactions taking place within its borders. That is, if it grants no right to 
the Oregon domiciliary, it cannot grant rights to its own domiciliaries in similar cases without 
violating the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 
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swallow; Currie dismisses it as patently absurd.338 The question 
must be whether withholding Arizona law serves a substantial non­
discriminatory interest; if it does, Privileges and Immunities will be 
no bar. Kramer suggests that deference to California constitutes 
such an interest. Although I may not agree as a general matter, the 
interest certainly will be clearer where the rule in question has a 
minimal effect on primary conduct. This approach tallies with my 
intuitions about Grant, but is still not a complete solution, since it 
does not explain why California could adopt a conflicts rule provid­
ing that the California right to recovery prevails over the Arizona 
abatement defense in such a case. The discrimination here - al­
lowing California rights asserted against a California domiciliary to 
prevail only when asserted by another Californian - could possibly 
be justified by similar deference to Arizona. If so, this amounts to 
the conclusion that this conflicts rule, requiring the law of common 
domicile to prevail in common domicile cases, does not violate Priv­
ileges and Immunities - at least where rules with minimal effect on 
primary conduct are at issue. I do not think the issue is free of 
doubt, but the conclusion is certainly possible.339 
The import of Privileges and Immunities is thus the following. 
If a state's rules provide that its rights prevail in a particular case, 
those rights must also prevail when the parties' domiciles are 
switched.340 In many situations, the requirement is more general: 
the same rights must prevail regardless of the parties' domiciles. 
338. See CmuuE, supra note 76, at 160-61. 
339. If Privileges and Immunities did forbid this "deference," the state of common domi­
cile could still regulate. It could attach what legal consequences it wanted to the transaction 
and re-allocate loss or even impose criminal sanctions - subject to the possible restrictions 
of the Commerce Clause, as Akhil Amar pointed out to me. The significance of domicile is 
precisely that a state can legitimately claim to apply its laws to its domiciliaries' actions 
abroad - even if it has to wait until they return home. See Brilmayer, supra note 71, at 1297-
1303. But see Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to 
Trave� and Extraterritorial Regulation in American Federalism, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 451 (1992) 
(arguing that extraterritorial regulation of domiciliaries is unconstitutional). Kreimer's anal­
ysis seems at odds with conflicts law. If a state can constitutionally apply its law to extraterri­
torial actions of foreigners who commit torts against its domiciliaries, it would be surprising if 
it were less able to regulate its domiciliaries. The question is complex; in some cases (per­
haps with regard to gambling) regulation of extraterritorial acts might look too much like 
protectionism to survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. The majority of scholarly opinions 
seems to support state authority over domiciliaries' extraterritorial acts. See, e.g., Gergen, 
supra note 271, at 907 n.94; Donald Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legis­
lation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1865, 1907 (1987); William Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Consti­
tutional Review from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision 
Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE LJ. 1677, 1684 n.27. 
340. Thus the full contact-switching mirror-image test works only to detect Full Faith and 
Credit violations. The test for Privileges and Immunities violations is to switch only domicili­
ary factors and ask if the same rights prevail. If not, there is a violation. Since the Privileges 
and Immunities constraint thus means that switching domiciliary factors cannot change the 
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The typical question here is whether a substantial nondiscrimina­
tory interest exists that might justify different treatment of cases in 
which both parties are domiciliaries of the same foreign state. As 
with Full Faith and Credit, a federal court enforcing this rule does 
not infringe on a state's ability to set priorities, except to the extent 
that it requires neutrality with respect to domicile. It simply accepts 
the state's rule and holds it to its word. 
C. A Final Wrinkle 
The preceding examples should reveal the workings of the 
conflicts-centered understanding, but one thing I have not discussed 
in detail is the conflicts-oriented counterparts to the categories of 
cases that bedeviled Currie's interest analysis: true conflicts and 
unprovided-for cases. Currie's true conflicts occur whenever both 
states grant rights; I have suggested that this category of cases is 
broad but not difficult. In many situations, both states will agree on 
whose rights should prevail. With the model I set out, however, 
cases may also arise in which both states grant rights and each 
state's conflicts rule provides that its rights should prevail. This sit­
uation, a conflict between conflicts rules, is the real "true conflict." 
And with respect to real true conflicts, I think, Currie's analysis is 
sound. If a state has decided sincerely that its interest is greater 
than the interest of the other state, without treating the other state's 
interests any more lightly than its own,341 there is no reason for it 
not to follow its own conflicts rule. The principle that the states are 
coequal sovereigns leads to no other conclusion. 
The situation is slightly more complicated with respect to my 
analogue to the unprovided-for case, where each state's conflicts 
rule provides that its rights should yield. The appropriate resolu­
tion may not be clear. If the other state directs that its rights shall 
yield, can the forum be blamed for ignoring its own law and "defer­
ring"? I think it can. If a state's conflicts rule provides that its 
rights yield, there is no excuse for not applying that rule. In part, 
this is a matter of keeping states honest, ensuring that they do not 
try to game the system and expand their legislative jurisdiction. In 
result, the Full Faith and Credit mirror-image test really comes down to switching the non­
domiciliary factors. 
341. The constitutional restrictions I have identified force each state to do this. A state 
will take the interests of other states just as seriously as its own because to claim priority in 
case A, it must surrender legislative jurisdiction over mirror-image case B. In case B its 
interests are those it has said are the less important in case A. Consequently, discounting 
sister-state interests means discounting local interests in mirror-image cases. The interests of 
other states are effectively the state's own interests. 
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part it is just -a matter of demanding they apply their laws as written 
- the conflicts rule says the rights yield, and yield they must. And 
in part it is a matter of Full Faith and Credit. A conflicts rule pro­
viding that local rights yield unless foreign rights also yield imper­
missibly discriminates against foreign law. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The approach I have developed allows us to draw some general 
conclusions about what conflicts rules will look like. The Privileges 
and Immunities Clause destroys the domiciliary-centered concep­
tion of governmental interests.342 If a state grants rights to its domi­
ciliaries, it must grant them to nondomiciliaries in the same cases. 
Its conflicts rU.les must similarly provide that rights that prevail in 
the hands of domiciliaries will also prevail in the hands of 
nondomiciliaries. The Privileges and Immunities Clause thus pre­
vents the crudely selective exercise of legislative jurisdiction to 
favor domiciliaries. 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause has a similar, though more 
subtle effect. · A state may surely regulate transactions occurring 
within its borders and involving its domiciliaries; that is, it may 
adopt conflicts rules providing that in such cases, local rights pre­
vail. But if it tries to draw within its regulatory field other cases 
involving its domiciliaries, the mirror-image requirements of Full 
Faith and Credit will start to sap its territorial authority. For every 
extraterritorial case it claims, it must yield the mirror image, which 
will necessarily be a case arising within its borders. 
It thus seems likely that territorial factors will play a large role 
in conflicts rules,343 but this does not mean a return to the bad old 
days of Joseph Beale. Beale's system produced arbitrary results not 
because of its territorialist orientation but because of its rigid devo-
"342. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 73, at 180; Laycock, supra note 73, at 251 ("[A] state's 
interests in enriching local citizens . . .  simply should not count."). The significance of a 
domiciliary connection, I think, is not so much that it gives states a reason to extend rights as 
that it gives them a justification for imposing penalties. See Brilmayer, supra note 71, at 
1297-1303. If a state is truly concerned about what its domiciliaries do outside its borders, it 
can probably impose criminal sanctions. See supra note 339. 
343. This should not be surprising; the Framers were working within the Anglo-American 
tradition that saw law as a territorial entity. See supra text accompanying notes 28, 255-60. 
Beale notes the two conflicting traditions of "personal" and "territorial" law and pronounces 
that "[t]he conception of the common law has always been the conception of a territorial 
law." 1 BEALE, supra note 6, § 5.2, at 52. Even today, federal laws are presumptively territo­
rial in their scope. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-59 {1991). 
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tion to the last act doctrine.344 More sophisticated, versions of the 
territorial approach are possible.345 
Nor must territorialism be the whole story. Comparative im­
pairment is a permissible approach, either by itself or as a supple­
ment to territorialist rules; so too is a rule that the law that validates 
a contract prevails.346 There is substantial flexibility, and it is im­
possible to predict what rules states would ultimately select. Shared 
conceptions of interest (for example, territorial sovereignty), how­
ever, would probably lead to substantive convergence, thereby pro­
ducing the beneficial effect of a reduction in forum shopping. The 
constitutional restrictions I have examined essentially require states 
to be consistent in their conflicts rules, and therefore prevent states 
from favoring their own laws and domiciliaries. States may struc­
ture the rules so as to promote their own interests, but only by de­
ciding which factors are most important. This is clearly a decision 
within the legitimate authority of the state - it is a matter of inter­
nal policy.347 Having asserted the importance of these factors, 
though, they must yield control over cases in which those factors 
point to another state. Consequently, states will probably be sin­
cere in their hierarchization of rights: they will lay claim to those 
cases that are most important to them, and cede control of cases 
they believe are more important to other states.348 There is no way 
for a state to extend illegitimately the reach of its laws. The system 
344. See Laycock, supra note 73, at 322. 
345. Laycock suggests a territorial approach that looks to the location of the relationship 
between the parties. See id. at 323-27. This is an interesting idea, although it seems odd that 
if one Californian commits a tort against another in Texas, the parties' rights will differ de­
pending on whether they know each other or not. 
346. The basic constitutional concern of conflicts jurisprudence is discrimination against 
foreign domiciliaries or, as a lesser and probably derivative matter, against foreign law. The 
model I sketch here does not do much to address problems of discrimination in favor of 
plaintiffs generally, which may occur if litigation brings benefits to the forum. A state proba­
bly could then adopt the rule that the law favoring the plaintiff prevails. The constitutional 
concern is that this would lead to privileging pro-plaintiff substantive law, since plaintiffs pick 
where to sue. Similar concerns arise with a preference for the generally adopted rule. 
347. Brilmayer puts it this way: 
Particularly where the Court is assessing state interests, it should not impose an ideal 
definition of interest but only ask whether a reasonable state might think it has an inter­
est under these circumstances. State preferences are likely to differ, in part because of 
difference in value choices and in part because of divergent empirical assumptions. That 
is what state lawmaking is all about. 
BRILMA YER, supra note 8, at 165. I agree with the caveat that the Court should ask whether 
a nondiscriminatory state might think it has a greater interest. 
348. This surrender of cases in which the conflicts calculus points to another state is pre­
cisely what interest analysis refuses to do, and that is why I believe it is unconstitutional. 
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cannot be gamed because states are, in a sense, playing against 
themselves: each assertion of power implies a retraction.349 
The federal judiciary's role in this system would be to oversee 
state conflicts rules and invalidate them when they violate one of 
the constitutional constraints. Federal courts would not dictate the 
substance of conflicts rules or tell states which factors are to be 
deemed more important.350 They would ensure only that when a 
state asserts that a particular arrangement of factors gives it the 
greater interest in a case, it acts consistently and concedes that a 
mirror-image array of factors gives another state a greater interest. 
This could be done simply by surveying other state conflicts deci­
sions. The common mistake of the Court and conflicts scholars has 
been to focus on individual cases, in which results can almost always 
be justified, rather than on patterns of state decisionmaking, which 
may reveal discriminatory conflicts rules. The suggested approach 
allows states to set their own priorities, but then holds them to their 
words. This seems the appropriate role for federal courts imple­
menting antidiscrimination norms: ensuring that when one state re­
jects the claims of another, it does so because it sincerely believes 
that its interest in regulation is greater, not because it counts its 
interests more heavily than those of sister states. 
This approach has applications beyond the field of conflicts of 
law, and is, in fact, almost identical to the approach Guido 
Calabresi and Allison Moore have proffered as an important, 
though neglected, form of judicial review.351 According to this ap­
proach, the defense of fundamental rights is a role appropriately 
given to an independent judiciary, but the identification of such 
rights - rights society deems important, not necessarily rights de-
349. The retraction does not mean that the state's rights will never be enforced. It means 
only that they will yield to sister-state rights, and if there are no opposing rights, there is 
nothing to which to yield. It is for this reason that a state's law may govern interactions 
between its domiciliaries in places with no local law. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909) (Holmes, J.). The difference between the ab­
sence of a right and its subordination explains why broad scopes of rights help in keeping 
states honest. If rights generally had narrow scope, states could try to game the system by 
structuring their conflicts rules so that cases in which their rights yielded tended to be cases in 
which no contrary rights existed. That would give them cheap wins in such cases, since their 
rights would be enforced without the sacrifice of the claim to authority over mirror-image 
cases. 
350. On this point I disagree with Laycock, who believes that "[w]hether sister-state law 
applies is a federal question, and each state is obliged to give the same answer to that federal 
question." See Laycock, supra note 73, at 301. 
351. See Guido Calabresi, The Supreme Court, 1990 Term - Foreword: Antidiscrimina­
tion and Constitutional Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. 
L. REv. 80, 91-103 (1991); Allison Moore, Loving's Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination 
Principles, 34 HAR.v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 163, 173-74, 178-82 (1999). 
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rived from the Constitution - is a task better suited to the demo­
cratically elected legislature.352 
Calabresi's approach is an elegant way of taking advantage of 
these two institutional competencies. He suggests that states be 
permitted to make choices between fundamental values, with courts 
reviewing essentially the sincerity of the choice. To subordinate 
one important value in the name of another is a legitimate demo­
cratic decision; it is illegitimate only when the disfavored value is 
weighed lightly because of who is asserting it.353 To determine this, 
Calabresi suggests, the court must first ascertain whether the bur­
den of a challenged law falls upon a class whose interests the legis­
lature may hold more lightly than their own. If so, the court must 
then examine the way the state resolves other conflicts between the 
competing values, to see if the challenged regulation reflects a hier­
archy of values consistently instantiated in the law. If it does - if 
the value subordinated by the particular law at issue also loses 
when the burden of its defeat falls on the people well represented in 
the legislature - it reflects a permissible choice between values. If 
not, it suggests that discrimination is at work.354 
The parallels should be clear. Sister state laws and domiciliaries 
are always likely candidates for discrimination, for they have no 
electoral voice. Federal courts should thus look to other examples 
of state conflicts decisionmaking to see if the factors asserted to 
make local law prevail in one case succeed when they support for­
eign law or foreign domiciliaries. Constitutional constraints do not 
usurp states' abilities to decide which contacts are most important 
- the danger analogous to judicial determination of which rights 
are fundamental - but they do require that states' claims to au­
thority over particular cases be based on a consistent hierarchy of 
contacts and not on discrimination against foreign law or citizens. 
Preventing this discrimination is all that the Constitution does. 
A domestic conflicts theory may in fact need more, but this is the 
most important thing, and probably the only realistic goal for the­
ory, rather than federal legislation. If states comply with their con­
stitutional obligations, laying claim only to those cases to which 
they sincerely believe they have a superior claim, there is no theo­
retical basis on which to fault them. There may be irresoluble dis­
agreements between states even on this approach, and these are the 
352. See Calabresi, supra note 351, at 91. 
353. See id. at 91-93. 
354. See id. 
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real true conflicts. Federal legislation may resolve them - it may 
set out the substantive rights that always prevail, or it may prescribe 
conflicts rules by which states must abide.355 The conflicts model 
reveals what federal judges should do in the absence of federal 
legislation. 
355. Congress's power to legislate under Article I is of course limited, see City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2162 (1997); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITlJ1lONAL 
LAW § 5-1, at 297 (2d ed. 1988), and it might be hard to displace local tort laws. Congress can 
also legislate pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which permits it to specify con­
filcts rules. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 1; see TRIBE, supra, § 5-2, at 298. 
